VINĪTADEVA'S

Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā

Sanskrit original reconstructed from the extant Tibetan version, with English translation and annotations
by

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PREFACE

The Sanskrit original of Vinītadeva's *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā* is lost. It survives in Tibetan translation and is contained in the *bstan-'gyur* (mDo cxi. 1 : *Tibetan Tripiṭaka,* Tokyo-Kyoto edition, pp. 145-1-1 to 154-4-7). Along with the Tibetan text of the *Nyāyabindu,* it was published in 1907 by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin. In preparing the present Sanskrit reconstruction, I have on the whole followed this printed edition. In a few cases where neither its reading nor that of the *Tibetan Tripiṭaka* has appeared satisfactory, I have suggested and adopted different readings. These, along with the page-numbers of the printed edition, are given in the notes to the Sanskrit text. For the Sanskrit equivalents of the Tibetan logical terms, I have specially depended on S. C. Vidyabhusana's *A Bilingual Index of Nyāyabindu* and E. Obermiller's *Indices Verborum Sanscrit-Tibetan and Tibetan-Sanscrit to the Nyāyabindu,* besides of course the Tibetan-English Dictionaries by S. C. Das and Jaschke.

Not much is known about the personal life of Vinītadeva. Mainly on the basis of the information given by Tāranātha, Vidyabhusana suggests his date as c A.D. 700. Tāranātha himself says that he lived during the period of King Lalitacandra and acted as the *ācārya* of Nālandā (Śrī Nalendra). In the *bstan-'gyur* are attributed to him twelve commentaries, mostly on the works of Dharmakīrti, but no original work. Stcherbatsky says that he followed in his works a method of 'simplicity and literalism'—characteristic of the school of commentators started by Devendrabuddhi, a direct disciple of Dharmakīrti, which 'aimed at exactly rendering the direct meaning of the commented text without losing oneself in its deeper implications'. It is perhaps one of the reasons that makes his work appear to us to be full of verbal repetitions.

In the annotations added to the English translation, I have mentioned the views of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians for a better understanding of Dharmakīrti's position and for indicating the more important points on which Vinītadeva differs from them.

I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Pandit Bisvabandhu Nyayacarya of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, who has been teaching me Indian logic and philosophy since my school-days and to Professor Lama Chimpa of the Visvabharati University, who taught me the Tibetan language.

I am thankful to Professor Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya who was the first to introduce me to the study of Tibetan and suggested the idea of the present work. He also took personal interest in its proper execution.

I thank Sri Ramakrishna Maitra and the staff of the R. D. Press for their kind co-operation in the matter of printing.

June 15, 1971 **Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya**

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Supplementary Notes

ABBREVIATIONS AND WORKS CITED

AGT	*Akalaṅkagranthatraya.* Singhi Series. Ahmedabad-Calcutta 1939.
	A Tibetan-English Dictionary (S. C. Das). Reprint. Calcutta 1960.
BL	*Buddhist Logic* (Th. Stcherbatsky). 2 vols. Reprint. Dover Publications. New York.
Fragments	*Fragments from Diṅnāga* (H. N. Randle). London 1926.
HB	*Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti). Sanskrit text as given in *pariśiṣṭa* of HBT. (See below).
HBT	*Hetubinduṭīkā* (Arcaṭa) with sub-commentary by Durveka Miśra. GOS 113. Baroda 1949.
ILM	*Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics* (Sukhlalji Sanghvi). Calcutta 1961.
	Kāśikā (Vāmana and Jayāditya). Benares 1898.
LS	*Laghīyastrayādisaṃgraha.* Edited by K. B. Niṭabe. Bombay 1915.
MV	*Madhyāntavibhaṅga* (ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya). Translated from the Sanskrit by Th. Stcherbatsky. Reprint. Calcutta 1971.
NBh	*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya.* See under NS.
NBT	*Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara). Benares 1924.
NK	*Nyāyakandalī* (Śrīdhara) with *Praśastapādabhāṣya.* Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya. Varanasi 1963.
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī* (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa). 2 parts. Kashi Sanskrit Series 106. Benares 1936.
NP	*Nyāyapraveśa* (Dignāga ?) with Haribhadrasūri's *Vṛtti* and Pārśvadeva's *Pañjikā* thereon. GOS 38. Baroda 1930.

NPh	*Nyāya Philosophy* (part i). Ed. by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya. Calcutta 1967.

NPV	*Nyāyapraveśavṛtti.* See under NP.

NPVP	*Nyāyapraveśavṛttipañjikā.* See under NP.

NS	*Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti.* Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House. Calcutta 1936.

NV	*Nyāyavārttika.* See under NS.

NVTT	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā.* See under NS.

PBh	*Praśastapādabhāṣya.* See under NK.

PS	*Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga). Chapter on perception only. Edited by Masaaki Hattori. Harvard 1968.

PV	*Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti) with the *Bhāṣya* of Prajñākaragupta. Edited by Rahula Sankrityayana. Patna 1953.

PVBh	*Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya.* See under PV.

PVr	*Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti) with the author's own *Vṛtti* and Karṇakagomin's *ṭīkā* thereon. Ed. by Rahula Sankrityayana. Allahabad 1943.

PVS	*Pramāṇavārttika-svārthānumānapariccheda.* Edited by D. Malvaniya. Benares Hindu University 1959

SD	*Sāhityadarpaṇa* (Viśvanātha Kavirāja). Edited by P. V. Kane. Bombay 1956.

SDS	*Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (Mādhavācārya). Anandasrama edition. Poona 1928.

SK	*Sāṃkhyakārikā* (Īśvarakṛṣṇa) with Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī.* Edited by Pancanana Tarkaratna. Calcutta 1316 (Bengali year).

SM *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (auto-commentary on Viśvanātha's *Bhāṣāpariccheda*). Nirnayasagara edition. Bombay 1933.

TB *Tarkabhāṣā* (Keśava Miśra). Chowkhamba edition. Benares 1952.

Tarkasaṃgraha (Annaṃbhaṭṭa). Edited by Y. V. Athalye. Poona 1963.

Tattvacintāmaṇi (Gaṅgeśa) with *Gādādharī*. Chowkhamba edition. Benares 1913-27.

TK *Tattvakaumudī*. See under SK.

TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita) with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*. 2 vols. GOS 30-31. Baroda 1926.

TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. See under TS.

Upāyahṛdaya (attributed to Nāgārjuna) in *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources* (edited by Giuseppe Tucci). GOS 49. Baroda 1930.

VD *Vaibhāṣikadarśana* (Pt. Anantakumar Tarkatirtha). In Bengali. Calcutta 1955.

Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya (Patañjali). 3 vols. Reprint. Delhi 1967.

Note on the title

The full title of the work is *Nyāyabindu-vistara-ṭīkā*. Its brief title is *Śiṣyahitā*, lit. composed for the benefit of the pupils.

Vinītadeva's

Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā

Reconstructed from Tibetan into Sanskrit, with English translation and annotations

Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya

Ācārya-vinītādeva-kṛtiḥ *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā* nibadhyate. Bhārata-bhāṣāyāṃ *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*. Bhoṭa-bhāṣāyāṃ *Rigs-pa'i-thigs-pa-rgya-cher-'grel-pa* (*Nyāyabindu-vistara-ṭīkā*).

Mañjuśrīkumārabhūtāya namaḥ.

Pratyakṣa-paricchedaḥ

yasya kulaprabhāvena viśuddhanyāyavartmani /
siddhiṃ prāhuḥ parāṃ tasmai pravāce munaye namaḥ //
[atha] nyāyabinduḥ pratipadaṃ vibhajyate.

samyag-jñāna-pūrvikā sarva-puruṣārtha-
siddhir iti tad vyutpādyate. //1//

samyag-jñāna-pūrvikā sarva-puruṣārtha-siddhir iti tad vyutpādyate iti prathama-vākyena asya prakaraṇasya sambandha-prayojana-abhidheyāni tathā prayojanasya prayojanam api upadiśyante. tathāhi sambandha-prayojana-abhidheyānām abhāve prakaraṇa-śāstram idaṃ prekṣāpūrvagāminām anumataṃ na syāt. tataśca kim iha vyākhyeyam iti āśaṃkā-nirāsārtham abhidheyam uktam. phalābhāva-śaṃkā-nirāsārthaṃ prayojanam uktam. upāyābhāva-śaṃkā-nirāsārthaṃ sambandha uktaḥ. tena śrotrutsāha-vardhanārthaṃ sambandhādikam uktam iti.

tatra tad vyutpādyate iti anena abhidheyaṃ prayojanaṃ ca sākṣād[1] ukte. sambandhas tu sāmarthyāt pratipādyate. etat ca tatra sāmarthyam—samyag-jñāna-pratipādanārthaṃ prakaraṇārambhād arthāt prakaraṇam upāya eva iti darśitam. anyathā yadi upāyo na syāt kimartham ārabhyeta ?

1. p. 32.2 : Stcherbatsky (*BL* ii, p. 2, n 4) suggests the reading *mnon-du* instead of *snon-du*. However, *snon-du* also means *sākṣāt* and hence seems to be alright. See *A Tibetan-English Dictionary* (S. C. Das), p. 375.3.

tasmāt sambandhaḥ arthāt pratipādyate. atra samyag-jñānam[2] iti etad abhidheyam. samyag-jñāna-vyutpattis tu prayojanam. tat ca vyutpattyātmakaṃ samyag-jñāna-pratipādanam anena kriyate iti prakaraṇam idaṃ tasya arthasya sādhanaṃ bhavati. tena prakaraṇa-prayojanayoḥ sādhya-sādhana[3]-lakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. tathāca etat-prakaraṇa-śravaṇāt samyag-jñāna-svarūpam abhrāntatayā jñāyate. tena prakaraṇaṃ sādhanaṃ samyag-jñāna-parijñānaṃ ca upāya-sādhyam iti sthitiḥ. sa ca sādhya-sādhana-lakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ kārya-kāraṇa-lakṣaṇa eva. tathāca prakaraṇaṃ sādhanaṃ phalaṃ ca sādhyam, prakaraṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ phalaṃ ca kāryam iti. tasmāt samyag-jñāna-parijñāna-hetoḥ etat-prakaraṇārambha iti sthitiḥ.

atha evaṃ sthite api yadi kaścit pṛcchati—kaḥ arthaḥ samyagjñāna-vyutpādanena ? tad eva tāvad niṣprayojanam iti etat kāka-danta-parīkṣākalpam. mā bhūd upadeśaḥ. kimarthaḥ ayaṃ śrama iti. tasmād āha—samyag-jñāna-pūrvikā sarva-puruṣārtha-siddhir iti. tena prayojanasya prayojanam uktam. tatra ayaṃ vākyārthaḥ—yasmāt sarva-puruṣārtha-siddhau samyag-jñānam āvaśyakaṃ tasmād anubaddhaṃ [puruṣārtha-siddhyā]. tacca vyutpādyam. taddhi vyutpādanaṃ prakaraṇād bhavati. tena āvaśyaka-samyag-jñāna-vyutpatti-hetoḥ prakaraṇam idam āravdham iti.

eṣa samāsārthaḥ. avayavārthaḥ tu samyag-jñāna-pūrvikā iti atra avisamvādakaṃ jñānaṃ samyag-jñānam. artha-kriyāyāṃ yad avisamvādakaṃ tad abhrāntam. tad eva ca samyag-jñānam.[4] anyathā prakaraṇena yogācāranaya-nirāsaḥ syāt. iṣṭaḥ ca prakaraṇārambhaḥ sautrāntika-yogācārobhaya-nayānudhāvanārtham. tasmād ubhaya-naya-saṃgrahād avisamvādakaṃ jñānam eva samyag-jñānam iti bodhyam. samyag-jñānaṃ pūrvaṃ yasyāḥ sā samyag-jñāna-pūrvikā. pūrva-śabdaḥ ayaṃ kāraṇaparaḥ. yasmāt kāraṇaṃ pūrvaṃ kāryasya

2. p. 32.7 : read *yaṅ-dag-pa'i-śes-pa* (=*samyag-jñāna*) instead of *yaṅ-dag-pa'i-śes-pa-bstan-to* (=*samyag-jñāna-kathana*) which does not make good sense.
3. p. 32.12 : read *thabs-kyis* . . . instead of *thabs-daṅ-thabs-kyis* . . .
4. p. 33.19 : read *yin-no* instead of *ma-yin-no.*

tasmāt tat pūrvam iti ucyate. samyag-jñāna-kāraṇikā iti śeṣaḥ.

sarva-puruṣārtha-siddhir iti. puruṣasya arthaḥ puruṣārthaḥ. artha-śabdena prayojanam ucyate. puruṣa-prayojanam iti śeṣaḥ. sarvaḥ ca asau puruṣārthaḥ ca iti sarva-puruṣārthaḥ. sarva iti sannikṛṣṭa-viprakṛṣṭa-lokottara-heya-upādeya-upekṣaṇīyāḥ. tatra samīpadeśavartī sannikṛṣṭaḥ. dūradeśavartī viprakṛṣṭaḥ. laukikaḥ saṃsāra-madhya-paryāpannaḥ. lokottarastu duḥkhātītaḥ. heyaḥ aniṣṭaḥ, ahi-kaṇṭaka-viṣa-śūlādi-lakṣaṇaḥ. upādeya iṣṭaḥ, srak-candana-vasana-aśana-pāna-śayyā-āsana-lakṣaṇaḥ. iṣṭāniṣṭayoḥ yo viparītaḥ sa upekṣaṇīyaḥ. sarvasya etasya puruṣārthasya kāraṇam samyag-jñānam. tathāhi pratyakṣādi-jñānena nirdhārya śūla-viṣa-kaṇṭakādikaṃ pariharati, puṣpamālyādikam ādatte, tad-bhinnān anyān ca upekṣate.

sarva-puruṣārtha-siddhir iti sarva-puruṣārtha-sādha-kam. siddhi-śabdena atra sādhakam ucyate. tena sarva-puruṣārtha-siddhau niścitam eva samyag-jñānaṃ kāraṇaṃ bhavati iti pradarśitam. iti-śabdaḥ tasmād ityarthe. yat-tadau nitya-sambaddhau. tena yasmāt sarva-puruṣārtha-siddhau samyag-jñānaṃ pūrvabhāvi tasmād eva tad vyutpādyate iti uktaṃ bhavati. tad vyutpādyate iti atra tad iti samyag-jñānaṃ yojanīyam, napuṃsaka-liṅgena svarūpa-nirdeśāt. na tu avyavahitā sarva-puruṣārtha-siddhiḥ, aprādhānyāt. //1//

dvividhaṃ samyag-jñānam. pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca. //2//

tacca samyag-jñānaṃ vipratipatti-catuṣṭaya-nirākaraṇena yathārthato jñāyate. vipratipatti-catuṣṭayaṃ tu saṃkhyā-vipratipattiḥ svarūpa-vipratipattiḥ viṣaya-vipratipattiḥ phala-vipratipattiḥ ca iti. tatra saṃkhyā-vipratipattiḥ. keṣāṃcid ekam iti yathā vārhaspatyānām, keṣāṃcit trīṇi iti yathā sāṃkhyānām, naiyāyikānāṃ catvāri, mīmāṃsakānāṃ ca ṣaḍ iti. svarūpa-vipratipattiḥ yathā keṣāṃcit pratyakṣaṃ savikalpakam, keṣāṃcit tu nirvikalpakam iti. viṣaya-vipratipattiḥ yathā kecid āhuḥ pratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam

eva, anumānasya ca viṣayaḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇam eva iti. anyaiḥ tu anye uktāḥ. phala-vipratipattiḥ yathā kecit pramāṇa-phalayor bhedam abhyupagacchanti, kecit punar abhedam abhyupagacchanti iti. tasmāt tādṛśa-vipratipatti-catuṣṭaya-nirākaraṇena sarvathā abhrāntatayā samyag-jñāna-svarūpam pratipāditaṃ bhavati.

tatra ca prathamam eva saṃkhyā-vipratipatti-nirākaraṇārtham uktaṃ dvividhaṃ samyag-jñānam iti. dve vidhe asya iti dvividham. saṃkhyā-śabda-kathanaṃ tu dvividham eva iti spaṣṭa-pratipādanārtham. tena trividhatvaikavidha-tvādīnāṃ nirāsaḥ. saṃkhyayā dvaividhyamātraṃ pratipāditam. kīdṛśaṃ ca dvaividhyam? kathaṃ vā na caturvidhaṃ jñānam iti ataḥ viśeṣeṇa uktaṃ pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca iti.

akṣeṣu āśritaṃ pratyakṣam. nipātaḥ ayaṃ jñāna-viṣayasya pratyakṣa-kārakatvaṃ sūcayati.[5] yathā gamanena gauḥ iti. tatra gamanaṃ gotvasya upalakṣakam. tasmād gotvāśraya-piṇḍaḥ go-śabdābhidheya iti upadarśyate. tathā atra api indriyāśritatvena jñāna-viṣayasya pratyakṣa-kāra-katva-sūcanāt pratyakṣa-catuṣṭayam eva pratyakṣatvena abhi-dhīyate. mīyate anena iti mānam. paricchedakam iti śeṣaḥ. anu-śabda ānantarya-vodhakaḥ. paścān mānam anumānam. pakṣadharmagraha-pratibandhasmaraṇa-pūrvakaṃ pravartamā-nam iti śeṣaḥ. pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca iti vibhakti-bhedena nirdiṣṭam. arthād viṣaya-bhedo gamyate. yathā tayoḥ vibhakti-bhedaḥ tathā viṣaya-bhedaḥ api iti śeṣaḥ.

ca-śabdaḥ samuccayārthaḥ. tena pratyakṣānumānayoḥ samavalatva-saṃgrahaḥ. yathā pratyakṣam arthena utpannaṃ sad abhrāntam iti pramāṇaṃ bhavati tathā anumānam api tādātmya-tadutpattibhyām artha-pratibandhād abhrāntam iti pramāṇaṃ bhavati. etena yad uktaṃ kaiścit sarveṣu

5. p. 37.17-18 : *ṅes-pa'i-tshig 'di-ni yul-la śes-pas mṅon-sum-du-byed-pa-ñid mtshon-par-byed-pa-ste* (*=nipātaḥ ayaṃ viṣaye jñānena pratyakṣa-kārakatvaṃ sūcayati*). A little freedom has been taken here to make the sense clearer. The exact literal reconstruction does not give a clear sense. cf. Also p. 38.5.

pramāṇeṣu mukhyaṃ pratyakṣam iti tad nirastam. abhrāntatvam ubhayor api samānam eva. pratipāditaṃ hi kenacit pratyakṣasya mukhyatvam. //2//

tatra kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntaṃ pratyakṣam. //3//

svarūpa-vipratipatti-nirākaraṇārthaṃ tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam iti uktam. tatra iti śabdaḥ nirdhāraṇārthaḥ. samyag-jñānayoḥ pratyakṣam adhonirdiṣṭa-lakṣaṇena nirdhāryate. pratyakṣam iti anena lakṣyam uktam. kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam iti anena lakṣaṇam uktam. tena kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntaṃ yad bhavati tad eva pratyakṣaṃ veditavyam iti artha ukto bhavati. avayavārthastu kalpanābhyaḥ apoḍham iti kalpanāpoḍham. kalpanāviyuktam iti śeṣaḥ. yadvā kalpanayā apoḍhaṃ kalpanāpoḍham. kalpanā-vivarjitam iti śeṣaḥ. na bhrāntam abhrāntam. prāpakaviṣaye avisamvādakam iti śeṣaḥ.

kasmād viśeṣaṇadvayam uktam iti cet ? ucyate. timiravato bhrānta-jñānavyavacchedārtham abhrāntam iti uktam. kalpanāpoḍham iti ca anumāna-vyavacchedārtham uktam. evam abhrāntatvaṃ prāpaka-viṣaye upādeyam, na tu ālambanaviṣaye. yadi ālambana-viṣaye abhrāntatvam abhyupagamyate tarhi atra yogācāra-naya-nirāsaḥ syāt. yogācārā hi sarvam ālambana-jñānaṃ bhrāntaṃ manyante. tataśca prakaraṇārambhaḥ tannaya-nirākaraṇārthaḥ syāt. iṣṭaḥ ca prakaraṇārambhaḥ sautrāntika-yogācārobhaya-matānudhāvanārtham. prāpaka-viṣaye avisamvādaka-lakṣaṇam abhrāntatvaṃ ca ubhayānumatam eva. evam anumānasya api pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ. tad api hi avisamvādakam abhrāntam eva iṣṭam. ataeva anumāna-nirāsārthaṃ kalpanāpoḍham iti uktam. tasmād viśeṣaṇadvayam uktaprayojanakam. //3//

abhilāpa-saṃsargayogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā. tayā rahitam. //4//

siddhānte prasiddha-kalpanā nirastā. laukika-kalpanopadeśārthaṃ abhilāpa-saṃsargayogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā

iti uktam. abhilapyate anena iti abhilāpaḥ, vācaka-śabda-sāmānyarūpaḥ. abhilāpena saṃsarga iti abhilāpa-saṃsargaḥ. saṃsargastu sambandhaḥ. abhilāpasaṃsargasya yogyam iti abhilāpasaṃsarga-yogyam, artha-sāmānyam. tad eva hi anvaya-vyatirekavattvād vyāptatvād abhilāpayituṃ śakyam. artha-viśeṣaḥ svalakṣaṇarūpaḥ tu abhilāpayituṃ na[6] śakyate, tadavyāptatvāt. jñāne abhilāpa-saṃsargayogyo yaḥ pratibhāsaḥ [sa eva abhilāpa-saṃsargayogya-pratibhāsaḥ], artha-sāmānyasya arthākāra iti śeṣaḥ.

yadvā abhilapyate iti abhilāpaḥ, abhidheyaṃ yad artha-sāmānyam. abhilāpena saṃsarga iti abhilāpa-saṃsargaḥ. abhilāpa-saṃsargasya yogyam iti abhilāpa-saṃsargayogyam, śabda-sāmānyam. anvaya-vyatireka-vaśāt tena arthābhidhānaṃ śakyam. śabda-viśeṣeṇa tu na śakyam, tasya asāmānyatvāt. jñāne abhilāpa-saṃsargayogyo yaḥ pratibhāsaḥ sa eva abhilāpa-saṃsargayogya-pratibhāsaḥ, śabda-sāmānyākāra iti śeṣa iti etad uktaṃ bhavati. evaṃ śleṣeṇa vākyasya vyākhyānena ubhayaḥ api tad-vikalpākāraḥ abhilāpa-saṃsargayogya-pratibhāsa iti uktaṃ veditavyam. pratītiḥ iti saṃvedanam, buddhiḥ iti śeṣaḥ. tayā rahitam iti kalpanayā rahitam, kalpanā-kaluṣeṇa rahitam iti śeṣaḥ. tena etaduktyā śabdārtha-sāmānyākāra-rahitā yā pratītiḥ sā eva pratyakṣa-pramāṇam iti uktaṃ bhavati. //4//

timira-āśubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṃkṣobhādya-nāhita-vibhramaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam. //5//

timira-āśubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṃkṣobhādyanāhita- vibhramam iti. atra timiram iti akṣipīḍā. āśubhramaṇam iti alātacakrādi. nauyānam iti nāvā yānam. saṃkṣobha iti vāyu-pitta[7]-prakopena dhātukhedaḥ. timiraṃ ca āśubhramaṇaṃ ca nauyānaṃ ca saṃkṣobhaḥ ca iti timira-āśubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṃkṣobhāḥ, te ādayo yeṣāṃ te timira-āśubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṃkṣobhādayaḥ. ādi-śabdena naṣṭadṛṣṭi-pītadṛṣṭyādīnāṃ

6. p. 41.8 : read (with *BL* ii, p. 23, n 2) *mi-nus-te* instead of *bshus-te*.
7. p. 42.10 : read *mkhris-pas* instead of *khris-pas*.

saṃgrahaḥ. āhito vibhramo yasmin tad āhita-vibhramam, na āhita-vibhramam iti anāhita-vibhramam. timira-āśubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṃkṣobhaiḥ anāhita-vibhramam iti timira-āśubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṃkṣobhānāhita-vibhramam. tathāca timira-rogeṇa dvicandra-darśanaṃ bhavati, nauyāna-gatyā tīrataruḥ calan dṛśyate, vāyu-pittādi-kopena vastujvalitādikaṃ dṛśyate.

jñānaṃ pratyakṣam iti. sūtre jñānaṃ na uktam. kathaṃ tat labhyate iti cet? kalpanā jñānena eva pratibaddhā, bhrāntir api jñānadharma iti dṛṣṭam. tasmāt kalpanā-rahitam abhrāntaṃ jñānam eva iti. yathā avatsā gaur ānīyatām iti anena aśvā [tathāvidhā] na ānīyate, dhenur eva ānīyate, tasyā eva vatsa-sambandha-darśanāt. tathā atra api bhrānti-kalpanayor jñānena eva sambandho dṛṣṭo na anyena iti jñānam eva pratyakṣatayā iṣyate. //5//

tat caturvidham. //6//

tat caturvidham iti. pratyakṣam iti yad uktaṃ tad indriya-janyaṃ mānasam ātmasamvedanaṃ yogijñānaṃ ca iti caturvidhaṃ jñeyam. pravibhāgaḥ ayaṃ vipratipatti-nirāsārtham upadiśyate. keṣāṃcid indriyam eva darśanakartṛ iṣṭam. tannirāsārthaṃ prathamam. indriyajanyaṃ jñānaṃ hi pratyakṣam, na tu indriyam iti. kaiścin mānasa-pratyakṣe doṣa udbhāvitaḥ. taddoṣa-parihārārthaṃ dvitīyam. kecit citta-caittānām ātmasamvedanaṃ na aṅgīkurvanti. tannirāsārthaṃ tṛtīyam. kecid yogipratyakṣaṃ na anumanyante. tannirāsārthaṃ caturthaṃ pratyakṣam uktam. //6//

indriyajñānam. //7//

indriyajñānam iti. cakṣurādīni pañca indriyāṇi eva indriyatvena iṣyante. manas tu indriyaṃ na, mānasa-pratyakṣasya pṛthaṅ-nirdeśāt. tasmāt cakṣurādi-indriyeṣu āśritaṃ jñānam eva indriyajanyaṃ pratyakṣam. //7//

svaviṣayānantara-viṣaya-sahakāriṇā indriya-jñānena samanantara-pratyayena janitaṃ manovijñānam. //8//

svaviṣayānantara-viṣaya-sahakāriṇā indriyajñānena samanantara-pratyayena janitaṃ manovijñānam iti. tatra svasya viṣaya iti sva-viṣayaḥ, svakīyam ālambanam iti śeṣaḥ. svaviṣayeṇa anantaraḥ svaviṣayānantaraḥ. dvitīyakṣaṇabhāvī sarūpaḥ ca anantara-śabdena ucyate. svaviṣayānantaraḥ ca asau viṣayaḥ ca iti svaviṣayānantara-viṣayaḥ. sa sahakārī yasya indriya-jñānasya tat svaviṣayānantara-viṣaya-sahakāri indriyajñānam, samanantarapratyayabhūtena indriyajñānena janitaṃ yat tad eva manomātrāśrayatvān mānasaṃ pratyakṣam iti.

iha svaviṣayānantara-viṣaya iti kathanaṃ gṛhīta-grahaṇād avavodhakaṃ na bhavati iti doṣaṃ tathā asamānajātīya-viṣaya-grahaṇa-doṣaṃ ca parihartuṃ bodhyam. tathāhi mānasa-pratyakṣam indriyavijñāna-viṣayānantara-dvitīyakṣaṇotpatti-kaṃ yat tad-viṣayakam iṣṭam. tasmāt kuto gṛhīta-grahaṇam?

anantara-śabdaḥ ca samānajātīyaparaḥ. tena asamānajātī-yaviṣaya-grahaṇa-prasaṅgo vā kutaḥ? indriya-vijñānena samanantarapratyayena janitam iti ukter andha-vadhirādya-bhāva-prasaṅga-doṣaḥ api nirastaḥ. andha-vadhirayor mano-vijñāne samanantarapratyaya indriyavijñānaṃ na asti. tena yad āhuḥ kecin manovijñānena vāhya-viṣaya-pratyakṣam aṅgīkri-yate, evam andha-vadhirādyabhāva-prasaṅga iti tad-vacanam apāstaṃ veditavyam. //8//

sarva-citta-caittānām ātmasamvedanam. //9//

sarva-citta-caittānām ātmasamvedanam iti. sarve ca te citta-caittāḥ ca iti sarva-citta-caittāḥ. sarveti uktvā bhramajñānāni api parigṛhyante. teṣāṃ ca yat svarūpa-prakāśanaṃ tad ātma-samvedanam.

sarve hi cittacaittāḥ pratīti-svabhāvatvāt svarūpa-jñāpakā bhavanti. yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśa-svabhāvatvāt ātmanaḥ api prakāśako bhavati, svarūpa-prakāśe ca pradīpāntaraṃ na apekṣate. tathā cittacaittā api svarūpāvavodhe jñānāntaraṃ

na apekṣante. tataśca svasiddha-bhāvāḥ svayaṃ pratyakṣa-pramāṇaṃ bhavanti. //9//

bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajaṃ yogijñānam iti. //10//

bhūtartha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajaṃ yogijñānam iti. bhūtaḥ aviparītaḥ artha [iti bhūtārthaḥ]. catvāri āryasatyāni. tasya bhāvanā bhūtārtha-bhāvanā. bhāvanā iti abhyāsaḥ. tasyāḥ prakarṣo bhūtartha-bhāvanā-prakarṣaḥ. smṛtyupasthāna-uṣmagata-mūrdha-kṣāntayaḥ. tasya paryanto bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantaḥ. paryantāḥ tu agradharmāḥ. tasmāt jāyate iti bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajam. yogaḥ samādhiḥ. sa yeṣām asti te yoginaḥ. teṣāṃ jñānaṃ yogijñānam.

tathāhi samādhi-vala-prabhavaṃ bhūta-bhāvi-vartamānānāṃ yathāyathaṃ prakāśakaṃ jyotir avibhramam āvirbhavati. yathā devādyadhiṣṭhāna-prabhāveṇa satyāni svapnajñānāni bhūta-bhāvi-vividha-vastu-viṣayāṇi avibhramāṇi utpadyante tathā eva yogavalena dhyeyānāṃ jñānam atīta-anāgata-dūrasāntara-aṇubhūta-viṣayāṇāṃ prakāśakaṃ jyotirūpam utpadyate. tasmāt pratyakṣa-pramāṇatvam iṣyate.

atra prayogaḥ—yogīśvarāṇām ekāgracittānāṃ jñānaṃ bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-viṣayakaṃ pramāṇam ameya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastujātasya abhrāntopadarśana-hetutvād, bhūtagrahaviśeṣāviṣṭa-jñānavat. yad na prāmāṇikaṃ tad na ameya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastujātasya abhrāntopadarśana-hetuḥ, yathā unmatta-jñānam. aprāpakasya api ameya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastujātasya abhrāntopadarśana-hetutve ayogyam apakārakam[8] [api] pramāṇaṃ syāt. dambhamātreṇa ameyasya [padārthasya] abhrāntopadarśanaṃ hi na sambhavati.

tasya vyākhyānam. yathā graha-viśeṣāveśe bhūta-bhāvi-vastusamūhānuśāsanaṃ tathā yogiṣu api bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-anuśāsanam abhrāntam upalabhyate. yathā harītakyādi bhāviroga-nirākaraṇa-samartham iti pākādi-munīnām abhrāntam

8. p. 48.16 : ... *mi-'thad-pa-ni gnod-par-byed-pa* (=*ayogyam apakārakam*). The sense is not clear.

anuśāsanam upalabhyate. yathā vā bhagavataḥ śākyasiddheḥ upadeśe bhāvi-daśanimitta[9]-satyopalabdhi[10]-mātṛceṭa[11]-kālakṣaya[12]-rājāśokādi-āśāvana[13]-kaśmīrādi-deśāgamā aviparītā upalabhyante. //10//

tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam. //11//

viṣaya-vipratipatti-nirāsārtham āha tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam iti. pratyakṣam pramāṇam yad uktam tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam eva iti draṣṭavyam, na tu sāmānya-lakṣaṇam, sāmānyasya avastutvāt pratyakṣeṇa ca vastu-svarūpopalambhāt. //11//

svalakṣaṇam ca kīdṛśam avagantavyam iti cet? tatra āha—

yasya arthasya sannidhānāsannidhānābhyām jñāna-pratibhāsa-bhedaḥ tat svalakṣaṇam. //12//

sannidhānam yogyadeśe sthitiḥ. asannidhānam ayogyadeśe sthitiḥ sarvathā sarvatra abhāvaḥ ca. sannidhānam ca asannidhānam ca iti sannidhānāsannidhāne. tābhyām hi jñāne visphuṭatvāsphuṭatva-viśeṣaḥ kriyate. sannidhāne sphuṭa-pratibhāsam jñānam utpadyate. asannidhāne ca asphuṭam jñānam utpadyate. jñāne yaḥ arthaḥ pratibhāsa-vailakṣaṇyam karoti sa eva svalakṣaṇam. //12//

astu[14] paramārthasad eva vastu pratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ. kasmāt svalakṣaṇam viṣaya iti cet? tatra āha—

tad eva paramārthasat. //13//

paramaḥ ca asau arthaḥ ca iti paramārthaḥ. parama iti akṛtrimaḥ, āropaśūnya iti śeṣaḥ. paramārthataḥ sad iti

9. p. 49.5 : *ma-'ons-pa'i-lhas-bcu.*
10. p. 49.5 : *bden-par-dmigs-pa.*
11. p. 49.6 : *ma-khol.*
12. p. 49.6 : *dus-'grib-par.*
13. p. 49.8 : *re-ba'i-tshul.*
14. p. 50.8 : read *yin-nam* instead of *ma-yin-nam.*

paramārthasat. svalakṣaṇaṃ eva hi paramārthasat. tena na yathoktadoṣaḥ. //13//

kasmāt svalakṣaṇam eva paramārthasad iti cet ? tatra āha—

arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ. //14//

artha iti prayojanam. kriyā niṣpattiḥ. arthasya kriyā arthakriyā. prayojana-niṣpattir iti śeṣaḥ. tasyāṃ sāmarthyam arthakriyā-sāmarthyam. arthakriyā-sāmarthyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ svabhāvo yasya vastunaḥ tad arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇam. tasya bhāvaḥ arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvam. tasmād arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvāt.

evaṃ yad arthakriyā-samarthaṃ tad eva vastu iti svalakṣaṇena eva arthakriyā iti upadarśitaṃ bhavati. tasmāt svalakṣaṇam eva paramārthasat. //14//

anyat sāmānya-lakṣaṇam. saḥ anumānasya viṣayaḥ. // 15 //

anyat sāmānya-lakṣaṇam iti. ukta-svalakṣaṇa-svabhāvād yad anyat prameyaṃ tad eva sāmānya-lakṣaṇam. yasya arthasya sannidhāne api asannidhāne api jñānam ekarūpam eva bhavati iti. saḥ anumānasya viṣaya iti. sāmānya-lakṣaṇam anumānasya eva viṣayaḥ. anvaya-vyatirekavattvena vyāptatvāt.

atra anavasare api [sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṃ] vacana-vāhulyaṃ syād iti āsaṅkayā uktam. tathāhi atra svalakṣaṇābhidhānāvasare avataraṇena tad-viparīta-lakṣaṇasya jñānaṃ sukaram iti sāmānya-lakṣaṇam uktam. saḥ anumānasya viṣaya iti hi svalpa-vacanena upanyāsaḥ. anyathā anumānaviṣaya-pradarśanārthaṃ sarvasya api etadvacanasya uccāraṇam āvaśyakaṃ syāt. // 15 //

phala-vipratipatti-nirāsārtham āha—

tad eva ca pratyakṣaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇa-phalam artha-pratīti-rūpatvāt. // 16 //

ayaṃ ca asya sambandhaḥ. yadi pratyakṣasya pramāṇatvam iṣṭaṃ tarhi rūpādi-prameya-paricchedalakṣaṇena[15] pramāṇa-phalena bhavitavyam, yathā kuṭhārikayā vṛkṣādi-chedane dvikhaṇḍīkaraṇaṃ phalaṃ dṛśyate iti ata aha tad eva pratyakṣajñānaṃ pramāṇa-phalam iti. tad eva pratyakṣa-jñānaṃ pramāṇa-phalam, pratyakṣāt [=pratyakṣa-jñānāt] atiriktaṃ tu phalaṃ na asti iti.

pratyakṣasya eva phalarūpatvaṃ kasmāt iti āśaṃkāyām āha arthapratītirūpatvād iti. pratītir niścayaḥ rūpaṃ svabhāvaḥ. tad asti yasya pratyakṣasya tad eva arthapratīti-rūpam. tasya bhāvaḥ arthapratītirūpatvam. tasmād artha-pratītirūpatvāt.

tad evam pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahārārope arthaniścayala-kṣaṇaṃ phalaṃ bhavati. jñānam arthaviniścayana-svabhāvam. pratyakṣam api jñānasvabhāvam iṣṭam. tasmāt pratyakṣasya arthaniścaya-svabhāvatvāt pratyakṣam eva phalasvabhāvaṃ syād iti veditavyam iti uktaṃ bhavati. // 16 //

yadi pratyakṣam eva phalasvabhāvaṃ tarhi pramāṇaṃ nāma kiṃ veditavyam iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam, tadvaśād arthapratīti-siddher iti. // 17 //

sārūpyaṃ sādṛśyam. asya iti pratyakṣasya. arthākāraṃ yat pratyakṣaṃ tad eva pramāṇam iti śeṣaḥ. arthasārūpyam eva kathaṃ pramāṇam iti āśaṃkya āha tad-vaśād arthapratīti-siddher iti. yasmād arthasārūpyavaśād niścayaḥ tasmāt tat sārūpyam eva pramāṇam. evaṃ hi nīlasya pratītir iyaṃ na pītasya iti vyavasthāpyate. tatra ca yo hetuḥ sa eva pramā-ṇatvena iṣṭaḥ.

indriyasya tu etad-vyavasthiti-karaṇe na asti sāmarthyam. tathāhi tat ca indriyaṃ sarvasya eva jñānasya sādhāraṇaṃ kāraṇam iti pratyeka-niścaya-vyavasthitau kathaṃ samarthaṃ syāt? yadi tad indriyaṃ nīlajñānasya eva janakaṃ syāt

15. p. 52.4 : read (with *BL* ii, p. 350, n, 2) *yoṅs-su-bcad-pa'i* (=*pariccheda*) instead of *yoṅs-su-dpyod-pa'i* (=*parīkṣaṇa*). for a better sense.

pītādijñānaṃ ca na janayet tadā eva vyavasthāyāṃ samarthaṃ syāt. sannidhānam api sādhāraṇatvād indriyavan na vyavasthiti-hetuḥ.

sārūpyaṃ tu asādhāraṇatvāt pratyeka-niścaya-vyavasthiti-hetur bhavati. tathāhi nīlavijñānasya yo nīlākāraḥ sa pītādi-jñāne na asti iti vyavasthā syāt. yasmād nīlākāratvād ayaṃ nīla iti eva pratītiḥ, na tu pīta iti buddhiḥ, tasmād arthasārūpyam eva pramāṇam iti. // 17 //

Nyāyabindu-vistara-ṭīkāyāṃ śiṣyahitāyāṃ prathamaḥ paricchedaḥ.

Svārthānumāna-paricchedaḥ

anumānaṃ dvidhā. svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ca. // 1 //

pratyakṣānumāna-bhedena samyag-jñānaṃ dvividham uktam. tatra pratyakṣaṃ saprapañcaṃ[1] kṛta-vyākhyānam. anumāna-kathanānujñārtham āha anumānaṃ dvidhā iti. anumānasya prakārau dvau veditavyau. jñānābhidhānātmakayoḥ sva-parārthānumānayoḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ kim api na asti. kathaṃ tāvat pūrvaṃ lakṣaṇam abhidhīyeta? vibhāgena ca pratiniyataṃ lakṣaṇaṃ sukhena vaktuṃ śakyam. tasmāt pūrvaṃ vibhāga uktaḥ.

svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ca iti viśeṣeṇa dvaividhyam eva upadarśyate. atra *artha* iti prayojanam. sva-prayojanaṃ para-prayojanaṃ ca iti śeṣaḥ. yena ātmanaḥ pratītis tat svārthaṃ yena ca aparasya pratipattis tat parārtham avagantavyam iti. // 1 //

tatra svārthaṃ trirūpād liṅgād yad anumeye jñānam. // 2 //

trīṇi rūpāṇi asya santi iti trirūpam. artho liṅgyate anena iti liṅgam. anumīyate iti anumeyaḥ. trilakṣaṇād hetor anumeye yaj jñānam utpadyate tad eva svārthānumānam iti. liṅgābhāsād yaj jñānam utpadyate tad api anumānaṃ syād iti tannirāsārtham anumeya iti uktam. liṅga-jñānam eva vastutaḥ anumānaṃ syād iti tannirāsārtham anumeya iti uktam. jñānam iti kathanaṃ tu liṅgam eva vastutaḥ anumānaṃ syād iti tannirāsārtham. // 2//

yadi anumeya-viṣaya-jñānam eva pramāṇam iṣṭaṃ tarhi phalaṃ nāma kiṃ syād iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

1. p. 55.5 : =*spros-pa-daṅ-bcas-te.*

pramāṇaphala-vyavasthā atra api pratyakṣavat. // 3 //

yathā pratyakṣe tajjñānam eva pramāṇa-phalam abhihitaṃ tathā atra api anumitir eva pramāṇa-phalaṃ syāt, artha-viniścayana-svabhāvatvāt. yathā pratyakṣasya artha-sārūpyaṃ pramāṇaṃ tathā anumānasya api artha-sārūpyam eva pramāṇam, tadvaśād artha-viniścaya-siddher iti // 3 //

trirūpād liṅgād iti uktam. kāni ca tāni trīṇi rūpāṇi iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

trairūpyaṃ ca liṅgasya anumeye sattvam eva, sapakṣe eva sattvam, asapakṣe ca asattvam eva niścitam iti. // 4 //

trirūpasya bhāvas trairūpyam. anumeye sattvam eva iti. adhonirdiṣṭānumeya-lakṣaṇe sattvam eva prathamaṃ rūpam. tatra sattvam iti uktvā cākṣuṣatvād ityādikaṃ nirastam. [eva iti] adhika-kathanena[2] pakṣaikadeśāsiddhyādikaṃ nirastam. sapakṣe eva sattvam iti. samajātīye sattvam eva dvitīyaṃ rūpam. atra sattvam iti uktvā asādhāraṇānaikāntiko nirastaḥ. [eva iti] adhika-kathanena sādhāraṇānaikāntiko nirastaḥ. ubhaya-kathanena viruddho nirastaḥ.

asapakṣe ca asattvam eva iti. asamajātīye kvacid api asattvaṃ tṛtīyaṃ rūpam. atra asattvam iti uktvā sādhāraṇānaikāntika-viruddhau nirastau. [eva iti] adhika-kathanena vipakṣaika-deśavṛtteḥ parihāraḥ. ante niścitam iti uktes triṣu eva niścitam iti veditavyam. tāni ca trīṇi rūpāṇi svayaṃ yathāyathaṃ pramāṇair niścitāni eva grāhyāṇi. anyathā anumeye pratyāyanam[3] aśakyam eva iti. //4//

kaś ca anumeya iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

anumeyaḥ atra jijñāsita-viśeṣo dharmī. //5//

2. p. 57.10 f : =*bsnan-pa-smos-pas.*
3. p. 58.4 : =*yid-ches-par-bya-bar.*

atra iti hetu-lakṣaṇe. jijñāsitaḥ pratyetum iṣṭaḥ. viśeṣa iti vilakṣaṇaḥ [dharmaḥ]. jijñāsito viśeṣo yasmin sa jijñāsita-viśeṣaḥ. dharmāḥ santi yasmin sa dharmī. tena yasya dharmiṇaḥ kaścid viśeṣaḥ pratyetum iṣṭaḥ saḥ anumeya iti arthaḥ. sa ca hetu-lakṣaṇāvasare eva bodhya iti uktaṃ bhavati. anyatra tu dharmaviśiṣṭa-dharmī anumeya iti. // 5 //

kas tāvat sapakṣa iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

sādhyadharma-sāmānyena samānaḥ arthaḥ sapakṣaḥ. // 6 //

samānaṃ mānam [asya iti] samānaḥ. samānajñāna-paricchedyaḥ, sadṛśa iti śeṣaḥ. yaś ca sadṛśaḥ arthaḥ sa sapakṣaḥ. kathaṃ prakāra-sāmyam iti cet? tatra evam āha sādhyadharma-sāmānyena iti. sādhyaś ca asau dharmaś ca iti sādhyadharmaḥ. tasya sāmānyaṃ sādhyadharma-sāmānyam. sādhyadharmasya hi viśeṣaḥ [bhavati], pratyarthaniyamāt. tena ca asamānatvād virodhaḥ syād iti sādhyadharma-sāmānyena iti uktam iti. // 6 //

kaś ca asapakṣa iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

na sapakṣaḥ asapakṣaḥ tataḥ anyas tad-viruddhas tadabhāvaś ca iti. // 7 //

yaś ca sapakṣo na bhavati sa sarva eva asapakṣa iti. tataḥ anya iti sapakṣād yaḥ anyaḥ. yathā uṣṇasparśe sādhye anuṣṇāśītaṃ[4] dravyam. tadviruddha iti sapakṣa-viruddhaḥ. yathā uṣṇasparśe eva sādhye śītaṃ dravyam. tadabhāva iti sapakṣābhāvaḥ. yathā sautrāntikasya anityatve[5] sādhye anityatvābhāva eva asapakṣaḥ, [tannaye] ākāśādiṣu api nityatvānaṅgīkārāt.

4. p. 59.13 f : =*tsha-ba yaṅ ma-yin graṅ-ba yaṅ ma-yin-pa.*
5. cf. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati thereon, under *Nyāyasūtra* i.1.35. (*Nyāyadarśana,* Metropolitan ed. p. 299).

trividha eva arthe na sapakṣaḥ asapakṣa iti bodhyam. abhāvas tu vastuta eva na sapakṣaḥ. anya-virodhau ca paramparayā na sapakṣau iti. // 7 //

yathokta-hetulakṣaṇa-yukto hetuḥ katividha iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

trirūpāṇi trīṇi eva ca liṅgāni. //8//

yathoktaṃ rūpatrayaṃ triṣu eva sambhavati, na adhika iti adhikārthaḥ [=evakārārthaḥ]. trayāṇāṃ liṅgānāṃ pratyekam api trirūpam eva draṣṭavyam, ekarūpaṃ dvirūpaṃ vā na eva iti. //8//

kāni ca trīṇi liṅgāni iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

anupalabdhiḥ svabhāva-kārye ca. //9//

iha svanāmnā trīṇi liṅgāni nirdiśyante. //9//

tatra anupalabdhir yathā na pradeśa-viśeṣe kvacid ghaṭaḥ, upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalabdher iti. //10//

tatra anupalabdhir iti anupalabdhi-svarūpam ucyate. yathā iti upapradarśana-śabdaḥ. pradeśa-viśeṣe kvacid ghaṭo na iti sannihitadeśa-vacanam. sambandhas tu evam. pradeśa-viśeṣe kvacid ghaṭo na iti kvacid iti anena dharmī nirdiśyate. pradeśa-viśeṣa iti tasya eva viśeṣaḥ kriyate. vādyabhimata-deśe ghaṭo na [iti arthaḥ]. deśa iti ukte sarvasya pakṣatve ghaṭābhāva-siddhir eva na syāt. sa ca yogyaḥ api na bhavati.

upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya iti anena hetu-viśeṣaṇam uktam. upalabdhir iti jñānam ucyate. lakṣyate iti lakṣaṇam, viṣaya iti śeṣaḥ. upalabdher lakṣaṇam iti upalabdhi-lakṣaṇam. taṃ prāpta iti upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptaḥ. yogyopalabdhi-viṣaya iti śeṣaḥ. anupalabdher iti. adarśanād iti arthaḥ. ayam arthaḥ—pradeśādau dṛśya-ghaṭādyadarśanāt, ghaṭa-śūnyadeśa-darśanād iti śeṣa iti. //10//

nanu kā sā upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptir iti āśaṃkāyām āha—

upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptir upalambha-pratyayāntara-sākalyaṃ svabhāva-viśeṣaś ca. *//11//*

upalambha iti jñānam. tasya pratyayāntarāṇi upalambha-pratyayāntarāṇi. upalambha-pratyayas tatra ghaṭa eva. tataḥ anyāni anantara-pratyayādīni. teṣāṃ sākalyam upalambha-pratyayāntara-sākalyam. sākalya-śabdena samāveśa ucyate. svabhāvaś ca viśeṣaś ca iti svabhāva-viśeṣaḥ. taddvayam upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpti-śabdena ucyate iti. //11//

nanu kaḥ ayaṃ svabhāva-viśeṣa iti ākāṅkhāyām āha—

satsu api anyeṣu upalambha-pratyayeṣu yaḥ svabhāvaḥ san pratyakṣa eva bhavati. //12//

yaś ca bhāvaḥ san cakṣurādi-sannidhāne viprakarṣa-prakāra-trayeṇa aviprakṛṣṭaḥ śakyadarśanaḥ sa eva atra svabhāva-viśeṣa ucyate. tena cakṣurādi-sannidhāne api pratyakṣa-yogya-ghaṭānupalabdher atra ghaṭo na asti iti ayam artha ukta iti. //12//

svabhāva-hetulakṣaṇa-nirdeśārtham āha—

svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhya-dharme hetuḥ. //13//

sattāmātram iti sādhanasattāmātram. sattāmātre bhavituṃ śīlaṃ yasya sa sattāmātrabhāvī. tasmin sattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme svabhāva-hetur bodhyaḥ. yathā vṛkṣaḥ ayaṃ śiṃśapātvād iti. atra vṛkṣasya śiṃśapāmātreṇa sambandhaḥ. tasmāt tena sādhyate. //13//

kāryaṃ yathā agnir atra dhūmād iti. //14//

kāryahetur udāhriyate. agni-nirbharotpattikatvād yatra dhūmas tatra agnir iti avagamyate. //14//

atha kasmād liṅgaṃ trividham iti vyavasthitir iti āśaṅkāyām āha—

tatra dvau vastusādhanau, ekaḥ pratiṣedha-hetur iti. //15//

yasmād anumeyo bhāvābhāvarūpo dvividhas tasmād hetur api bhāvasādhanaḥ abhāvasādhanaś ca dvividha eva. anumeyaḥ api bhāvarūpo dvividhaḥ, bhinnaḥ abhinnaś ca. anumeyasya bhāvarūpasya dvaividhyena bhāvasādhanaḥ api dvividho bhavati. tathāhi sādhyahetvoḥ svarūpabhede abhinnaṃ sādhyaṃ sādhayituṃ na śaknoti. sādhyahetvoḥ svarūpābhede ca bhinnaṃ sādhyaṃ sādhayituṃ na śaknoti.

tatra sādhya-sādhanayor abhede svabhāvahetuḥ, sādhya-sādhanayor bhede ca kāryahetuḥ. anupalabdhis tu abhāvahetuḥ. etena yasmād dvābhyāṃ bhāvasādhanam ekena ca pratiṣedha-sādhanaṃ tasmād liṅgaṃ trividham, dve bhāvasādhane ekaṃ ca pratiṣedhakāraṇam iti darśitam iti. //15//

atha kasmād dvau eva vastusādhanau iti cet ? tatra āha—

svabhāva-pratibandhe hi sati arthaḥ arthaṃ gamayet. //16//

svabhāvena svarūpeṇa pratibandhaḥ svabhāva-pratibandhaḥ. tatsattve eva liṅga-lakṣaṇārthena sādhya-lakṣaṇārthasya pratyāyanam iti śeṣaḥ. //16//

kasmāt svabhāvapratibandha-sattve eva arthaḥ arthaṃ gamayed iti cet ? tatra āha—

tadapratibaddhasya tadavyabhicāra-niyamābhāvāt. //17//

yato yad na pratibaddhaṃ tad na arthaniścayāvyabhicāri tasmāt pratibandhe sati eva gamya-gamaka-bhāvo veditavyaḥ, na anyathā iti. //17//

sa ca tāvat kasya pratibandhaḥ, kena rūpeṇa vā pratibandha iti pradarśanārtham āha—

sa ca pratibandhaḥ sādhye arthe liṅgasya vastutaḥ sādhyārtha-tādātmyāt sādhyārthād utpatteś ca. //18//

yasmāt paramārthato liṅgaṃ kvacit sādhyārtha-svabhāvam eva tasmāt tat tena pratibaddham. sādhyārthād utpatter iti. yasmād liṅgaṃ kvacit sādhyārthād eva utpadyate tasmāt tat tena pratibaddham iti. //18//

atha katham ucyate sādhyārtha-tādātmyāt sādhyārthād utpatteś ca eva liṅgasya pratibandha iti cet ? tatra āha—

atatsvabhāvasya atadutpatteś ca tatra apratibaddha-svabhāvatvāt. //19//

yat ca na sādhyaika-svabhāvaṃ yad api ca na utpadyate sādhyārthāt tasya tena pratibandhaḥ kena prakāreṇa abhidhīyeta ? apratibaddhaṃ ca na liṅgam, atiprasaṅgāt. tasmāt tādātmya-tadutpattibhyām eva pratibandho vaktavyaḥ, na anyathā iti. //19//

bhavatu tāvat tathā eva. tataś ca kim āyātam iti ced āha—

te ca tādātmya-tadutpattī svabhāva-kāryayor eva iti tābhyām eva vastusiddhiḥ. //20//

tādātmyaṃ svabhāva-hetoḥ pratibandhaḥ. tadutpattiḥ kārya-hetoḥ pratibandhaḥ. ataeva tābhyām eva vastusiddhir iti uktam. yasmāt tādātmya-tadutpattī svabhāva-kāryayor eva tasmāt tābhyām eva vastusiddhiḥ śakyā, na tu anyena apratibaddhena. tataś ca vastusiddhir dvābhyām eva iti sthitam. //20//

ekaś ca pratiṣedha-hetur iti uktam. ko nāma asau iti āha—

pratiṣedha-siddhir api yathoktāyā eva anupalabdheḥ. //21//

upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalabdher iti yad uktaṃ prāk taddvayam eva pratiṣedha-hetuḥ. //21//

katham iti ced āha—

sati vastuni tasyā asambhavāt. //22//

tathāhi vastuni vidyamāne sā na eva sambhavati. //22//

yathoktā anupalabdhir eva vastvabhāva-vyavahāra-sādhikā iti etad ca kasmād iti ced āha—

anyathā ca deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭārtheṣu anupalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpteṣu ātma-pratyakṣa-nivṛtter abhāva-niścayābhāvāt. // 23 //

yadi yathokto viśeṣo na āśrīyate tadā deśa-kāla-svabhāvair viprakṛṣṭā[6] vyavahitā ye arthā na upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptāḥ, teṣu ca yā pratipattṛ-pratyakṣa-nivṛttiḥ, tayā abhāva-niścayo na śakyate. ca iti yasmād iti arthe bodhyam. deśaś ca kālaś ca svabhāvaś ca iti deśa-kāla-svabhāvāḥ. tair viprakṛṣṭeṣu iti arthaḥ. tatra aparimeyadeśena vyavahitā deśa-viprakṛṣṭāḥ, anekakalpena vyavahitāḥ kāla-viprakṛṣṭāḥ, atīndriyāś ca bhāvāḥ svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭā veditavyāḥ. tasmād iha anupalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpta iti anena upalabdhipratyaya-sākalyābhāva uktaḥ.

deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭā iti anena svabhāva-viśeṣeṇa abhāva upadarśitaḥ. tasmād yathoktā anupalabdhir eva pratiṣedha-sādhikā iti sthitam. evaṃ kvacit kāla-viśeṣe[7] agrahe api yathoktā anupalabdhir eva pratiṣedha-sādhikā bhavati iti ucyate. //23//

idānīm ukta-kāla-viśeṣeṇa siddhi-nirdeśārtham āha—

amūḍha-smṛtisaṃskārasya atītasya vartamānasya ca pratipattṛ-pratyakṣasya nivṛttir abhāva-vyavahāra-sādhanī iti. //24//

6. p. 66.19 : Omit the suffix *gis* (which expresses the instrumental) after *bskal-pa-dag* (=*viprakṛṣṭāḥ*).
7. p. 67.14 : *-bye-brag-la* (= *-viśeṣe*), instead of *-bye-brag* (=*viśeṣaḥ*) seems better.

smṛti-janakaḥ saṃskāraḥ [smṛti-saṃskāraḥ]. smṛti-vījam iti śeṣaḥ. amūḍhaḥ smṛti-saṃskāro yasmin ghaṭādau sa tathoktaḥ. atītasya vartamānasya ca pratipattṛ-pratyakṣasya nivṛttir iti. atīta-vartamāna-kālayor yaḥ śūnya-pradeśādir upalabdhas tatpradeśādi-samānayogyo yo ghaṭādiḥ sa eva atīta-vartamānatvena ucyate. anyathā pradeśādau ghaṭādyabhāve [ca] atītatvaṃ vartamānatvaṃ vā kutaḥ syāt ?

pratipattā ca devadattādiḥ. tasya pratyakṣeṇa paricchedyatvāt ghaṭādiḥ pratyakṣaḥ. atra api pratyakṣa-parichhedyapradeśādi-samānayogyarūpatvād ghaṭādiḥ pratyakṣa iti ucyate. paramārthatas tatra ghaṭādyabhāve kathaṃ pratyakṣatvaṃ syāt ? evam ukta-prakāreṇa pratipattṛ-pratyakṣasya atītasya vartamānasya ca nivṛttir abhāvāśritatvād apara-vastu-lakṣaṇā, ghaṭādiśūnya-deśaviśeṣa-svarūpā bhavati iti śeṣaḥ.

abhāva-vyavahāras tu iha ghaṭo na asti iti evamākāraṃ vijñānam, tadabhidhānam, niḥśaṃkaṃ pradeśādau gamanalakṣaṇā pravṛttiś ca. jñānābhidhāna-pravṛtti-lakṣaṇaḥ-vyavahāraḥ sādhyate anayā iti abhāvavyavahāra-sādhanī. tad evam atītavartamānotpanna-viṣayā anupalabdhir eva abhāva-vyavahārasādhanī, bhāvi-viṣayā tu na iti uktaṃ bhavati. tathāhi bhāvikālasya pradeśādir dharmī na pratyakṣaḥ. śūnya-pradeśopalabdhilakṣaṇā anupalabdhir[8] api na sidhyati. atītakālasya tu dharmī pratyakṣaḥ, ghaṭaśūnya-pradeśaś ca smaryate. tadubhaya-hetor amūḍha-smṛtisaṃskāra iti uktam. tasmād vigatādi-divasīya-ghaṭādi-śūnya-pradeśādi-smaraṇe abhāvavyavahāra-siddhir bhavati. vartamānakālasya ca dharmī ghaṭādi-śūnya-pradeśādir api pratyakṣa-siddhaḥ. tasmāt tatra abhāva-vyavahāra-sambandhaḥ sulabhaḥ.

amūḍha-smṛtisaṃskāra iti uktvā 'hetvasiddhir nirastā. anyathā śūnya-pradeśādyasmaraṇe anupalabdhir eva na sidhyati. atīta-vartamāna iti anena uktaḥ kālaviśeṣo nirdiṣṭaḥ. pratipattṛ-pratyakṣa iti uktvā ca nikhila-pratipattṛ-pratyakṣaṃ nirastam. nikhila-pratipattṛ-pratyakṣoktau hi hetur asiddha eva syāt. sakala-pratipattṛ-pratyakṣa-nivṛttis tu prativādyasiddhā iti. //24//

8 p. 69.11 : read *mi-dmigs-par* (=*anupalabdhi*) instead of *dmigs-par* (=*upalabdhi*).

anantaroktā anupalabdhir eva abhāva-vyavahāra-sādhanī iti etad eva kasmād iti ced āha—

tayā eva abhāva-niścayād iti. //25//

anupahata-smṛtivījasya pratipattṛ-pratyakṣasya atīta-vartamānotpanna-viṣayavastuno yā nivṛttis tayā eva abhāva-niścayaḥ śakyate, anyayā bhāvi-viṣayayā tu na. //25//

tad evaṃ pūrvokta-hetunā anupalabdhi-svarūpaṃ kālaviśeṣaś ca abhihitaḥ. tasyāḥ prayogabheda-pradarśanārtham āha—

sā ca prayoga-bhedād ekādaśa-prakārā iti. //26//

prayoga iti trilakṣaṇa-sādhanasya śabdena abhidhānam. tadbhedād anupalabdhir ekādaśa-prakārā bhavati. //26//

prakāra-bheda-nirdeśārtham āha—

svabhāvānupalabdhir iti. //27//

svabhāvasya vastu-svarūpasya anupalabdhir [iti arthaḥ]. //27//

dṛṣṭānta-pradarśanārtham āha—

yathā na atra dhūma iti. //28//

yathā iti dṛṣṭānta-śabdaḥ. iha sarvatra [tathā] draṣṭavyam. atra iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. dhūmo na iti anena sādhyadharma uktaḥ. // 28 //

upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalabdhir iti. // 29 //

upalabdhi-pratyayāntarasattve api yogyasvabhāva-dhūmānupalabdher iti śeṣaḥ. // 29 //

kāryānupalabdhir yathā na atra apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni santi dhūmābhāvād iti. // 30 //

kāryānupalabdhir iti. kāryasya anupalabdhir iti vigrahaḥ. dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā na atra apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni dhūma-kāraṇāni santi iti. apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni yāni

dhūma-kāraṇāni analendhanādīni tāni tathoktāni. atra iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni dhūma-kāraṇāni na santi iti anena sādhyadharma uktaḥ. dhūmābhāvād iti. yasmād atra dhūmasya eva abhāvas tasmād iti śeṣaḥ. yadi atra apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni dhūma-kāraṇāni syus tarhi dhūamaḥ api utpadyamānaḥ syād eva. // 30 //

vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā na atra śiṃśapā vṛkṣābhāvād iti. // 31 //

vyāpakānupalabdhir iti. vyāpnoti iti vyāpakam. tasya anupalabdhir iti arthaḥ. yathā na atra śiṃśapā vṛkṣābhāvād iti. anena dṛṣṭānta uktaḥ. vṛkṣas tu śiṃsapāyā vyāpakaḥ. tasya nivṛttau sā api nivartitā bhavati. atra iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. vṛkṣābhāvād iti anena hetur uktaḥ. śiṃśapā na iti anena sādhyadharma uktaḥ. // 31 //

svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na atra śītasparśaḥ anger iti. // 32 //

svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhir iti. svabhāvena viruddhaḥ svabhāva-viruddhaḥ. tasya upalabdhir iti arthaḥ. dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā na atra śītasparśaḥ agner iti. atra iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. agner iti anena hetur uktaḥ. na śītasparśa iti anena sādhyadharma uktaḥ. tathāhi agneḥ śītasparśena virodhāt tatsattve śītasparśo nivartyate. // 32 //

viruddha-kāryopalabdhir yathā na atra śītasparśo dhūmād iti. //33//

viruddha-kāryopalabdhir iti. viruddhasya kāryaṃ viruddha-kāryam. tasya upalabdhir iti arthaḥ. yathā na atra śītasparśo dhūmād iti anena sā abhidhīyate. atra iti dharmī. dhūmād iti hetuḥ. na śītasparśa iti sādhyadharmaḥ. śītasparśa-viruddhaḥ agniḥ, tasya kāryaṃ dhūmaḥ. tasmād yatra dhūmas tatra agnir api. yatra agnis tatra ca kutaḥ śītasparśaḥ ? //33//

viruddha-vyāptopalabdhir yathā na dhruvabhāvī bhūtasya api bhāvasya vināśo hetvantarāpekṣaṇād iti. //34//

viruddha-vyāptopalabdhir iti. viruddhena vyāptaṃ viruddha-vyāptam. tasya upalabdhir iti arthaḥ. dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā na dhruvabhāvī bhūtasya api bhāvasya vināśa iti. dhruvabhāvī iti niścita-bhavana-dharmā iti śeṣaḥ. bhūtasya api bhāvasya iti. jātasya bhāvasya iti śeṣaḥ. bhūtasya api bhāvasya vināśa iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. na dhruvabhāvī iti anena sādhayadharma uktaḥ. tena jātasya eva bhāvasya vināśo na nitya iti ayam arthaḥ paryavasitaḥ. katham etad iti ced āha hetvantarāpekṣaṇād iti.

evaṃ hi hetvantarāpekṣā aṅgīkriyate. yeṣāṃ hetvantarāpekṣā te na avaśyambhāvinaḥ. yathā kārpāse raktatā. iha api dhruvabhāvitvam adhruvabhāvitvena viruddham. tena hetvantarāpekṣaṇaṃ vyāptam. tasmād yatra hetvantarāpekṣā tatra adhruvabhāvitvam. yatra adhruvabhāvitvaṃ tatra dhruvabhāvitvaṃ ca kutaḥ ? //34//

kārya-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na iha apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni śītakāraṇāni santi agner iti. //35//

kārya-viruddhopalabdhir iti. kāryeṇa viruddhaṃ kārya-viruddham. tasya upalabdhir iti arthaḥ. dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā na iha apratibaddha-sāmarthyāṇi śīta-kāraṇāni santi agner iti. iha iti dharmī. agner iti hetur uktaḥ. na apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni śīta-kāraṇāni santi iti sādhyadharma uktaḥ.

atra śīta-kāraṇānāṃ kāryaṃ śītam. śītaṃ ca agninā viruddham. yatra agnis tatra kutaḥ śītasparśaḥ ? yatra na śītasparśas tatra apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni śīta-kāraṇāni ca katham api na, yadi syus tādṛśāni tarhi avaśyaṃ śītasparśaḥ api syāt ? // 35 //

vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na atra tuṣārasparśaḥ agner iti //36//

vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhir iti. vyāpakena viruddhaṃ vyāpaka-viruddham. tasya upalabdhir iti arthaḥ. dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā na atra tuṣārasparśaḥ agner iti. atra iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. agner iti anena hetur uktaḥ. na tuṣārasparśa iti anena sādhyadharma uktaḥ.

tuṣārasparśaḥ himasparśaḥ. tasya vyāpakaḥ śītasparśaḥ. tadviruddhaḥ agniḥ. tasmād yatra agnis tatra śītasparśaḥ kutaḥ? yatra ca na śītasparśaḥ tatra tuṣārasparśaḥ api katham api na. //36//

kāraṇānupalabdhir yathā na atra dhūmaḥ agnyabhāvād iti. //37//

kāraṇānupalabdhir iti. kāraṇasya anupalabdhiḥ kāraṇānupalabdhir iti vigrahaḥ. dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā na atra dhūmaḥ agnyabhāvād iti. atra iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. agnyabhāvād iti anena ca nirduṣṭo hetuḥ kīrtitaḥ. na dhūma iti anena sādhyadharma uktaḥ. iha ca agneḥ kāryaṃ dhūma iti yatra agnyabhāvas tatra dhūmaḥ api katham api na. //37//

kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na asya romaharṣādi-viśeṣāḥ sannihita-dahana-viśeṣatvād iti. //38//

kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhir iti. kāraṇena viruddhaṃ kāraṇa-viruddham. tasya upalabdhir iti arthaḥ. dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā na asya romaharṣādi-viśeṣā iti. asya iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. na romaharṣādi-viśeṣā iti anena sādhyadharma uktaḥ. romaharṣas tu romṇām udbhedaḥ. sa ādir yeṣāṃ te romaharṣādayaḥ. ādiśabdena dantasaṃgharṣaṇa-śarīrakampādīnāṃ parigrahaḥ. te ca romaharṣādaya eva viśeṣā iti romaharṣādi-viśeṣāḥ. bhaya-prītyādibhir api romaharṣādir jāyate. tasya vyavachhedārthaṃ viśeṣa iti uktam. iha ca śītavāyu-pīḍitasya ye [romaharṣāḥ] te eva bodhyāḥ.

sannihita-dahanaviśeṣatvād iti atra dahana-viśeṣas tu agni-viśeṣaḥ. sannihita iti samīpavartī. sannihito dahana-viśeṣo yasya sa sannihita-dahanaviśeṣaḥ. tasya bhāvas tattvam. tasmāt sannihita-dahanaviśeṣatvāt. yādṛśaḥ agni-viśeṣaḥ śīta-nirākaraṇa-samarthas tādṛśasya siddhyarthaṃ viśeṣa iti uktam. tathāhi atra romaharṣādi-viśeṣasya hetuḥ śītasparśaḥ, tadvi-ruddhaḥ agniḥ. agnitāpaḥ śīta-nivārakaḥ. śītanivṛttau romaharṣādi-viśeṣāḥ katham api na syuḥ. //38//

kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhir yathā na romaharṣādi-viśeṣa-yukta-puruṣavān ayaṃ pradeśo dhūmād iti. //39//

kāraṇaviruddha-kāryopalabdhir iti. kāraṇena viruddhaṃ kāraṇa-viruddhaṃ. tasya kāryaṃ kāraṇaviruddha-kāryam. tasya upalabdhiḥ kāraṇaviruddha-kāryopalabdhiḥ. dṛṣṭāntam āha yathā na roamaharṣādiviśeṣa-yukta-puruṣavān ayaṃ pradeśo dhūmād iti. ayaṃ pradeśa iti anena dharmī uktaḥ. dhūmād iti anena hetur uktaḥ. na romaharṣādiviśeṣa-yukta-puruṣavān iti anena sādhyadharma uktaḥ. romaharṣādi-viśeṣeṇa yukto romaharṣādiviśeṣa-yuktaḥ. romaharṣādiviśeṣayuktaś ca asau puruṣaś ca iti romaharṣādiviśeṣa-yukta-puruṣaḥ. sa vidyate yasmin pradeśe sa romaharṣādiviśeṣa-yukta-puruṣavān.

iha romaharṣādi-viśeṣasya kāraṇaṃ śītasparśaḥ, tadviruddhaḥ agniḥ, agnikāryaṃ dhūmaḥ. tasmād yatra dhūmas tatra agniḥ. yatra agnis tatra na śītasparśaḥ. yatra na śītasparśaḥ tatra śītakāryāṇi romaharṣādi-viśeṣāḥ kathaṃ syuḥ? //39//

pūrvam upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalabdhir ekaḥ pratiṣedha-hetur uktaḥ.[9] atha kathaṃ kāryānupalabdhyādibhiḥ svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhyādibhiś ca pratiṣedha iti cet? tatra āha—

ime sarve kāryānupalabdhyādayo daśa anupalabdhi-prayogāḥ svabhāvānupalabdhau saṃgraham upayānti iti. //40//

ime iti avyavahitoktāḥ. sarve iti nikhilā daśa-saṃkhyā-paricchinnāḥ. anupalabdhi-prayogāś ca svabhāvānupalabdhau antarbhavanti. //40//

svabhāvānupalabdhi-prayogaś ca anyaḥ, kāryānupalabdhyādir api anyaḥ. tathāhi kāryānupalabdhyādiṣu arthāntara-paratiṣedhaḥ, svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhyādiṣu ca arthāntara-vidhiḥ. kathaṃ tarhi tasyām antarbhāva iti cet? tatra āha—

arthāntara-vidhi-pratiṣedhābhyāṃ prayoga-bhede api pāramparyeṇa iti. //41//

9. p. 78.10 ; 79.4 : read *yin-nam* instead of *ma-yin-nam* in both places.

yadyapi arthāntara-vidhi-pratiṣedhābhyāṃ prayoga-bheda eva tathāpi paramparayā tasyām antarbhāvaḥ abhipretaḥ, na tu vastutaḥ. tathāhi kvacit kāryānupalabdhau dhūmābhāvena dhūmahetor apratibaddhasāmarthyasya abhāve [siddhe] abhāva-pratītir bhavati. yatra dhūmābhāvas tatra upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasya eva taddhetor anupalabdhir iti svabhāvānupalabdhau antarbhavati.

pratipattṛṇāṃ cintābhedāt [bhedaḥ]—kasyacit kāryābhāva-dvāreṇa hetvabhāva-pratītiḥ, kasyacit tu svabhāvābhāva-dvāreṇa. tathā eva vyāpakānupalabdheḥ[10] kāraṇānupalabdheś ca paramparayā [antarbhāvaḥ] avagantavyaḥ. svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhau ca agninā śītābhāvapratītiḥ. yatra agnis tatra upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya śītasparśasya eva anupalabdhir iti svabhāvānupalabdhau antarbhāvaḥ.

viruddhavyāptopalabdhau api hetvantarāpekṣayā sarva-varṇeṣu prakāśa-svabhāvaḥ api [svabhāva]-anupalabdhivad eva. tathā kāraṇaviruddha-kāryopalabdhau api dhūmena agnisiddhiḥ. śītanivṛttau ca tatra tadviparītasya romaharṣādiviśeṣa-yukta-puruṣasya abhāva-siddhiḥ. sā ca tatra upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta-tādṛśa-puruṣasya anupalabdhir iti svabhāvānupalabdhau eva antarbhavati. //41//

[ye ca kārya-kāraṇa-dvaya-vyāpti-abhedaiḥ bhedābhāvena upacārāt svabhāvānupalabdhau antarbhavanti iti āhus teṣāṃ tat upacāreṇa antarbhāvaḥ, paramārthas tu na. pratijñaikadeśasya api hetutve sati paramparārthaḥ api na ramyaḥ].[11]

svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhyādiṣu ca vijātīyapramāṇena

10. p. 79.16 : transfer *khoṅ-du* (=*ava-*) to the next line immediately before *chud-par-bya-'o* (=*gantavya*).

11. p. 80.11-16 : The implication of these lines seems to be obscure and hence put in brackets. I have given above only a literal reconstruction as exact as possible. The original Tibetan runs as follows : *gaṅ-dag 'bras-bu daṅ rgyu gñis khyab-pa daṅ tha-mi-dad-pa-dag-gis bye-brag-med-par ñe-bar-btags-nas, raṅ-bshin mi-dmigs-pa'i naṅ-du-'du-'o shes brjod-pa de-dag-gi de-ni btags-pas 'du-ba-yin-gyi don-dam-par-ni ma-yin-no, dam-bcas-pa'i phyogs-gcig kyaṅ gtan-tshigs-su 'gyur-la, brgyud-pa'i-don yaṅ mi-'thad-do.* The reading in *Tibetan Tripiṭaka* (Tokyo-Kyoto ed., vol. 137, p. 154-2-1ff) is exactly the same.

nivṛttyabhidhānam iti kiṃ kena samānaṃ syād. svārthānumāne prayogo na sambhavati. tatra anupalabdhiprayogaprakāraviśeṣā ekādaśa iti kuta iti cet ? tasmād āha—

prayogadarśanābhyāsāt svayam api evaṃ vyavaccheda-pratītir bhavati iti svārthānumāne api viśeṣa-nirdeśa iti. //42//

prayogāṇāṃ darśanaṃ pratītiḥ. tasyāḥ paunaḥpunyena āvartanam abhyāsaḥ. tasmāt prayogeṣu abhyāsātiśayāt svayam api yadā kasyacid vyavachheda-pratītir bhavati tadā prayogarūpeṇa eva pratītir bhavati. ataeva svārthānumāne api anupalabdhiprayogasya viśeṣa-nirdeśaḥ. vyavachheda[12]-pratītiḥ pratiṣedha-pratyāyanam iti śeṣaḥ. yadvā vyavachheda-pratītir viśeṣa-pratipattir iti śeṣaḥ. //42//

svabhāvānupalabdher viśeṣa uktaḥ. kāryānupalabdhyādau tadabhāvāt kathaṃ teṣām avyabhicāritvam iti cet ? tatra āha—

sarvatra ca asyām abhāva-vyavahāra-sādhanyām anupalabdhau yeṣāṃ svabhāva-viruddhādīnām upalabdhyā kāraṇādīnām anupalabdhyā ca pratiṣedha uktas teṣām uplabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptānām eva upalabdhir anupalabdhiś ca veditavyā iti. // 43 //

abhāva-vyavahāra-sādhanyo vahuprakārā yā anupalabdhayaḥ abhihitās tāḥ sarvās tadviśeṣā eva draṣṭavyāḥ. yadi kāraṇāder upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalabdhiḥ syāt tadā kāryādeḥ pratiṣedha-siddhiḥ sambhavati, na anyatra. // 43 //

svabhāva-viruddhādir api yadi upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpta eva syāt tadā viparīta-pratiṣedhe samarthaḥ, na anyathā. katham iti cet ? tatra āha—

anyeṣāṃ virodha-kāryakāraṇabhāvā-'bhāvā-siddher iti. // 44 //

12. p. 81.9, 11 : read *bcad-pa* (=*cheda*) instead of *dpyad-pa* (=*īkṣaṇa*) in both places.

virodhaś ca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaś ca abhāvaś ca virodha-kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvā-'bhāvāḥ. teṣām asiddhir iti uktam. tad evaṃ ye na upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptās teṣāṃ virodhaḥ asiddhaḥ, virodhābhāvaḥ api asiddhaḥ, kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ asiddhaḥ, kārya-kāraṇabhāvābhāvaḥ api asiddha iti etat pradarśitaṃ bhavati.[13] tathāhi upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya niyatānuṣaṅgino ye dṛṣṭās tatsannidhāne kasyacit tirobhāve tena saha virodhasya pratyāyanaṃ śakyam, yat ca sannihitaṃ tad api tathā eva [viruddham]. tadupalabdhau tu virodhābhāva iti niścīyate. evam upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya yasya sattve upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptam adṛṣṭapūrvaṃ yad upalabhyate, tadabhāve na upalabhyate, tat tasmād utpadyate iti taddvayoḥ kārya-kāraṇabhāvo niścīyate. yadabhāve api yadupalabdhis taddvayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvābhāvo niścīyate. evam api abhāva-vyavahāra-siddhir upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalabdhi-samāśritā iti uktaṃ bhavati. //44//

nanu tadanyena api kvacit siddhir iti cet ? ucyate—

viprakṛṣṭa-viṣayānupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣānumāna-nivṛtti-lakṣaṇā saṃśayahetur iti. //45//

viprakṛṣṭo yo viṣayaḥ pratyakṣānumāna-nivṛtti-svabhāvaḥ sa saṃśayasya hetuḥ, na tu abhāva-vyavahāra-hetuḥ. //45//

tad eva kasmād iti āha—

pramāṇa-nivṛttau api arthābhāvāsiddher iti. //46//

pramāṇa-nivṛtti-lakṣaṇā viprakṛṣṭa-viṣayānupalabdhiḥ. pramāṇanivṛttir api arthābhāvaṃ na sādhayati. pramāṇaṃ tu arthakāryam iti pramāṇa-nivṛttyā kāraṇamātra-nivṛttir na sidhyati. //46//

Nyāyabindu-vistara-ṭīkāyāṃ śiṣyahitāyāṃ dvitīyaḥ paricchedaḥ.

13. cf. *BL* ii, p. 104, n 2.

Parārthānumāna-paricchedaḥ

samyagjñāna-nirūpaṇa-prasaṅgena svārtha-parārtha-bhedena anumānaṃ dvividham aṅgīkṛtam. tatra svārthaṃ saprapañcaṃ nirūpitam. parārthānumānābhidhānārtham evam anujānīte—

trirūpa-liṅgākhyānaṃ parārthānumānam. //1//

ākhyāyate anena iti ākhyānaṃ vacanam iti. trīṇi rūpāṇi santi yasya tat trirūpam. trirūpaṃ ca tat liṅgaṃ ca iti trirūpaliṅgam. tasya ākhyānam iti arthah. //1//

anumānaṃ ca samyagjñānam iti uktam. katham anumānaṃ vacanam iti cet ? tatra āha—

kāraṇe kāryopacārāt. //2//

kāraṇaṃ hi vacanaṃ kāryaṃ ca anumānam iti vacane tasmin anumānāropāt tad vacanam eva anumānam iti abhidhīyate. anumāna-kāraṇatvād anumānam iti ucyate iti śeṣaḥ. //2//

tad dvividhaṃ prayogabhedāt. //3//

tad dvividham iti atra tad iti parārthānumānam.[1] trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ tat kathaṃ dvividham iti ced āha prayogabhedād iti. prayogas tu śabdata upasthāpanam. tasya bhedena dvaividhyam iti. //3//

kiṃ tat prakāradvayam iti āha—

sādharmyavad vaidharmyavac ca. //4//

samāno dharmo yasya sa sadharmā. sadharmaṇo bhāvaḥ sādharmyam. tad yasya asti tat sādharmyavat. visadṛśo dharmo yasya sa vidharmā. vidharmaṇo bhāvo vaidharmyam. tad yasya asti tad vaidharmyavat. anvayavad vyatirekavac ca iti śeṣaḥ. //4//

1. p. 85. 2 omit *daṅ-sbyor-ro* (=*prayoga* which seems superfluous.

yadi sādharmya-prayogaḥ anvayavān vaidharmya-prayogaś ca vyatirekavān tarhi arthataḥ api bhedaḥ syāt. tat kasmāt prayoga-bhedena dvividham iti ucyate iti cet ? tatra āha—

na anayor arthataḥ kaścid bhedaḥ anyatra prayoga-bhedāt. //5//

sādharmyavān api trirūpāpekṣaḥ, vaidharmyavān api trirūpāpekṣaḥ. tasmāt sarvatra trirūpasattvād arthato bhedaleśaḥ api na asti. anyatra prayoga-bhedād iti. iha prayogasya eva bhedaḥ na tu sarvathā api. tathāhi prathame vastutaḥ anvayābhidhāne api vyatirekaḥ sāmarthyād avagamyate. dvitīye ca vastuto vyatirekābhidhāne api anvayaḥ arthāt jñāyate. //5//

tatra sādharmyavad, yad upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ san na upalabhyate saḥ asad-vyavahārasya viṣayaḥ siddhaḥ. yathā dṛṣṭaḥ kaścit śaśaviṣāṇādiḥ. //6//

tatra sādharmyavataḥ prathamam upanyāsaḥ. yad upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ san na upalabhyate saḥ asad-vyavahārasya viṣayaḥ siddha iti. atra anupalabdher anvaya uktaḥ. yathā dṛṣṭaḥ kaścid śaśaviṣāṇādir iti. asadvyavahārasya viṣayo dṛṣṭaḥ, tasya udāharaṇaṃ śaśaviṣāṇādiḥ. dṛṣṭa iti siddhaḥ, parīkṣita iti śeṣaḥ. tena dṛṣṭānta-kathanam. //6//

na upalabhyate ca kvacit pradeśa-viśeṣe upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpto ghaṭa iti. //7//

anena pakṣadharma uktaḥ. //7//

svabhāva-hetoḥ prayogaḥ. yat sat tat sarvam anityaṃ yathā ghaṭādir iti śuddhasya svabhāva-hetoḥ prayogaḥ. yad utpattimat tad anityam iti svabhāvabhūta-dharmabhedena svabhāvasya prayogaḥ. yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityam iti upādhibhedena. apekṣita-para-vyāpāro hi bhāvaḥ svabhāva-niṣpattau kṛtaka iti. //8//

svabhāva-hetoḥ prayoga iti. dvitīyasya hetoḥ sādharmyavān prayoga npadarśyate. yat sat tat sarvam anityaṃ yathā

ghaṭādir iti. yad iti yogyaṃ vastumātraṃ sat, tat sarvam akhilam anityam. anena anvaya eva uktaḥ.

śuddhasya svabhāva-hetoḥ prayoga iti. nirviśeṣaṇasya svabhāva-hetoḥ prayoga iti śeṣaḥ. yad utpattimat tad anityam iti vacanaṃ svabhāva-hetor dvitīyasya anvayaḥ.

svabhāvabhūta-dharmabhedena svabhāvasya prayoga iti. ātmabhūta-dharmasya eva bhedaṃ kṛtvā svabhāva-hetoḥ prayogaḥ kṛtaḥ. tathāhi utpattir vastuno janmalābhaḥ, abheda eva. tathāpi utpattir yasya asti tad utpattimad iti bhedena uktaḥ.

yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityam iti anena svabhāva-hetos tṛtīyasya anvaya uktaḥ. upādhi-bhedena iti atra upādhir viśeṣaṇam. anabhivyakta-viśeṣaṇaḥ[2] svabhāvahetu-prayoga iti śeṣaḥ.

katham anabhivyakta-viśeṣaṇa iti cet ? tatra āha apekṣita-paravyāpāro hi bhāvaḥ svabhāva-niṣpattau kṛtaka iti. apekṣitaḥ parasya vyāpāro yena iti vigrahaḥ. yaś ca bhāvaḥ svabhāva-niṣpattaye hetūnāṃ vyāpāram apekṣate [iti]. yataḥ kṛtakam iti uktaṃ tasmād anabhivyakta-viśeṣaṇaṃ svabhāva-hetvantaram [etat]. //8//

evaṃ prayatnāntarīyaka-pratyayabheda-
bheditvādayo draṣṭavyāḥ. //9//

ete api upādhibhedāpekṣitāḥ svabhāva-hetava eva draṣṭavyāḥ. tathāhi prayatne hetuvyāpāre sati yasya siddhiḥ sa prayatnāntarīyaka iti. tena anityaṃ prayatnāntarīyakatvād iti ayam api anabhivyakta-viśeṣaṇaḥ svabhāvahetur eva. pratyayasya bhedaḥ pratyayabhedaḥ. pratyayabhedena bhettuṃ śīlaṃ yasya sa pratyayabheda-bhedī. tasya bhāvaḥ pratyayabheda-bheditvam. kāraṇabhedānukūlarūpavattvam[3] iti śeṣaḥ.

tathāhi svalpa-kardamapiṇḍād ghaṭaḥ kṣudro bhavati, mahatas tu mahān bhavati. nipuṇakumbhakāra-vyāpāre sati śobhano bhavati, anipuṇa-[kumbhakāra]-vyāpāre aśobhano bhavati. tasmād anityaṃ pratyayabheda-bheditvād iti ayam api anabhivyakta-viśeṣaṇaḥ svabhāva-hetur eva. //9//

2. p. 88. 1f: =*bye-brag-mi-mṅon-pa*
3. p. 89. 1f: =*rgyu'i-bye-brag-gis rjes-su-mthun-pa-can-ñid.*

saṇ utpattimān kṛtako vā śabda iti pakṣadharmopadarśanam. //10//

pūrvaṃ trayāṇāṃ svabhāvahetūnām anvayamātram uktam. idānīṃ tena krameṇa pakṣadharmā ucyante. san śabdaḥ, utpattimān śabdaḥ, kṛtakaḥ śabda iti prayogabheda-darśanārthaṃ vā iti. //10//

sarve ete sādhanadharmā yathāsvaṃ pramāṇaiḥ[4] *siddha-sādhana-dharma-mātrānubandha eva sādhyadharme avagantavyāḥ.* //11//

tanmātrānubandhini sādhyadharme svabhāvo hetur iti pūrvaṃ svabhāvahetu-lakṣaṇaṃ yad abhihitaṃ tatprayogārtham āha sarva ete sādhanadharmā iti. pūrvaṃ yeṣāṃ trividhānāṃ svabhāvahetūnāṃ pakṣadharmā uktās te. yathāsvaṃ pramāṇair iti. yasya yad ātmīyaṃ pramāṇaṃ taiḥ svapramāṇaiḥ.

siddha-sādhanadharmamātrānubandhe eva sādhyadharme avagantavyā iti. sādhanadharma-svarūpam eva sādhanadhramamātram. sādhanadharmamātreṇa anubandhaḥ sādhanadharmamātrānubandhaḥ. anubandhaḥ sambandhaḥ. anvaya iti śeṣaḥ. siddhaḥ sādhanadharmamātrānubandho yasya sādhyadharmasya tasmin.

yathāsvaṃ sādhyadharme sādhanadharmamātrānubandhe sādhite eva te pakṣadharmā hetutvena abhidheyā iti. //11//

kasmāt ca sādhyadharmaḥ sādhanadharmamātrānubandhī iti cet ? tatra āha—

vastutas tat-svabhāvatvāt. //12//

tathāhi paramārthataḥ anityasvabhāva eva kṛtakaḥ. anyaś ca kṛtakaḥ, anyaś ca anitya iti tu na. katham iti cet ? hetupratyayair yat kriyate tad vinaśyat-svabhāvam eva iti. //12//

svabhāvasya ca hetutvāt. //13//

atra sādhyasya svabhāva eva hetur uktaḥ. kathaṃ sādhyānanubandhī syāt ? tathāhi tanmātrānubandhi-svabhāva eva iti. //13//

4. p. 90. 2 ; read *tshad-ma* (=*pramāṇa*) instead of *bsgrub-pa* (=*siddha*).

tac ca kasmāt iti cet ? tatra āha—

tanniṣpattau aniṣpannasya tatsvabhāva-tvābhāvāt. //14//

yadi sādhanadharmasya kṛtakatvādeḥ siddhau sādhyaḥ anityatvādir na siddhyati tadā kṛtakatvānityatve paramārthata ekasvabhāve na syātām. //14//

vyabhicāra-sambhavāc ca. //15//

yadi kṛtakatva-pariniṣpattau uttarakāle daṇḍādi-kāraṇāntareṇa anityatvaṃ kriyeta tadā vyabhicāraḥ syāt, daṇḍāder api svapratyaya-sāpekṣatayā utpannatvāt. tad avaśyam eva anutpannasya kasya api vināśasya api na sambhava iti. //15//

kāryahetoḥ prayogaḥ. yatra dhūmas tatra agniḥ. yathā mahānasādau. asti ca iha dhūma iti. //16//

kāryahetoḥ prayoga iti sādharmyavad-anumānasya kāryahetoḥ prayoga upadarśyate. yatra dhūmas tatra agnir iti. yatra iti yasmin pradeśe dhūmas tatra sarvatra agnir iti anvaya iti. yathā mahānasādau iti anena dṛṣṭānto darśitaḥ. asti ca iha dhūma iti. abhimatadeśe ca dhūmo dṛśyate iti pakṣadharmo darśitaḥ. //16//

iha api kārya-kāraṇabhāve siddhe eva kāraṇe sādhye kāryahetur vaktavyaḥ. //17//

kāryahetau api pūrvaṃ kārya-kāraṇabhāvaḥ sādhanīyaḥ. anantaraṃ ca kāraṇa-sādhanārthaṃ kāryahetur vaktavyaḥ. tathāhi svarūpeṇa niścitam eva liṅgaṃ jñeyam, na tu aniścitam iti. //17//

vaidharmyavataḥ prayogaḥ. //18//

yāni ca vaidharmyavad-anumānāni tāni vaktavyāni. //18//

yat sad upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ tad upalabhyate eva. yathā nīlādi-viśeṣaḥ. na

ca evam iha upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya upalabdhir ghaṭasya iti anupalabdhi-prayogaḥ. //19//

yat sad upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptam tad upalabhyate eva iti. sat ca vastu kim api upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptam yadi syāt tadā avaśyam upalabhyeta. etena vyatireka uktaḥ. yathā nīlādi-viśeṣa iti vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ.

na ca evam iha upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya ghaṭasya upalabdhir iti upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpto yādṛśo nīlādi-viśeṣa upalabhyate tādṛśo ghaṭa iha na asti. iha iti anena abhimataḥ pradeśa uktaḥ. anupalabdhi-prayoga iti. ayam anupalabdher vaidharmyavān prayoga iti. // 19 //

asati anityatve na asti sattvam utpattimattvaṃ kṛtakatvaṃ vā. san ca śabda utpattimān kṛtakaś ca iti svabhāvahetoḥ prayogaḥ. // 20 //

asati anityatve na asti sattvam utpattimattvaṃ kṛtakatvaṃ vā iti anena trayāṇāṃ svabhāvahetūnāṃ vyatireka upadarśitaḥ. san ca śabda utpattimān kṛtako vā iti pakṣadharmā uktāḥ. svabhāvahetoḥ prayoga iti. ete ca svabhāvahetor vaidharmyavantaḥ prayogā iti. // 20 //

asati agnau na bhavati eva dhūmaḥ. atra ca asti iti kāryahetoḥ prayogaḥ. // 21 //

asati agnau na bhavati eva dhūma iti anena vyatireka uktaḥ. atra ca asti iti anena pakṣadharma uktaḥ. kāryahetoḥ prayoga iti. kāryahetor vaidharmyavān prayoga upadarśita iti. // 21 //

sādharmyavad-anumāne ca anvayaḥ pakṣadharmo vyatirekaś ca iti trīṇi rūpāṇi na abhivyaktāni. kathaṃ parārthānumānaṃ trirūpaliṅgākhyānam iti cet ? tatra āha—

sādharmyeṇa api hi prayoge arthād vaidharmyagatir iti. // 22 //

yasmāt sāmarthyadvāreṇa sādharmyavat-prayoge api vaidharmyasya pratītis tasmāt yathoktadoṣa-prasaṅgo na asti iti. //22//

sāmarthyaṃ ca kīdṛśam iti ced āha—

asati tasmin sādhye hetor anvayābhāvāt. //23//

yadi vyatireko na syāt tadā sādhyena hetor anvayaḥ api asiddha eva syād iti. //23//

tathā vaidharmyeṇa api anvayagatir iti. //24//

vaidharmyavat-prayoge api sāmarthyena anvayapratītir bhavati iti. //24//

atha tac ca sādharmyaṃ kīdṛśam iti ced āha—

asati tasmin sādhyābhāve hetvabhāvasya asiddheḥ. //25//

yadi sādhyena hetor anvayo na syāt tadā sādhyābhāve api [hetoḥ] abhāvaḥ kathaṃ syāt ? //25//

anvayābhāve vyatirekaḥ asiddha iti etat kasmād iti cet ? tatra āha—

asati svabhāva-pratibandhe ekanivṛttau aparasya nivṛttir niyamena na iti. //26//

yadi svabhāvapratibandha ātmanaḥ svarūpeṇa pratibandho na syāt tadā ekanivṛttau api aparasya nivṛttir niyamena na syāt. yathā kvacid aśvābhāve gavām api abhāvo na iti. //26//

sa ca sarvasya dviprakāraḥ. tādātmyalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇaś ca iti uktam. //27//

sa ca sarvasya dviprakāra iti. sarvasya eva padārthasya yaḥ kaḥ api pratibandho yogyaḥ samupalabhyate sa sarvaḥ prakāradvaye eva antarbhavati. tādātmya-[lakṣaṇaḥ] tadutpatti-[lakṣaṇaḥ] ca iti uktam iti.

tasya ātma tadatmā. tadātmano bhāvas tādātmyam. tādātmyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ yasya sa tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ. tasmād utpattis tadutpattiḥ. tadutpattir lakṣaṇaṃ yasya sa tadutpattilakṣaṇa iti vigrahaḥ. etac ca pūrvam uktam eva. //27//

tena hi nivṛttiṃ kathayatā pratibandho darśanīyaḥ. //28//

yasmāt pratibandhe sati ekanivṛttyā aparanivṛttir bhavati, abhāve na, tena hetunā kasyacid ekasya nivṛttyā aparanivṛttir abhidhīyate. etena nivartya-nivartakayoḥ pratibandha ukta iti. //28//

tasmād nivṛttivacanam ākṣipta-pratibandhopadarśanam eva bhavati. //29//

nivṛttivacanena eva pratibandha ākṣipyate iti. //29//

yadi evaṃ syād eva tataś ca kim āyātam iti ced āha—

yac ca pratibandhopadarśanaṃ tad eva anvaya iti. //30//

yad eva pratibandhopadarśanaṃ tad eva anvaya iti. //30//

tasmād ekena api vākyena anvayamukhena vyatirekamukhena vā prayuktena sapakṣāsapakṣayor liṅgasya sadasattva-khyāpanaṃ kṛtaṃ bhavati iti na avaśya-vākyadvaya-prayogaḥ. //31//

tasmād ekena api vākyena anvayamukhena vyatirekamukhena vā prayuktena sapakṣāsapakṣayor liṅgasya sadasattvakhyāpanaṃ kṛtaṃ bhavati iti. yadyapi anvayamukhena prayogaḥ kriyate ced vyatirekamukhena karaṇam api yuktam eva tathāpi uktaprakāreṇa sapakṣāsapakṣayoḥ sattvāsattvayor abhidhānam eva sattvāsattva-pradarśanaṃ bhavati [iti] ubhayena api liṅgena pratyekaṃ kriyate.

iti na avaśyavākyadvaya-prayoga iti. tasmād ekasmin eva prayoge sādharmyavato vaidharmyavataś ca vākyadvayasya prayogo na avaśyakāryaḥ. //31//

evaṃ kārya-svabhāvahetvor anvaya-vyatirekayoḥ parasparākṣepaḥ[5] abhihitaḥ. tṛtīyahetu-nirdeśārtham āha—

anupalabdhau api. //32//

kārya-svabhāvahetubhyām anadhigatasya iti śeṣaḥ. //32//

5. p. 97. 2 : *gcig-gis-gcig-(=paraspara).*

yat sad upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ tad upalabhyate eva iti ukte anupalabhyamānaṃ tādṛśam asad iti pratīter anvayasiddhir iti. //33//

yadā upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ yadi syād avaśyam upalabhyeta iti vyatireka ucyate tadā upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalambhe sāmarthyād na asti iti pratītir jāyate. tasmād anvayasiddhir ākṣipyate eva. evam anvayākṣepa uktaḥ. anupalabdhau vyatirekākṣepas tu svayaṃ draṣṭavya iti. //33//

sādharmyavati vaidharmyavati ca anumāne ubhayatra api pakṣanirdeśo[6] na asti. evaṃ ca pakṣanirdeśābhāva eva kalpyate iti cet ? tatra āha—

dvayor api anayoḥ prayoge avaśyaṃ pakṣanirdeśo na. //34//

avaśyam eva pakṣo nirdeśya iti yo niyamaḥ sa tu na asti. //34//

evaṃ sādharmyavat-prayoge api yad upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ na upalabhyate saḥ asadvyavahāra-viṣayaḥ. //35//

upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpto yāvān na upalabbhyate sa sarvaḥ asadvyavahāra-viṣaya iti nikhilapadārthopasaṃhāreṇa[7] anvayaḥ kārya iti. //35//

atra api upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpto ghaṭo na upalabhyate iti pakṣadharma-nirdeśe sāmarthyād atra ghaṭo na asti iti bhavati iti. //36//

nikhilapadārthopasaṃhāreṇa anvayo yatra ca pakṣadharmaḥ [iti etayoḥ] nirdeśe tac ca sādhyaṃ tatra sāmarthyena sidhyati iti pakṣanirdeśasya kiṃ prayojanam ? //36//

6. p. 97. 16 : omit *ma* (=*na*) and add *phyogs*(=*pakṣa*) before *bstan-pa* (=*nirdeśa*).

7. p. 98. 6f : =*dṅos-po-ma-lus-pa-bsdu-bas.*

tathā vaidharmyavat-prayoge api yaḥ sadvyavahāra-viṣaya upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaḥ sa upalabhyate eva. //37//

sadvyavahāra-viṣayo yāvān bhāvaḥ sa sarva upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaḥ avaśyam upalabhyate iti vyatireka uktaḥ. //37//

na tathā atra tādṛśo ghaṭa upalabhyate iti pakṣadharma-nirdeśe sāmarthyād atra sadvyavahāra-viṣayo na iti bhavati iti. //38//

nikhilapadārthopasaṃhāreṇa yo vyatireka-nirdeśaḥ pakṣadharmaś ca iti tadubhaya-sāmarthyena pratijñā-pratīter na pratijñā-nirdeśaḥ. anyathā yad na pratīyate tan nirdiśyeta. yadā sāmarthyena pratijñārtha-pratītir jāyate tadā pratijñā-vacana-śravaṇe uparodhena api ka āgrahī syāt[8] ? evaṃ ca yadā sāmarthyena vitarka-viṣayārtha[9]-viniścayaḥ pakṣadharma-vyāpti-nirdeśavalāc ca pratijñārthāvagamas tatra pakṣanirdeśena kim ?

etac ca viniścaya-vacanābhidhāne draṣṭavyam. prapañcābhidhānārthaṃ pakṣanirdeśe ca doṣaḥ kaḥ api na asti. ataeva niyamo na iti uktam. yadi punas sarvathā pakṣanirdeśa-pratiṣedha eva abhipretaḥ syāt tarhi vacanam etad avaśyaṃ na upadiśyeta iti uktaṃ bhavati iti. //38//

yadi viniścaya-vacanābhidhāne na pakṣanirdeśa [iti] ucyate, yatra prapañcābhidhānaṃ tatra nirdeśaḥ, [tarhi]—

kīdṛśaḥ punaḥ pakṣa iti nirdeśyaḥ. //39//

kīdṛśa-lakṣaṇa-viśiṣṭaḥ pakṣatvena abhidheya iti ced āha—

svarūpeṇa eva svayam iṣṭaḥ anirākṛtaḥ nirdeśyaḥ pakṣa iti abhidheya iti. //40//

yaś ca artho vādyabhimatena viṣayīkṛtaḥ sādhyarūpeṇa eva nirdiśyate tathā pratyakṣādinā ca na nirākriyate tādṛśaḥ arthaḥ pakṣa iti abhidheyaḥ. eṣa samāsārthaḥ. //40//

8. p. 99. 9 : *dam-bcas-pa'i-tshig-la ṅo-mi-chod-pa ci yod.* The reconstruction is not exactly literal.

9. p. 99. 10 : *log-par-rtog-pa'i-yul-gyi-don = vitarka-viṣayārtha.*

avayavārthas tu—

svarūpeṇa iti sādhyatvena iṣṭa iti. //41//

sādhyarūpeṇa vinā anyarūpeṇa na yujyate iti ataḥ svarūpeṇa uktam eva sādhyatvena avagantavyam iti. //41//

svarūpeṇa eva iti sādhyatvena iṣṭaḥ, na sādhanatvena api. //42//

anayā uktyā kevalasādhyarūpeṇa nirdeśyasya eva pakṣatvena abhidhānam, anyarūpeṇa [nirdeśyasya] tu na iti. //42//

sādhyarūpānya-[rūpa]-viśiṣṭasya nirdeśaḥ kīdṛśa iti ced āha—

yathā śabdasya anityatve sādhye hetuś cākṣuṣatvaṃ śabde asiddhatvāt sādhyaṃ bhavati iti. //43//

yaḥ śabdaḥ saḥ anitya iti ucyamāne tac ca cākṣuṣatvaṃ śabde asiddham iti sādhyaṃ bhavati. tasmāt [svarūpeṇa eva iti] nirdeśābhāve cākṣuṣatva-nirdeśasya api pakṣatva-prasaṅgaḥ. //43//

yadi tasmin sādhyarūpam asti eva, kasmān na pakṣa iti ced āha—

atra sādhanatvena api abhidhānāt sādhyatvam eva na iti. //44//

cākṣuṣatve sādhyarūpatā asti eva. tathāpi hetutvena nirdeśād na kevalaṃ sādhyasvarūpatvam eva, sādhanarūpatā api asti. tasmāt sādhyatve api atirikta-sādhanarūpa-sattvād adhikavacanasya pakṣatvaṃ nirastam. //44//

svayam iti vādinā yas tadā sādhanam āha [tena] iti. //45//

sādhanaṃ kathayatā svayaṃ nirdeśyo yaḥ arthaḥ sa eva pakṣaḥ, śāstrakāreṇa nirdeśyaḥ arthas tu na iti śeṣaḥ. tena iti. vādinā nirdeśya eva pakṣa ucyate. //45//

yadyapi kvacit śāstre sthitaḥ sādhanam āha ca iti. //46//

kaścit kvacit śāstre sthitaḥ pakṣe kṛtaniścaya eva, astu tādṛśo niścayaḥ, tathāpi yadi śāstrād uddhṛtya pramāṇīkriyate iti śeṣaḥ. //46//

tacchāstrakāreṇa tasmin dharmiṇi[10] *aneka-dharmābhyupagame api iti. //47//*

vādī yasmin śāstre sthitaḥ sādhanaṃ kathayati tacchāstrakāreṇa vitarkaviṣaya-dharmiṇi yadi vahavo dharmā aṅgīkriyante tathāpi ca—

tadā tena vādinā yo dharmaḥ svayaṃ sādha-yitum iṣṭaḥ sa eva sādhyo na itara iti uktaṃ bhavati iti. //48//

vādinā eva yo dharmaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ sa eva sādhyaḥ, śāstrakāreṇa iṣṭas tu na. yasmād vādinā nirdeśyasya pakṣatvam aṅgīkriyate tasmād vādinā śāstrāṅgīkāradvāreṇa upakārako[11] yo dharmaḥ pariṣkartum iṣyate sa eva sādhyaḥ. śāstrakāreṇa aṅgīkṛtas tu na iti anena vacanena uktaṃ bhavati. //48//

iṣṭa iti yatra arthe vivādena sādhanam upa-nyastaṃ tasya siddhim icchatā iti. //49//

[iṣṭa]-śabdārtha ākhyāyate. yasmin vastuni vivāda utpannaḥ, vivādādhikaraṇaṃ tad vastu sādhayitum icchatā sādhyatvena upanyastaḥ artha eva iṣṭa iti. //49//

saḥ anuktaḥ api vacanena sādhyo bhavati iti. //50//

yadi vitarka-viṣyārthaḥ asau vacanena na abhidhīyate tathāpi sa eva sādhyo bhavati. //50//

tac ca kasmād iti ced āha—

tad-adhikaraṇatvād vivādasya iti. //51//

tata eva yasmād vivādaḥ katham asau vivāda eva sādhyo na syāt ? //51//

yac ca vivādādhikaraṇaṃ tad vacanena anuktam api sādhyam eva iṣyate iti katham iti cet ? tatra āha—

yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṃghāta-tvāt śayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti. //52//

10. p. 102. 10 : *chos-can de-la* (=*tasmin dharmiṇi*) seems better than *bstan-cos de-la* (=*tasmin śāstre*).

11. p. 103. 3 : =*sman-daṅ-'dag-ñid-'dod-pa.*

yathā śayanāsanādīni aṅgāni saṃghātarūpatvāt parārthāni dṛṣṭāni tathā cakṣurādayaḥ api saṃghātarūpatvāt parārthā eva iti prayogārthaḥ. //52//

atra ātmārthā iti anukte api ātmārthatā eva sādhyaṃ bhavati iti. //53//

asmin prayoge yadyapi cakṣurādaya ātmarthā iti na uktaṃ tathāpi ātmārthatā eva sādhyate. anyathā parārthatvamātre [sādhye] siddhasādhanaṃ syāt. ātmani [ātmārthatāyām] vipratipattyā sādhyatvena upasthāpyate. tasmāt tad eva sādhyaṃ bhavati. //53//

tena uktamātram eva sādhyaṃ na iti uktaṃ bhavati iti. //54//

yasmād evam anuktam api iṣṭatvena viṣayīkaraṇāt sādhyatvena eva iṣṭaṃ tasmāt kevalam uktam eva na sādhyaṃ bhvavati. katham iti cet ? [yasmāt] iṣṭatvena viṣayīkṛtam api sādhyam eva. //54//

anirākṛta iti etat-lakṣaṇa-yoge api yaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ api arthaḥ pratyakṣa-anumāna-prasiddhi-svavacanair nirākriyate na sa pakṣa iti pradarśanārtham iti. //55//

yathokta-lakṣaṇa-yuktaḥ api artho yadi sādhanadaśāyāṃ pratyakṣa-anumāna-prasiddhi-svavacanair nirākriyate tadā saḥ arthaḥ pakṣo na bhavati iti pradarśanārtham anirākṛta iti uktam. //55//

tatra pratyakṣa-nirākṛto yathā aśrāvaṇaḥ śabda iti. //56//

atra śravaṇam ākarṇanam. karṇavijñānam iti śeṣaḥ. śrāvaṇa-pratītir vā. śravaṇena grāhyaḥ śrāvaṇaḥ. na śrāvaṇaḥ aśrāvaṇaḥ. karṇavijñānena apratīta iti śeṣaḥ. tathāca atra śabdo dharmī. aśrāvaṇatvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ. aśrāvaṇaḥ śabda iti pratijñā tu pratyakṣeṇa nirākriyate. tathāhi karṇavijñānasya śabda-prakāśakatvaṃ prāṇibhiḥ sarvaiḥ svayam avagamyate. tena [śabde] śrāvaṇatvasya svakīyajñānena pratīter aśrāvaṇatvaṃ nirākriyate. //56//

anumāna-nirākṛto yathā ghaṭo nitya iti. //57//

atra ghaṭasya nityatvaṃ pratijñātaṃ kṛtakādyanumānena nirākriyate. tathāhi kṛtakam anityaṃ dṛṣṭam. ghaṭah api kṛtaka iti. tena kuto nityatvam? //57//

prasiddhi-nirākṛto yathā acandraḥ śaśī iti. //58//

yadi kenacid śaśī na candraśabdābhidheya iti pratijñā kriyate, sa tu śaśī candra-śabdābhidheya[12] eva iti prasiddhyā nirākriyate. apica, sarveṣu artheṣu sarvasya śabdasya vācyatayā api nirākriyate. śabdārtha-sambandhasya saṅketa[13]-sūcitatvāt. yathā ghaṭasya api candra-śabdābhidhāna-yogyatā. //58//

svavacana-nirākṛto yathā na anumānaṃ pramāṇam iti. //59//

kenacid anumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na bhavati iti ucyamāne tat svavacanena viruddham. anumānaṃ pramāṇam eva yadi na syāt etad vacanam api na vaktavyam. tathāhi vākyaṃ api anumānāntarbhūtam eva. anumānaṃ ca yadi pramāṇaṃ na syāt vākyaṃ tāvat kutaḥ pramāṇam? tad vākyam apramāṇaṃ cet kasmād ucyate iti svavacanena viruddham. //59//

[iti] catvāraḥ pakṣābhāsā nirākṛtā bhavanti iti. //60//

atra āgama-viruddhaḥ svavacana-viruddhe antarbhūta iti sarve pakṣābhāsāś catvāra iti uktam. kiṃca āgamasya vastuvalapravṛtte anumāne anāśrayaṇīyatayā avirodhād api catvāra iti uktam. iti iti. uktaprakāreṇa. //60//

siddhasya asiddhasya api sādhanatvena abhimatasya tadā vādinā svayaṃ sādhayitum aniṣṭasya uktamātrasya nirākṛtasya ca viparyayeṇa sādhya iti. //61//

12. p. 106. 3f: omit *gnag-rdsi-mo-tshad* which does not seem to make any sense.

13. p. 106. 6: *brda'i-rtags-pa=saṅketa.*

atra viparītam iti pratyekaṃ yojanīyam. etena siddhasya viparītam, asiddhasya api [viparītam], sādhanatvena abhimatasya viparītam, tadā vādinā svayaṃ sādhayitum aniṣṭasya viparītam, uktamātrasya viparītam, nirākṛtamātrasya ca viparītaṃ pakṣatvena draṣṭavyam iti ayam artha ukto bhavati. tathāca vaiparītyamukhena pakṣalakṣaṇa-kathanam etat. //61//

tena eva rūpeṇa vādinā iṣṭaḥ anirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti pakṣalakṣaṇam anavadyaṃ darśitaṃ bhavati iti. //62//

tena eva rūpeṇa iti. sādhyatvena eva iti śeṣaḥ. vādinā iṣṭa iti śāstrakārasya iṣṭo nirastaḥ iṣṭa iti uktamātram eva na [iti pradarśanārtham]. anirākṛta iti. apariharayaṇīya iti śeṣaḥ. pakṣa iti. sādhya iti śeṣaḥ. iti pakṣa-lakṣaṇam anavadyaṃ darśitaṃ bhavati iti. evaṃ pakṣasya lakṣaṇaṃ doṣarahitam abhihitam [iti]. tad evaṃ yathārthalakṣaṇakam anumānaṃ kṛtavyākhyānam. //62//

anumānābhāsābhidhānānujñārtham āha—

trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ parārthānumānam iti uktam iti. //63//

uktam iti uktvā hetvābhāsasya sambandha ucyate. //63//

tatra trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇāṃ yadi ekam api anuktam. //64//

tadā nyūnam[14] iti sādhanadoṣo bhavati. //64//

uktam api pratipādya-pratipādakayor asiddhau sandehe vā iti. //65//

trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇāṃ yogyam ekam api yadi uktam api vādiprativādinor asiddhaṃ sandigdhaṃ vā syāt tadā api sādhanābhāsaḥ syāt. tad evaṃ sādhanābhāsa-yogo darśitaḥ. //65//

14. p. 108. 12f: =*ma-tshañ-ba.*

viśeṣakathanārtham āha—

ekasya rūpasya dharmisambandhasya asiddhau sandehe ca asiddho hetvābhāsa iti. //66//

dharmiṇā sambandho dharmisambandhaḥ. pakṣadharma iti arthaḥ. tasya asiddhau sandehe ca asiddho nāma hetvābhāso bhavati. //66//

dṛṣṭānta-nirdeśārtham āha—

yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ [iti] sādhye cākṣuṣatvam ubhayāsiddham iti. //67//

śabdasya cākṣuṣatvaṃ hi vādi-prativādinor ubhayor api ananumatam. //67//

cetanās taravaḥ [iti] sādhye sarvatvag-apaharaṇe maraṇaṃ prativādyasiddham iti. //68//

yadi digamvarair uktaṃ cetanā vṛkṣāḥ sarvatvag-apaharaṇe maraṇād iti bauddhaiḥ pramīyate tarhi vṛkṣāṇāṃ sarvatvag-apaharaṇe maraṇaṃ bauddhānām asiddham. //68//

kasmād asiddham iti ced āha—

vijñānendriyāyur-nirodha-lakṣaṇasya maraṇasya anena abhyupagamād iti. //69//

vijñānaṃ ca indriyāṇi ca āyuś ca iti vigrahaḥ. teṣāṃ nirodho vijñānendriyāyur-nirodhaḥ. sa eva lakṣaṇaṃ yasya maraṇasya tad vijñānendriyāyurnirodha-lakṣaṇaṃ maraṇam. bauddhānāṃ tu tathāvidhaṃ maraṇam anumatam, na tu śoṣamātram.[15] //69//

tasya ca taruṣu asambhavād iti. //70//

tādṛśaṃ hi marṇaṃ vṛkṣeṣu na sambhavati. //70//

15. p. 110. 1 : =*skam-pa-tsam.*

acetanāḥ sukhādayaḥ [iti] sādhye utpatti-mattvam anityatvaṃ vā sāṃkhyasya svayaṃ vādinaḥ asiddham iti. //71//

yadā sāṃkhyair uktaṃ sukhādayaḥ acetanā utpattimattvād anityatvād iti bauddhaiḥ pramīyate, tadā sukhādiṣu utpattir anityatvaṃ vā sāṃkhyānāṃ svayam eva asiddham. tasya hi kim api na utpadyate, kim api vā na vinaśyati. //71//

tathā tasya svayaṃ tadāśrayaṇasya vā san-dehe asiddha iti. //72//

yadā hetor ātmanas tadadhikaraṇasya vā sandehas tadā asi-ddha-hetvābhāso bhavati. //72//

tatra dṛṣṭāntaḥ—

yathā agnisiddhau vāṣpādi-bhāvena sandi-hyamāno bhūtasaṃghāta iti. //73//

vāṣpa ādir yasya sa vāṣpādiḥ. teṣāṃ bhāvo vāṣpādi-bhāvaḥ, vāṣpādi-svarūpam iti śeṣaḥ. bhūtānāṃ saṃghāto bhūta-saṃghātaḥ. agnisiddhau hetuḥ kriyate ced asau vāṣpo vā dhūlir vā dhūmo vā kuheḍikā[16] vā iti vāṣpādibhāvena sandihyamānaḥ asiddha-hetvābhāso bhavati. //73//

tadāśraya-sandeha-nirdeśārtham āha—

yathā iha nikuñje mayūraḥ kekāyitād iti. //74//

mayūradhvani-pravāhaḥ kekāyitam. nikuñjaḥ parvata-pradeśa-viśeṣaḥ. yadi kenacid iha nikuñje mayūraḥ asti kekāyitād iti

16. p. 111. 2 : =*khug-na.*

pramīyate, tadā mayūradhvanis tatra tadabhimata-nikuñje sandigdha eva. //74//

kathaṃ sandigdha iti ced āha—

tadāpātadeśa-vibhrame iti. //75//

mayūradhvanyāpāta-deśaḥ sandigdha eva. sa hi mayūradhvaniḥ kasmān nikuñjān niḥsarati iti atra saṃśaya eva. //75//

dharmyasiddhau api asiddho yathā sarvagata ātmā iti sādhye sarvatra upalabhamāna-guṇatvam iti. //76//

sarvagato nikhilavyāpī. vibhur[17] iti śeṣaḥ. sarvatra upalabhamānā guṇā yasya iti vigrahaḥ. tasya bhāvaḥ sarvatropalabhamāna-guṇatvam. kaścit sarvatropalabhamāna-guṇatvena sarvagatatvam ātmanaḥ sādhayati. tatra āśrayāsiddho hetuḥ. tathāhi sarvatropalabhamāna-guṇatvaṃ yasya dharma uktaḥ sa ātmā eva na asti.

ayaṃ tu parasamvādaḥ. sukhādaya ātmaguṇā iti prasiddham. te ca sarvadeśasthe eva devadatte upalabhyante. kriyābhāvād ātmani gamanāgamane na staḥ. yasmāt tasya guṇāḥ sarvatra upalabhyante, tasmād nūnam ātmā sarvatra sthita iti. //76//

tathā ekasya rūpasya asapakṣe asattvasya asiddhau anaikāntiko hetvābhāsa iti. //77//

vyatirekāsiddhau anaikāntiko hetvābhāso draṣṭavyaḥ. //77//

dṛṣṭānta-nirdeśārtham āha—

yathā śabdasya nityatvādike dharme sādhye prameyatvādiko dharmaḥ sapakṣa-vipakṣayoḥ sarvatra ekadeśe vā vartamāna iti. //78//

17. p. 111. 18 : *thams-cad-na-yod* (=lit. *sarvatra san*)

nityatvaṁ ādir yasya dharmasya sa nityatvādikaḥ. tathā prameyatvam ādir yasya sa prameyatvādikaḥ. śabdo nityaḥ prameyatvād iti sādhye prameyatvaṃ sapakṣa-vipakṣayoḥ sarvatra asti. śabdo na prayatnāntarīyakaḥ anityatvād iti sādhye, anityatvaṃ sapakṣasya ekadeśe vipakṣasya ca sarvatra eva asti. śabdaḥ prayatnāntarīyakaḥ anityatvād iti sādhye, anityatvaṃ sapakṣasya sarvatra vipakṣasya ca ekadeśe asti. śabdo nityaḥ asparśād iti sādhye, sparśābhāvaḥ sapakṣa-vipakṣayor ubhayor ekadeśe asti. etena sādhāraṇānaikāntikaś caturvidha uktaḥ. //78//

tathā asya eva rūpasya sandehe api anaikāntika eva iti. //79//

vipakṣe asattvam eva yadā sandigdhas tadā api anaikāntika eva. //79//

dṛṣṭānta-nirdeśārtham āha—

yathā asarvajñaḥ kaścid vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo rāgādimān vā iti sādhye vaktṛtvādiko dharma iti. //80//

kenacid vivakṣitaḥ kaścit puruṣo na sarvajño vaktṛtvāt tathā rāgādimān [vā] vaktṛtvād eva iti ucyamāne tasya vaktṛtvādi-dharmaḥ anaikāntika eva. //80//

sa ca anaikāntikaḥ kiṃ-nāmaka iti ced āha—

sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛttika iti. //81//

vipakṣād vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdhā asya iti sa sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛttikaḥ. sandigdha-vyatireka iti śeṣaḥ. sarvajñaḥ kaścid vaktā na dṛśyate iti adarśane api vyatireka-siddhir na bhavati. //81//

katham ayam anaikāntika iti cet? tatra āha—

evamprakārasya anupalabhyasya adṛśyātmaviṣayatvena sandehe hetutvād iti. //82//

sarvajñasya vaktur adarśane api adṛśyātmaviṣayā iyam anupalabdhir iti adṛśyātmaviṣayatvāt sandehahetur eva bhavati, vyatireka-siddhiṃ na abhidhatte. //82//

tasmād asarvajña-viparyayād vaktṛtvāder vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdhā iti. //83//

adṛśya-viṣayānupalambhaḥ saṃśayasya eva hetur iti asarvajña-viparyayāt sarvajñād vaktṛtva-lakṣaṇa-hetor nivṛttiḥ sandigdhā eva. //83//

anupalabdhir adṛśyātmaviṣayatvād vyatirekaṃ mā sādhayatu. svabhāva-virodhopalabdhyā siddhiḥ syād iti cet? tatra āha—

vaktṛtva-sarvajñatvayor virodhābhāvād iti. //84//

vaktṛtva-sarvajñatvayos tu virodho na asti. //84//

tasmāt—

yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sa vaktā na bhavati iti adarśane api vyatireko na sidhyati, sandehād iti. //85//

sarvajñasya vaktur adarśane api vaktṛtva-sarvajñatvayor virodhābhāvād vaktṛtvasya sarvajñatvād vyāvṛttir na sidhyati, sandehasattvāt. //85//

kathaṃ tayor virodhābhāva iti cet? tatra āha—

dvividho hi padārthānāṃ virodha iti. //86//

yatra yaḥ kaḥ api virodha upalabhyate sa sarva eva prakāra-dvaye antarbhavati. eko vāstava-virodhaḥ. dvitīyo lākṣaṇika-virodhaḥ. //86//

vāstava-virodha-kathanārtham āha—

avikalakāraṇasya bhavataḥ anyabhāve sati abhāvād virodhaḥ. śītoṣṇa-sparśavad iti. //87//

yadā bhāvasya kāraṇasamūhānām avaikalye kāraṇa-nivartyasya āvirbhāvaḥ, anyabhāva-pariniṣpattau ca nivṛttiḥ, tadā virodhapratītiḥ. yathā śītoṣṇa-sparśayoḥ śītasya avikala-kāraṇasya sato yadā uṣṇatva-pariniṣpattis tadā śītanivṛttiḥ. tayoś ca loke virodhapratītiḥ. //87//

paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇatayā vā bhāvābhāvavad iti. //88//

paraspara-parihāreṇa sthitaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ yeṣāṃ tāni paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇāni. teṣāṃ bhāvaḥ paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇatā. tayā virodhaḥ. yathā bhāvābhāvayor bhāvaḥ abhāva-parihāreṇa vyavasthitaḥ, abhāvaś ca bhāva-parihāreṇa vyavasthitaḥ. //88//

sa ca dvividhaḥ api virodho vaktṛtva-sarva-jñatvayor na sambhavati iti. //89//

sa ca ubhayavidhaḥ api virodho vaktṛ-sarvajñayor na sambhavati. vaktṛtvasya hi avikala-kāraṇasya sataḥ sarva-jñatva-pariniṣpattau api nivṛttir na dṛṣṭā. vaktṛtva-parihāreṇa api saravajñatvasya na vyavasthitiḥ. na api vā sarvajñatva-parihāreṇa vaktṛtvasya vyavasthitiḥ. //89/

virodhābhāve ca aviruddhavad vaktṛtvaṃ sarvajñatvāviparya-yeṇa[18] upalabhyeta iti cet ? tatra āha—

18. p. 117. 12 : add *ma* (=*na*) before *zlog-pa-po* (=*viparyaya*).

anupalabdhau api na abhāvagatiḥ, aviruddhavidher iti. //90//

yatra viruddhatvena na abhidhānaṃ tatra vastunor anupalabdhau api na abhāva-niścayaḥ sambhavati. asarvajñatve sādhye vaktṛtvasya vyatirekas tathā eva sandigdhaḥ. //90//

rāgādimattvena nirdeśe api vyatireka-sandeha-kathanārtham āha—

rāgādīnāṃ vacanādeś ca kārya-kāraṇabhāvāsiddher iti. //91//

rāgādir vacanasya hetur iti etad asiddham. //91//

astu rāgādi-vacanayoḥ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ asiddhaḥ. tataḥ kim iti ced āha—

arthāntarasya akāraṇasya nivṛttau na vacanāder nivṛttir iti. //92//

arthāntaraṃ rāgādikam. akāraṇasya tasya nivṛttau kathaṃ vacanāder nivṛttiḥ syāt ? //92//

evaṃ vacanādiḥ sandigdha-vyatirekaḥ anaikāntika iti. //93//

tathāhi yasmād vaktṛtva-sarvajñatvayoḥ kaḥ api virodho na asti, rāgādivacanayor vā na kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ, tasmāt asarvajñatva-nivṛttyā rāgādi-nivṛttyā vā vacana-nivṛttiḥ sandigdhā. tasmāt sandigdha-vyatireko nāma anaikāntikaḥ. //93//

dvayoḥ rūpayor viparyaya-siddhau viruddha iti. // 94 //

yadi dvayoḥ rūpayor viparyaya-siddhis tadā viruddha-hetvābhāsaḥ syāt. // 94 //

kayor dvayor iti. // 95 //

kayor dvayoḥ rūpayor viparyaya-pratītau viruddha-hetvābhāsa ucyate? // 95 //

sapakṣe ca sattvaṃ vipakṣe ca asattvam iti. // 96 //

anvaya-vyatirekau iti śeṣaḥ. evaṃ viruddhasya sāmānyaṃ lakṣaṇam uktam. // 96 //

viśeṣeṇa kathanārtham āha—

kṛtakatvaṃ prayatnāntarīyakatvaṃ ca nityatve sādhye viruddho hetvābhāsa iti. // 97 //

yadi kṛtakatvena prayatnāntarīyakatvena vā nityatvaṃ sādhyate tarhi viruddho hetvābhāsaḥ syāt. // 97 //

katham iha viparyaya-siddhir iti ced āha—

anayoḥ sapakṣe asattvam asapakṣe ca sattvam iti viparyaya-siddhir iti. //98//

nityatve sādhye sapakṣa ākāśādiḥ. tatra kṛtakatva-prayatnāntarīyakatvayor ubhayor eva asambhavaḥ. vipakṣaś ca anityo ghaṭādiḥ. tatra tayor ubhayor eva sattvam. tathāca tayor viparyaya-siddhiḥ. //98//

etau ca sādhya-viparyaya-sādhanād viruddhau iti. //99//

yasmād dvayoḥ rūpayor viparyaya-siddhis tasmāt sādhyaviparyaya-siddhiḥ, sādhyaviparyaya-sādhanāc ca viruddho hetvābhāsaḥ. //99//

tṛtīyaḥ api iṣṭavighātakṛd viruddho na iti. //100//

iṣṭasya vighātaḥ kriyate anena iti iṣṭavighātakṛt. tṛtīyo hi viruddhaḥ śāstrakārair uktaḥ. //100//

dṛṣṭānta-kathanam—

yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṃghātatvāt, śayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti. //101//

tasya arthas tu vyākhyāta eva. //101//

viruddhaś ca ayaṃ katham iti ced āha—

sa tadiṣṭāsaṃhata-pārārthya-viparyaya-sādhanād viruddha iti. //102//

parebhyaḥ ayam iti parārthaḥ. tasya bhāvaḥ pārārthyam. asaṃhatasya pārārthyam iti asaṃhata-pārārthyam. iṣṭaṃ ca tasya tad asaṃhatapārārthyaṃ ca iti vigrahaḥ. tad-viparyayaḥ asaṃhatapārārthya-viparyayaḥ. tasya sādhana iti arthaḥ. tasmāt tadiṣṭāsaṃhatapārārthya-viparyaya-sādhanād asau viruddha eva draṣṭavyaḥ. // 102 //

sa kasmān na ukta iti ced iti. //103//

śāstrakāreṇa anumatas tathā viruddha-lakṣaṇa-yuktaḥ api iti bhāvaḥ. //103//

anayor eva antarbhāvād iti. //104//

yac ca viruddhadvayam uktaṃ tayor eva antarbhāveṇa pṛthag na abhidhānam. //104//

antarbhāvasya eva pradarśanārtham āha—

ayaṃ hi sādhya-viparyaya-sādhanād ābhyāṃ na bhidyate iti. //105//

kṛtakatva-prayatnāntarīyakatva-lakṣaṇaṃ hetur nityatve sādhye sādhya-viparyaya-sādhanād viruddha iti uktam. ayam api sādhya-viparyaya-sādhanāt tābhyāṃ samāna eva viruddhaḥ. //105//

pūrvaṃ śabdena uktasya eva sādhyasya viparyaya-siddhiḥ. tatra ca na iṣṭārtha-viparyaya-siddhiḥ. tasmāt katham ayaṃ tābhyāṃ samāna iti cet? tatra āha—

na hi iṣṭoktayoḥ sādhyatvena kaścid viśeṣa iti. //106//

yac ca iṣṭaṃ yac ca uktaṃ tad-dvayoḥ sādhyatve viśeṣaḥ kaḥ api na asti iti etad uktam eva. // 106 //

dvayoḥ rūpayor ekasya asiddhau aparasya ca sandehe anaikāntika iti. //107//

anvaya-vyatirekayor eva ekasya asiddhau aparasya ca sandehe hetor anaikāntikatvam. //107//

dṛṣṭānta-kathanam—

yathā vītarāgaḥ sarvajño vā kaścid vaktṛtvād iti. //108//

tasya artha ukta eva. //108//

atra vyatirekaḥ asiddhaḥ, anvayas tu sandigdha iti. //109//

asmin prayoge vyatireko na asti. anvayas tu sandigdhaḥ. tathāhi sarvajñatve sādhye asarvajño vipakṣaḥ. asarvajñebhyaś ca vacanaṃ na vyāvṛttam. //109//

anvaya-sandeha-kathanārtham āha—

sarvajña-vītarāgayor viprakarṣād vacanādes tatra sattvam asattvaṃ vā sandigdham iti. *//110//*

yasmāt sarvajñatvaṃ vītarāgatvaṃ ca indriyasya aviṣaya eva tasmāt tayoḥ kutra api vacanam asti na asti vā iti sandigdham eva. tathāhi dṛṣṭāntatvena yaḥ puruṣa uktaḥ sa kiṃ sarvajñaḥ san vaktā kim uta asarvajñaḥ san vaktā iti atra niścayo na asti. //110//

dvayor eva rūpayoḥ sandeke anaikāntika iti. *//111//*

yadi anvayo vyatirekaś ca dvau eva sandigdhau tadā api anaikāntika-hetvābhāsaḥ. //111//

dṛṣṭānta-kathanārtham āha—

sātmakaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ prāṇādimattvād iti iti. *//112//*

prāṇa ādir yasya sa prāṇādiḥ. prāṇa-śabdena unmeṣa-nimeṣa-prasāraṇa-saṃkocādīnāṃ parigrahaḥ. sātmakam iti ātmano bhogāyatana-bhūtam.[19] jīvaccharīram iti anena mṛtaśarīrasya nirāsaḥ. //112//

tatra ca vyatireka-sandeha-kathanārtham āha—

na hi sātmaka-nirātmakābhyām anyo rāśir asti yatra prāṇādir vartate iti. *//113//*

dvividho hi rāśiḥ, sātmako nirātmakaś ca. tatra anantarbhūtaḥ aparo na asti. prāṇādimattvasya vastudharmatve tac ca sātmaka-nirātmakābhyāṃ nivṛttam. //113//

19. p. 123. 16f : =*bdag-loṅs-spyod-kyi-ñid-du gnas-pa-'o.*

tiṣṭhatu anyatra kutra api. katham tṛtīya-rāśyasambhava iti ced āha—

ātma-vṛtti-vyavacchedābhyāṃ sarva-saṃgrahād iti. //114//

vṛttiś ca vyavacchedaś ca vṛtti-vyavachhedau. vṛttiḥ sadbhāvaḥ. vyavacchedaḥ abhāvaḥ. ātmano vṛtti-vyavacchedau ātma-vṛtti-vyavacchedau. tābhyāṃ hi sakala-vastu-saṃgrahaḥ. tathāhi yasmin ātmano vṛttis tat sātmakam. tatra anantarbhūthm anyat sarvaṃ nirātmakam. tasmāt kutas tṛtīyarāśisambhavaḥ? evaṃ hi prāṇādimattvasya sātmaka-nirātmakābhyāṃ vyatirekaḥ asiddhaḥ. //114//

yadyapi tābhyāṃ vyatirekaḥ asiddhas tathāpi tatra anvaya eva astu iti cet? tatra āha—

na anayor ekatra api vṛtti-niścaya iti. //115//

prāṇādimattvasya sātmake nirātmake vā sattvam iti niścayo na śakyate kartum. //115//

tac ca kasmād iti ced āha—

sātmakatvena nirātmakatvena vā prasiddhe prāṇāder asiddher iti. //116//

sātmakatvena niścite vastuni nirātmakatvena vā niścite vastuni prāṇādimattvam adṛṣṭam. tasmāt kuto vṛttiniścayaḥ? //116//

tasmāt jīvaccharīrasambandhī prāṇādir iti. //117//

upasaṃhāre pakṣadharmo nirdiśyate. jīvaccharīreṇa sambandha iti vigrahaḥ. sa yasya asti sa jīvaccharīra-sambandhī. pakṣadharma iti śeṣaḥ. //117//

sātmakād anātmakāc ca sarvasmād vyāvṛttatvena asiddhes tābhyāṃ na vyatiricyate iti. // 118 //

anena upasaṃhāreṇa vyatirekābhāvo darśitaḥ. // 118 //

ekātmani api asiddhes tatra na anveti iti. // 119 //

anena upasaṃhāreṇa anvayābhāvo darśitaḥ. evaṃ ca anvaya-vyatirekayor dvayoḥ sattvam asiddham. // 119 //

nanu tayos tatra abhāva-niścaya eva syād iti cet ? tatra āha—

na api sātmakād nirātmakāc ca tasya anvaya-vyatirekayor abhāvaniścaya iti. // 120 //

yathā sātmake anvaya-vyatirekayoḥ sattvam aniścitaṃ tathā eva asattvam api aniścitam. evam eva nirātmakasya api vaktavyam. // 120 //

sattva-niścayābhāve api asattva-niścayaḥ kathaṃ na syād iti cet ? tatra āha—

anvaya-vyatirekayor anyonya-vyavaccheda-rūpatvād iti. //121//

anvaya-vyatirekau hi parasparābhāva-rūpeṇa avasthitau. tathāhi yatra anvayābhāvas tatra vyatirekasattvam. yatra vā vyatirekābhāvas tatra anvayasattvam. //121//

anyonya-vyavacchedarūpeṇa tau sthitau iti ucyate. tataś ca kim iti ced āha—

ekābhāva-niścaye aparabhāvāvaśyambhāvād iti. //122//

yadi tayoḥ parasparābhāvarūpeṇa sthitis tadā yatra anvayābhāva-niścayas tatra vyatirekasattva-niścayaḥ avaśyambhāvī. tathā vyatirekābhāva-niścaye api anvayasattva-niścayaḥ avaśyambhāvī. evaṃ yatra prāṇādimattvasya sattvaṃ na iti niścayas tatra abhāvaniścayaḥ. yatra ca tadasattvaṃ na iti niścayas tatra bhāvaniścayaḥ. yasmād evam anvaya-vyatirekayor ekasya abhāvaniścaye eva aparasya sattva-niścayaḥ avaśyambhāvī tasmāt sātmaka-nirātmakayoḥ prāṇādimattvābhāva-niścayaḥ api na asti eva. //122//

ataeva anvaya-vyatirekayoḥ sandehād anaikāntika iti. //123//

tasmād anvaya-vyatirekayoḥ sandehād asau anaikāntika eva. //123//

anvaya-vyatirekayoḥ sandehe sati api kasmād anaikāntikatvam eva syād iti cet ? tatra āha—

sādhyetarayor niścayābhāvād iti. //124//

yasmāt sādhya-sādhyavipakṣayoḥ prāṇādimattva-niścayo na asti tasmād anaikāntikaḥ. //124//

evaṃ trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇām ekaikasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe ca yathāyogam asiddha-viruddha-anaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsā iti. //125//

evam iti ukta-prakāreṇa. trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇām iti. pakṣadharmaḥ anvayo vyatirekaś ca iti. ekaikasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe ca iti. kvacid ekasya rūpasya asiddhiḥ sandeho vā, kvacit tu dvayoḥ rūpayoḥ. yathāyogam iti. prayogānurūpam. asiddha-viruddha-anaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsā iti. asiddhaś ca viruddhaś ca anaikāntikaś ca iti vigrahaḥ. //125//

viruddhāvyabhicāryapi saṃśaya-hetur ukta iti. //126//

viruddhena avyabhicāro viruddhāvyābhicāraḥ. saḥ atra asti iti viruddhāvyabhıcārī. yadvā viruddhaś ca asau na vyabhicaritum śīlam ca asya iti viruddhāvyabhicārī. sa ca śāstrakāreṇa anaikāntika uktaḥ. //126//

sa iha na ukta iti. //127//

svayaṃ na nirdiṣṭaḥ [iti arthaḥ]. //127//

tac ca kasmād iti ced āha—

anumāna-viṣaye asambhavād iti. //128//

tathāhi vastuvala-pravṛtte anumāne tasya asambhavaḥ. //128//

katham asambhava iti ced āha—

ukta-lakṣaṇa-kārya-svabhāvānupalambheṣu viruddhāsambhava iti. //129//

kāraṇasattve kāryasattvam eva kāryahetor lakṣaṇam. tanmātrānubandhi-hetutvam eva svabhāvahetor lakṣaṇam. upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalabdhir anupalabdher lakṣaṇam. viruddhaś ca ukta-lakṣaṇa-viśiṣṭeṣu na sambhavati. tathāhi śiṃśapayā vṛkṣa-saṃsiddhau vijātīyāvṛkṣa-sādhanaṃ yathoktalakṣaṇasya dvitīyasya asambhavaḥ. //129//

yadi ukta-lakṣaṇeṣu triṣu asambhavaḥ, astu tarhi aparatra sambhava iti cet ? tatra āha—

na anyaḥ avyabhicārī iti. //130//

triṣu hetuṣu anantarbhūtam avyabhicāri-hetvantaraṃ na asti yasmin viruddhāvyabhicāri-sambhavaḥ. //130//

kasmāt triṣu asambhavaḥ [iti ced āha]—

tasmād avastudarśanavala-pravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tadartha-vicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa ukta iti. //131//

yatra pratibaddhena pramāṇena na nirṇayas tad avastudarśanavala-pravṛttam iti. āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya iti. āgama āśrayaḥ asya iti āgamāśrayam. yatra āgamadvāreṇa dharmi-pakṣadharmādikam upasthāpyate tad āgamāśrayam anumānam iti. tadartha-vicāreṣu iti āgamārthavicāreṣu. viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanadoṣa ukta iti. sugamam. //131//

yadi ayam ayogya eva tarhi āgamāśrayānumāne api tasya kathaṃ'sambhava iti ced āha—

śāstrakārāṇām artheṣu bhrāntyā svabhāva-viparītopasaṃhāra-sambhavād iti. //132//

sarvaiś ca śāstrakārais taddarśanānutpannā api kecana arthāḥ svabhāva-viparyayeṇa abhihitā bhavanti. tatas tadā viruddhāvyabhicārī bhavati. //132//

yadi tasya āgama-pratibaddhānumāne sattvam eva iṣyate tarhi vastuvalena pravṛttir api kasmān na iṣyate iti cet? tatra āha—

na hi asya sambhavo yathāvasthia-vastu-sthitiṣu ātma-kāryānupalambheṣu iti. //133//

yathā vastunaḥ avasthitis tathā eva sthitir yeṣāṃ te yathāvasthitavastu-sthitayaḥ. sthitir vyavasthā. ātmā ca kāryaṃ ca anupalambhaś ca iti vigrahaḥ. ātmā svabhāvo nāma. yathā sadarthe vastuvyavasthā tathā svabhāva-kārya-anupalambhahetavas tevyavasthitās, teṣu viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ kutaḥ sambhavaḥ? //133//

tatra udāharaṇam. yat sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhir yugapad abhisambadhyate tat sarvagatam. yathā ākāśam. sāmānyam api sarva-deśāvasthita-svasambandhibhir yugapad abhisambadhyate iti. // *134* //

tatra udāharaṇam iti. āgamāśrita-pramāṇopadarśanam. yat sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ savasambandhibhir yugapad abhisambadhyte tat sarvagatam iti. sarvasmin deśe avasthitāḥ sarvadeśāvasthitāḥ. te eva svasya ca sambandhinaḥ svasambandhinaḥ. yad api vastu sarvadeśāvasthita-svasambandhibhir yugapad abhisambadhyate tat sarvagatam eva dṛṣṭam. yathā ākāśam iti. ākāśaṃ hi sarvadeśāvasthita-svasambandhibhiḥ [yugapad] abhisambadhyate. tac ca sarvagatam eva iṣṭam. etad-vacanena anvayo darśitaḥ. sāmānyam api sarvadeśāvasthita-svasambandhibhir yugapad abhisambadhyate iti. sāmānyasya sambandhino hi vyakti-viśeṣāḥ sarveṣu deśeṣu vidyamānāḥ, taiś ca sāmānyaṃ yugapad abhisambadhyate. anena pakṣadharma uktaḥ. // 134 //

svabhāvahetu-lakṣaṇatvaṃ prayogasya darśayitum āha—

tatsambandhi-svabhāvamātrānubandhinī taddeśa-sannihita-svabhāvatā iti. //*135*//

tasya sambandhinas tat-sambandhinaḥ. tatsambandhināṃ svabhāvamātram anubaddhuṃ śīlaṃ yasyāḥ sā tatsambandhi-svabhāvamātrānubandhinī. teṣāṃ sambandhināṃ deśas taddeśaḥ. taddeśe sannihitas taddeśa-sannihitaḥ. taddeśa-sannihitaḥ svabhāvo yasya sa taddeśa-sannihita-svabhāvaḥ. tasya bhāvas taddeśa-sannihita-svabhāvatā. sambandhi-deśe upasthitir iti śeṣaḥ. //135//

sarvagatena eva hi sambandhino vyāpyante iti etac ca kasmād iti ced āha—

yo yatra na asti sa hi taddeśam ātmanā na vyāpnoti iti svabhāvahetu-prayoga iti. //*136*//

yaś ca yatra na asti tasya taddeśa-vyāpanaṃ kathaṃ śakyam ? taddeśa iti. sa deśo yasya sa taddeśaḥ. yasmin deśe sa na asti taddeśa-sambandhinaṃ sa na śaknoti vyāpayitum iti śeṣaḥ. svabhāva-hetu-prayoga iti. sugamam.[20] //136//

atha kāṇādaiḥ kaiścit śāmānyasya sarva-sarvagatatvam uktam. aparaiś ca kāṇādaiḥ sāmānyasya kevalāśraya-sarvagatatvam eva aṅgīkṛtaṃ. tannaya-pradarśanārtham āha—

dvitīyaḥ api prayoga iti. //137//

tac ca sugamam. //137//

yad upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ yatra na upalabhyate tat tatra na asti. yathā kvacid avidyamāno ghaṭa iti. //138//

atra anupalabdher anvayaḥ kathitaḥ. //138//

na upalabhyate ca upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ sāmānyaṃ vyaktyantarāleṣu iti. //139//

vyakter antarālāni vyaktyantarālāni, vyaktyantarāṇi. teṣu upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptaṃ sāmānyaṃ na upalabhyate. anena pakṣadharma uktaḥ. tadvādinā ca kevalāśraya-sarvagatatvam uktam. //139//

ayam anupalabdhiprayogaḥ svabhāvaś ca paraspara-viruddhārtha-sādhanād ekatra saṃśayaṃ janayata iti. //140//

avyavahitoktayā anupalabdhyā sāmānyasya kevalāśraya-sarvagatatvaṃ sādhyate. prāk ca svabhāvahetunā sarva-sarvagatatvaṃ sādhitam iti dvābhyāṃ paraspara-viruddhār-

20. p. 133. 5 : =*go-sla'o.*

tha-sādhanāt kiṃ vyaktyantarāleṣu sāmānayānupalabdheḥ kevalāśraya-sarvagatatvam eva, sarvadeśāvasthita-svasambandhiṣu anubaddhatvāt sarva-sarvagatatvam eva vā iti anubhavād ekasmin eva sāmānye sandeho jāyate. evam iyatā parārthānumānaṃ tatsarūpair darśitam. //140//

nanu dṛṣṭānta-lakṣaṇaṃ kasmān na uktam iti cet? tatra āha—

trirūpo hetur uktaḥ. tāvatā eva arthapratītir iti na pṛthag dṛṣṭānto nāma sādhanāvayavaḥ kaścit. tena na asya lakṣaṇaṃ pṛthagucyate iti. //141//

pūrvaṃ hetor lakṣaṇatrayaṃ yad uktaṃ tena eva rūpatrayeṇa sādhyārtha-siddhir bhavati. tena dṛṣṭānto nāma pṛthak sādhanāvayavo na asti. tataś ca tallakṣaṇaṃ pṛthaṅ na uktam. //141//

gatārthatvād iti. //142//

hetvarthena eva dṛṣṭāntārthasya avagamād. //142//

kaṭham iti ced āha—

hetoḥ sapakṣe eva sattvam asapakṣāc ca sarvato vyāvṛttiḥ rūpam uktam aviśeṣeṇa iti. //143//

prayogamātre etad eva hetulakṣaṇam—sapakṣe eva sattvam iti evaṃrūpam, tathā sarvasmād vipakṣād vyāvṛttir iti evaṃrūpaṃ ca. //143//

punar viśeṣeṇa kārya-svabhāvayor janma-tanmātrānubandhau darśanīyau uktau iti. //144//

viśeṣeṇa ca hetor lakṣaṇam—kāryahetor janma pradarśanīyam

iti uktam, svabhāvahetos tanmātrānubandhaḥ kathanīya iti uktam. //144//

tac ca darśayatā iti. //145//

sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṃ viśeṣa-lakṣaṇaṃ ca darśayatā iti śeṣaḥ. //145//

yatra dhūmas tatra agniḥ, asati agnau na kvacid dhūmaḥ. yathā mahānasetarayor iti. //146//

kāryahetor hi svakīya-lakṣaṇaṃ [=viśeṣa-lakṣaṇam] tathā sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṃ ca yogyam. evaṃ ca darśayatā viśeṣeṇa kathayatā iti [arthaḥ]. tathāhi atra sapakṣa-sattvaṃ pradarśayatā avaśyaṃ yathā mahānasa iti abhidheyam. anyathā sapakṣa-sattvam eva kathayituṃ na śakyate. tathā eva vyāvṛttiṃ kathayatā api avaśyaṃ yathā jalam iti abhidheyam. anyathā vyāvṛttir eva na uktā syāt. //146//

yatra kṛtakatvaṃ tatra anityatvam, anityatvābhāve kṛtakatvāsambhavaḥ. yathā ghaṭākāśayor iti darśanīyam iti. //147//

anena svabhāvahetoḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ viśeṣalakṣaṇaṃ ca yathā vaktavyaṃ tathā darśyate. iha yadi yathā ghaṭa iti na ucyate tadā sapakṣa-sattvam eva kathayituṃ na śakyate. yadi yathā ākāśam iti na ucyate tadā vyāvṛttir api kathayituṃ na śakyate. tanmātrānubandhaḥ api tathā eva darśayituṃ śakyam. tathāhi yadi yatra yatra kṛtakatvaṃ tatra tatra avaśyam anityatvaṃ yathā ghaṭe iti nirdiśyate, tadā tanmātrānubandha eva ukto bhavati. //147//

na hi anyathā sapakṣa-vipakṣayoḥ sadasattve yathokta-prakāre śakye darśayitum iti. //148//

sapakṣa-sattvaṃ darśayatā yadi yathā mahānasaḥ, yathā ghaṭa iti vā na ucyate, tadā sapakṣa-sattvam eva uktaṃ na syāt. yadi ca vipakṣāsattvaṃ darśayatā yathā jalam, yathā ākāśam iti vā na ucyate, tadā vyāvṛttir eva na uktā syāt. //148//

evaṃ sāmānya-lakṣaṇam uktvā aśakyatvam uktam. viśeṣa-lakṣaṇena aśakyatva-kathanārtham āha—

tatkāryatā-niyamaḥ kārya-liṅgasya iti. //149//

tasya kāryaṃ tat-kāryam. tasya bhāvas tatkāryatā. tasya niyamas tatkāryatā-niyamaḥ. kāraṇa-sattve kāryasya api sattvam iti eṣa niyama eva tatkāryatā-niyamaḥ. //149//

svabhāva-liṅgasya ca svabhāvena vyāptir iti. //150//

svarūpeṇa vyāptir eva svabhāvena vyāptiḥ. tanmātrānubandha iti śeṣaḥ. tad ubhayam api dṛṣṭāntam anuktvā vaktuṃ na śakyate. yadā yathokta-nyāyena kvacid dharmiṇi hetuḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇato viśeṣalakṣaṇataś ca ucyate tadā dṛṣṭāntaḥ api ukta eva. //150//

tac ca kasmād iti ced āha—

etāvanmātra-rūpatvāt tasya iti. //151//

tathāhi tasya rūpam etāvanmātram eva. yatra sādhyena hetor anvayo darśyate sa sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ. yatra ca sādhyābhāve hetvabhāvo nirdiśyate sa vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ. //151//

etena eva dṛṣṭāntābhāsā api nirastā bhavanti iti. //152//

yasmād yadā hetoḥ sāmānyaviśeṣa-lakṣaṇayor nirdeśaḥ kriyate sa nirduṣṭa-dṛṣṭānta iti ucyate tasmād yatra tallakṣaṇayor nirdeśo na sambhavati sa dṛṣṭāntābhāso bhavati iti uktaṃ bhavati. //152//

udāharaṇāni āha—

yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ amūrtatvāt, karmavat paramāṇuvad ghaṭavad iti. //153//

sādhya-sādhana-dharmobhaya-vikalā iti. śabdo nityaḥ amūrtatvāt, karmavad iti sādhyadharma-vikalaḥ, paramāṇuvad iti sādhanadharma-vikalaḥ, ghaṭavad iti ubhaya-vikalaḥ. //153//

tathā sandigdha-sādhyadharmādayaś ca iti. //154//

sandigdhaḥ sādhyadharmaḥ asmin iti vigrahaḥ. sādhyadharma ādir yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ. //154//

udāharaṇāni āha—

rāgādimān ayaṃ vaktṛtvād rathyā-puruṣavad iti. //155//

ayaṃ sandigdha-sādhyadharmaḥ. //155//

maraṇadharmā ayaṃ puruṣo rāgādimattvād rathyā-puruṣavad iti. //156//

ayaṃ sandigdha-sādhanadharmaḥ. //156//

asarvajñaḥ ayaṃ rāgādimattvād rathyā-puruṣavad iti. //157//

ayaṃ sandigdhobhaya-dharmaḥ. //157//

ananvayaḥ apradarśitānvayaś ca iti. //158//

ananvaya iti yatra anvayo na asti eva. apradarśitānvaya iti yatra anvayo vidyamānaḥ api na pradarśitaḥ. //158//

udāharaṇam āha—

yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādimān iṣṭa-puruṣavad iti. //159//

tatra anvayo na asti. tena tatra vacana-rāgādyor vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāvaḥ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvo vā na eva vidyate. //159//

anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti. //160//

iha anvayo vidyamānaḥ api na pradarśitaḥ. //160//

tathā viparītānvaya iti. // 161 //

anvayo viparīto yasmin dṛṣṭānte iti vigrahaḥ. // 161 //

udāharaṇam āha—

yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam iti. //162//

iha yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityam iti abhidheye yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam iti vipaıītābhidhānam. //162//

sādharmyeṇa iti /163//

ete sarve sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsāḥ. //163//

vaidharmyeṇa api iti. //164//

vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsā ucyante. //164//

paramāṇuvat karmavad ākāśavad iti sādhyā-dyāvyatirekiṇa iti. // 165 //

sādhyam ādir yeṣāṃ tāni sādhyādīni. teṣām avyatirekaḥ sādhyādyavyatirekaḥ. te ca yatra santi te sādhyādyavyatire-kiṇaḥ. tatra paramāṇuvad iti sādhyāvyatirekī. nityatvāt paramāṇūnāṃ sādhyāvyatirekaḥ. karmavad iti sādhanāvya-tirekī. amūrtatvāt karmaṇāṃ sādhanāvyatirekaḥ. ākāśavad iti ubhayāvyatirekī. ākāśasya ca ubhayāvyatirekaḥ. // 165 //

tathā sandigdha-sādhyavyatirekādaya iti. // 166 //

sādhyasya vyatirekaḥ sandigdho yasmin iti vigrahaḥ. sandigdha-sādhya-vyatireka ādir yeṣām iti samāsaḥ. // 166 //

udāharaṇāni āha—

yathā asarvajñā anāptā vā kapilādaya iti. // *167* //

pratijñā-dvayam upanyastam. // 167 //

avidyamāna-sarvajñatva-vītarāgatva-liṅga-bhūta-pramāṇātiśaya-śāsanatvād iti. //*168*//

sarvajñatvaṃ ca vītarāgatvaṃ ca sarvajñatva-vītarāgatve. sarvajñatva-vītarāgatvayor liṅgabhūtaṃ pramāṇātiśaya-śāsanam avidyamānaṃ yeṣu te avidyamāna-sarvajñatva-vītarāgatva-liṅgabhūta-pramāṇātiśaya-śāsanāḥ. teṣāṃ bhāvas tattvam. tasmād avidyamāna-sarvajñatva-vītarāgatva-liṅgabhūta-pramāṇātiśaya-śāsanatvāt. //168//

atra vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta iti. //*169*//

parīkṣyate [iti] upari sambandhaḥ. //169//

yaḥ sarvajño vītarāgo vā sa jyotirjñānādikam upadiṣṭavān. yathā ṛṣabha-vardhamānādir iti iti. //*170*//

jyotirjñānaṃ nakṣatra-viparīkṣaṇam iti hetuḥ. [bu-lbu-kā-mā-ṣa]-ādi[21] iti. tac ca sarvajñatva-vītarāgatva-liṅgabhūtam ṛṣabha-vardhamānādibhir anuśiṣṭam. tasmāt te sarvajñā vītarāgā vā iti niścetuṃ śakyate iti. //170//

vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānte asarvajñatvāvītarāgatvayoḥ sādhyadharmayor vyatirekaḥ sandigdha iti. // *171* //

21. p. 142. 16: The expression put within brackets occurs in the text as transliterated in Tibetan. Its meaning however seems obscure.

atra ṛṣabha-mahāvīrādir vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta uktaḥ. teṣu ca asarvajñatvāvītarāgatvayor vyatireka-niścayo na asti. // 171 //

sandigdha-sādhanavyatireka iti. //172//

tadarthas tu gata eva. //172//

udāharaṇam—

yathā na trayīvidā brāhmaṇena vivakṣito grāhyavacanaḥ kaścit puruṣo rāgādimattvād iti. //173//

ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedaś ca iti trayo vedāḥ. te eva trayī-śabdena ucyante. trayīṃ vetti iti trayīvit. grāhyaṃ vacanam asya iti grāhya-vacanaḥ. prāmāṇya-vacana iti śeṣaḥ. tena etad uktaṃ bhavati trayīvid yo brāhmaṇas tadabhimata-puruṣavacanaṃ nitya-pramāṇaṃ na asti iti. //173//

atra vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta iti. //174//

tadarthas tu gata eva. ye hi grāhya-vacanā na te rāgādimantaḥ. //174//

yathā gautamādayo dharmaśāstrāṇāṃ praṇetāra iti. //175//

gautama-vyāsa-muni-prabhṛtibhir yāni dharmaśāstrāṇi praṇītāni tāni hi trayīvidāṃ prāmāṇya-vacanāni. //175//

gautamādibhyaḥ sādhanadharmasya rāgādimattvasya vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdhā iti. //176//

tebhyo hi rāgādimattvasya vyāvṛtter niścayo na asti. //176//

sandigdhobhaya-vyatireka iti. //177//

sandigdha ubhayor vyatireko yasmin iti samāsaḥ. //177//

udāharaṇam—

yathā avītarāgāḥ kapilādayaḥ parigrahāgraha-yogād iti. //178//

parigraho dravasya svīkaraṇam. āgrahaḥ svīkārād ūrdhvam āsaktiḥ. parigrahaś ca āgrahaś ca iti prigrahāgrahau, tābhyāṃ yoga iti arthaḥ. //178//

atra vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ. yo vītarāgo na tasya parigrahāgrahau. yathā ṛṣabhādaya iti iti. //179//

ṛṣabhādayo hi svalpamātraṃ vyañjanam api na parigṛhnanti. tasmāt teṣāṃ parigraho na asti. parigrahābhāvena ca āgrahābhāvaḥ. te ca vītarāgāḥ.. //179//

ṛṣabhāder avītarāgatva-parigrahāgraha-yogayoḥ sādhya-sādhana-dharmayoḥ sandigdho vyatireka iti. //180//

avītarāgo rāgādimān iti arthaḥ. parigrahaś ca manasā svīkaraṇam. āgrahaś ca tṛṣṇā. te ca sarve mānasatvād indriyagocarā na bhavanti. tasmād ṛṣabhādibhyo vyāvṛttir eva iti niścetuṃ na śakyate. //180//

avyatireka iti. //181//

avidyamāno vyatirekaḥ asmin iti vigrahaḥ. //181//

yathā avītarāgo vaktṛtvād iti. //182//

tadarthas tu gata eva. //182//

yatra avītarāgatvaṃ na asti na sa vaktā. yathā upalakhaṇḍa iti. //183//

vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ ayam. //183//

yadyapi upalakhaṇḍād ubhayaṃ vyāvṛttam eva tathāpi sarvo vītarāgo na vaktā iti vyāptyā vyatirekāsiddher avyatireka iti. //184//

yadyapi upalakhaṇḍasya acetanatvād rāgādimattvaṃ vaktṛtvaṃ vā na eva, tathāpi sarvo vītarāgo na vaktā iti vyāptir asiddhā. rāgavattva-vaktṛtvayoḥ sambandhābhāvād rāgavattva-vyāvṛttau vaktṛtva-vinivṛttir na bhavati. tasmād atra vastuto vyatireko na asti. //184//

apradarśita-vyatireka iti. //185//

yatra vyatireko vidyamānaḥ api na ucyate. //185//

udāharaṇam āha—

vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntaḥ, yathā śabdaḥ anityaḥ kṛtakatvād ākāśavad iti iti. //186//

kenacid vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntatvena śabdaḥ anityaḥ kṛtakatvād ākāśavad iti ukte, tatra vyatireko vidyamānaḥ api anukta eva bhavati. tathāhi yadi ye ye ca padārthā nityās te sarve eva akṛtakā iti ucyate, tadā vyatireko darśito bhavati, na tu dṛṣṭāntamātreṇa. //186//

viparīta-vyatireka iti. //187//

viparīto vyatirekaḥ asmin iti vigrahaḥ. //187//

udāharaṇam āha—

yathā yad akṛtakaṃ tad nityaṃ bhavati iti. //188//

iha yad nityaṃ tad akṛtakam iti abhidheye tadviparītam uktam. //188//

na hi ebhir dṛṣṭāntābhāsair hetoḥ sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṃ sapakṣe eva sattvaṃ vipakṣe ca sarvatra asattvam eva niścayena śakyaṃ darśayitum, viśeṣa-lakṣaṇaṃ vā iti. //189//

taiś ca dṛṣṭāntābhāsair hetor yac ca sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṃ yad api viśeṣa-lakṣaṇaṃ tac ca na śakyate darśayitum. tata eva te dṛṣṭāntābhāsā iti. dṛṣṭāntavad ābhāsate iti dṛṣṭāntābhāsāḥ. //189//

tasmād arthāpattyā eṣāṃ nirāso veditavya iti. //190//

yasmād dvividham api hetor lakṣaṇaṃ darśayituṃ na śakyate tasmād arthāpattyā teṣāṃ nirāso draṣṭavyaḥ. iyatā samyagjñānaṃ tat-sarūpair vyākhyātam. //190//

idānīṃ tat-sahāyakābhidhānam anujñātum āha—

nyūnatādyuktir dūṣaṇā iti. //191//

nyūnatā ādir yeṣāṃ te nyūnatādayaḥ. teṣām uktir nyūnatādyuktiḥ. tāś ca pratyekaṃ dūṣaṇāḥ. //191//

ye pūrvaṃ nyūnatādayaḥ sādhanadoṣā uktās teṣām udbhāvanaṃ dūṣaṇam iti. // 192 //

atra 'ādi' iti ukter asiddha-viruddhānaikāntika-doṣāṇāṃ parigrahaḥ. ucyate anena iti uktir vacanam. yena vacanena doṣā uddhriyante tad dūṣaṇam iti. // 192 //

tac ca kasmād iti cet ? tatra āha—

tena pareṣṭārtha-siddhi-pratibandhād iti. //193//

yasmāt tena vacanena pūrvapakṣiṇā sādhayitum iṣṭasya arthasya siddhiḥ pratibadhyate tasmāt tad dūṣaṇam. tad etāni anudbhūta-dūṣaṇāni. //193//

dūṣaṇābhāsās tu jātaya iti. //194//

jātaya eva duṣaṇābhāsā veditavyāḥ. //194//

kāś ca punas tā jātaya iti ced āha—

abhūta-doṣodbhāvanāni jātaya iti. //195//

na bhūtaḥ abhūtaḥ. abhūtā doṣā abhūta-doṣāḥ. teṣām udbhāvanāni abhūta-doṣodbhāvanāni. yaiś ca vacanaiḥ sādhanadoṣā avidyamānā api udbhāvyante tāni jātayo veditavyāḥ.

samyagjñāna-nirūpaṇāvasare katham dūṣaṇa-tadābhāsānām upadarśanam iti cet? ucyate. dūṣaṇānāṃ tathā dūṣaṇābhāsānāṃ ca nirūpaṇe samyagjñānam api sasahāyaṃ[22] nirūpitaṃ bhavati iti. tathāca etā hi atra dūṣaṇā iti tāsāṃ parihāro vidheyaḥ, yadā vā ete dūṣaṇābhāsā etebhyaḥ śaṃkābhāva eva veditavya iti abhidhīyate, tadā samyagjñānam eva sarvathā nirūpitaṃ bhavati. tasmād yathokta-[doṣa]-prasaṅgo na asti. //195//

pṛthu yaccārjitaṃ puṇyaṃ nyāyabindoḥ padaṃ padam /
vyākhyānena mayādyaiva tato labdhvāmṛtaṃ dhruvam /
prāṇikulam aśeṣaṃ hi yātu bhavaparikṣayam /
yathocitena mārgeṇa nirdeśena nṛpasya ca /
iyaṃ vinītadevena śiṣyakalyāṇasiddhaye /
vistaro nāma ṭīkā hi nyāyabindor vinirmitā //

Nyāyabindu-vistara-ṭīkāyāṃ śiṣyahitāyāṃ
tṛtīyaḥ paricchedaḥ.

sahasram ekaṃ ślokānāṃ triṃśacchlokās tathaiva ca /
granthe vistaraṭīkāyām ihoktaṃ paripiṇḍitam //

ācārya-vinītadevakṛtir nyāyabindu-vistara-ṭīkā
śiṣyahitā nāma samāptā.

22. p. 149. 16 : =*gñen-po-daṅ-bcas-par.*

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

[The text of Dharmakīrti is indented and Vinītadeva's commentary given in full measure.]

Herein is contained *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, a work by *ācārya* Vinītadeva. In Indian language [the work is called] *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā*. In Tibetan language [the work is called] *Rigs-pa'i-thigs-pa-rgya-cher-'grel-pa* (*Nyāyabindu-vistara-ṭīkā*).

Salutation to Mañjuśrīkumārabhūta

CHAPTER ONE

ON PERCEPTION

I bow to the Muni[1], the most excellent speaker, by the grace of whose lineage[2], as is said, highest success is attained in the pure and rightful[3] path. Now follows the explanation of *Nyāyabindu*, sentence by sentence.

> The attainment of all 'human ends' (*puru-ṣārtha*)[4] is 'preceded by' (*pūrvikā*) right knowledge and therefore (*iti*), it is expounded. / 1 /

1. This offering of salutation at the very beginning of a treatise is one of the most widely observed practices for the authors of any *śāstra*. In the long run, this rite of salutation assumed so great an importance that it itself often formed the subject-matter of a heated logical discussion appended to the introductory part of the actual work. Even Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has a separate section on *maṅgalavāda*.
   The result to be attained by the act of salutation is supposed to be either completion (*samāpti*) of the work started or removal of the adverse conditions hindering its progress (*bighna-dhvaṃsa*). cf. *SM* on verse 1.
2. Lineage or *kula* may be due to either birth in one's family or adherence to one's doctrine. The latter is intended here. cf. *Kāśikā* on Pāṇini 2. 1. 19.
3. The word *nyāya* admits of a double sense. It may mean 'rightful' as well as 'logic'. Hence the expression *viśuddha-nyāya-vartmani* may also mean 'in the path of pure logic'.
4. The word *puruṣārtha* is used in the primary sense of any human end.

In this prefatory sentence, viz. 'the attainment of all human ends is preceded by right knowledge and therefore it is expounded', the author [i.e. Dharmakīrti] states the relation (*sambandha*), the purpose (*prayojana*), the subject-matter (*abhidheya*) and also the purpose of the purpose of this treatise (*prakaraṇa*). Because, in the absence of any purpose, relation or subject-matter, this 'scholarly treatise' (*prakaraṇa-śāstra*) would not be acceptable to the people who are guided by crititcal judgment [i.e. to the scholars].[5]

Contrary to general practice, Dharmakīrti here mentions right knowledge as the cause of human activity in general and not specifically as the means for attaining liberation. It may remind one of the logical dictum 'if the fruit of an action can be represented by something common or ordinary, it is improper to represent it by something extraordinary'(*sambhavati dṛṣṭa-phalakatve 'dṛṣṭa-phala-kalpanāyā anyāyyatvāt.* cf. *SM* on verse 1).

5. There are certain preliminary conditions—accepted by the authors of *śāstra*-s—which must be stated at the outset in order to show that the study of the treatise would be worthwhile. Dharmakīrti states them in this very first statement. These conditions are generally accepted to be three in number. But Vinītadeva here interprets Dharmakīrti as showing four such conditions in all—adding an unusual fourth to the usual three. They are: i) subject-matter (viz. right knowledge), ii) purpose (viz. proper comprehension of the nature of right knowledge), iii) relation (viz. the relation of being the means to an end) and iv) purpose of the purpose (viz. involvement of right knowledge in all human activities). The subject-matter and the purpose are stated directly and the relation indirectly.

The implication of a reference to the fourth condition may be understood as follows. The purpose of the treatise is said to be the proper comprehension of the nature of right knowledge. In other words, it follows that one desirous of comprehending the nature of right knowledge should engage oneself in the study of this treatise. But every purposive action presupposes 'a knowledge in the form that such an action would be conducive to one's own well-being' (*iṣṭa-sādhanatā-jñāna*). One's effort for comprehending right knowledge would also presuppose such a knowledge and the purpose of the purpose is stated here to indicate the presence of such *iṣṭa-sādhanatā-jñāna*.

Dharmottara (*NBT* pp. 2f) however takes exception to the last condition and explains the above statement as containing an indication of the usual three.

Thus, the subject-matter is stated to dispel the doubt, namely, 'What is going to be explained here ?' The purpose is stated to remove the apprehension (*śaṃkā*) of there being no fruit (*phala*). The relation is stated to dismiss the apprehension of there being no possible means (*upāya*). Therefore, [it is to be concluded that] the relation and all these are stated to create the interest of the listener [i.e. one who would like to study the work].

In the above assertion, the expression 'it is expounded' (*tad vyutpādyate*) states the subject-matter and the purpose directly (*sākṣāt*). The relation, however, is conveyed through implication (*sāmarthya*). The implication here is as follows. The treatise is going to be composed for the purpose of expounding right knowledge and this shows, by implication, that the treatise is nothing but the means [for a correct understanding of the nature of right knowledge]. Otherwise—if it were not the means—why should it at all be started ? Hence [it is to be concluded that] the relation is conveyed through implication.

Here the subject-matter is right knowledge itself. The purpose is 'a thorough comprehension' (*vyutpatti*) of [the nature of] right knowledge. Such an exposition of right knowledge as results in its thorough comprehension can be accomplished by it [i.e. this treatise] and thus the treatise becomes the means [to that end]. Therefore, the relation between the treatise and the purpose is that of 'being the means to an end' (*sādhya-sādhana-lakṣaṇa*). To explain, the nature of right knowledge is comprehended quite properly by listening to [i.e. studying] this treatise. As such, it ultimately follows that the treatise is the means and the comprehension of right knowledge is the end to be attained by this means.

This relation of being the means to an end is nothing but [the relation of] being the cause for an effect. Thus, the treatise is the means (*sādhana*) and the result is the 'attainable end' (*sādhya*) ; again, the treatise is the cause (*kāraṇa*) and the

result is the effect (*kārya*). It is finally concluded, therefore, that this treatise is going to be composed to facilitate the comprehension of right knowledge.

Now, even if it be actually so, someone may argue, 'What is the use of the comprehension of right knowledge ? It [i.e. such comprehension itself] is without any purpose and as such, it is [as useless as] a discourse on the nature of a crow's teeth. Let there be no instruction [regarding the nature of right knowledge]. What is the use of such labour ?' Hence, [in answer to such an objection], the author says, "The attainment of all human ends is preceded by right knowledge". It states the purpose of the purpose. The full implication of the statement is as follows. Since right knowledge is necessary for the attainment of every human end, it is invariably connected [with the attainment of the various human ends]. It is, therefore, to be comprehended. Such comprehension results from [the study of] this treatise. Hence [the conclusion that] this treatise is going to be composed for the purpose of comprehending right knowledge which is indispensable.

This is the 'significance [of the prefatory sentence] taken as a whole' (*samāsārtha*). The 'significance of each of the component members' (*avayavārtha*) [will now be stated]. In the expression 'preceded by right knowledge', right knowledge means knowledge 'which is not contradicted' (*avisamvādaka*) [6] Knowledge which is not contradicted by 'an action in respect of an

6. This is the general definition of *pramāṇa* given by Dharmakīrti himself in the *Pramāṇavārtika*. Right knownledge is uncontradicted in the sense that it does not mislead one, i.e. an object as indicated by right knowledge or *pramāṇa* in a particular place and a particular time can *actually* be attained by one. In common discourse also, a man is said to be a 'dependable guide' (*samvādaka*) when the information given by him is corroborated by the actual order of things. Similar is the case with *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* does not create an object. Nor does it accompany one to the spot where an object may be present. It only reveals the nature of an object as it is and this indication correctly leads one to the attainment of the desired objects or the avoidance of the undesirable ones. On the contrary, false knowledge which is not *pramāṇa* is contradicted by experience. One, for

object' (*arthakriyā*) is non-erroneous (*abhrānta*) and it [i.e. such non-erroneous knowledge] is nothing but right knowledge. Otherwise [i.e. if right knowledge is not defined in the above way], the treatise would lead to the repudiation of the Yogācāra view. But the treatise is [actually] going to be composed with the intention of explaining the views of both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra. As such, right knowledge here is to be understood [specifically] as knowledge which is not contradicted, because it covers the views of both.

instance, may have the perception of water in a mirage. But when one reaches the actual spot one finds nothing but sand. (cf. *NBT* pp. 5ff for a detailed discussion).

This definition thus also tacitly contains an answer to the objection that *pramāṇa* itself being without any validity cannot be the subject of a fruitful discussion. The argument may be put as follows : validity of *pramāṇa* cannot be doubted, since the nature of an object as revealed by it is in conformity with the actual order of things.

It is similar to the view expressed in the very opening statement of Vātsyāyana (*NBh* p. 1) defending the validity of *pramāṇa* : *pramāṇa* is valid, because it gives rise to successful activity.

In this connection, the views of the Buddhists on some problems of knowledge in genaral may briefly be noted.

a) On the problem of cognition being self-revelatory (*svaprakāśa*) or not-self-revelatory (*paraprakāśa*), Buddhists belonging to the Vijñānavāda school maintain that it is self-revelatory. Knowledge may be likened to a lamp. It can reveal an object as well as its own self. (See text 9 below. Also *BL* ii, p. 29, n 4).

b) On the problem of cognition being valid intrinsically (*svataḥ*) or extrinsically (*parataḥ*), the Buddhists, according to Mādhavācārya (*SDS* p. 104, verse), hold that invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) is determined intrinsically and validity (*prāmāṇya*) extrinsically. Śāntarakṣita (*TSP*, verse 3123) however gives a different account. He says that in this regard the Buddhists do not like to adhere specifically to any single principle. The validity and the invalidity of a piece of cognition may well be intrinsic in one case and extrinsic in another. In the case of repeated acquaintance, for instance, the validity as well as the invalidity of the cognition should be treated as intrinsic, while in the case of first acquaintance, both of them should be treated as extrinsic.

c) The Buddhists deny the validity of recollection (*smaraṇātmaka-jñāna*) on the usual ground that it reveals what is already apprehended (*TSP*, verse 1298 ; *NBT* p. 6).

The expression 'preceded by right knowledge' means 'that which has right knowledge for its antecedent (*pūrva*)'. The word 'antecedent' here stands for the 'cause' (*kāraṇa*). Since the cause [always] precedes the effect, it is [also] called the antecedent. Finally, [the expression 'preceded by right knowledge'] is equivalent in meaning to 'that which has right knowledge for its cause'.

[The expression] 'the attainment of all human ends' [will now be explained]. 'Human end' means an end relating to a human being. The word 'end' (*artha*) refers here to 'an object that induces [one] to a purposive action' (*prayojana*). Finally, [the expression 'human end'] is equivalent in meaning to an object that induces a human being to a purposive action. 'All human ends' means the human ends taken in their entirety. The word 'all' (*sarva*) [refers to each of the various types of objects, namely], the proximate (*sannikṛṣṭa*), the remote (*viprakṛṣṭa*), the extra-ordinary (*lokottara*), those to be avoided (*heya*), those to be desired (*upādeya*) and those to be treated with indifference (*upekṣaṇīya*).

Of these, a proximate object is an object placed near at hand. A remote object is an object placed at a distance. An ordinary (*laukika*) object is an object which one comes across in course of the [cycle of] 'worldly existence' (*saṃsāra*). An extraordinary object is what is beyond all sufferings. An

d) Though Dharmottara makes no express mention of 'continuous cognition' (*dhārāvāhika-jñāna*), his remark characterising *pramāṇa* as knowledge having an object 'not already cognised' (*anadhigata*) suggests that such cognition should not be regarded as *pramāṇa*. Arcaṭa (*HBT* p. 37) however maintains that the continuous cognition of a *yogin* only is *pramāṇa*, because it can distinctly apprehend each of the very minute divisions of time. But the continuous cognition of an ordinary person which does not involve such awareness is not *pramāṇa*.

e) Re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) itself is unproved in the Buddhist view, for it goes against the very basic principle of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*). All permanence being illusory, there is nothing to constitute a real object of re-cognition.

object to be avoided is an object that one does not intend to have, namely, a snake, a thorn, poison, a spear and the like. An object to be desired is an object that one strives to acquire, namely, a garland, a piece of sandalwood, clothes, food, drinks, beds, seats and the like. Any object which is opposite to both these—those to be desired and those to be avoided—is an object to be treated with indifference.[7]

Right knowledge is the cause [of every successful action] in respect of all these various human ends. Thus, after rightly determining [the nature of an object] through perceptual knowledge etc, one avoids [the objects like] spears, poison, thorns etc ; takes up [the objects like] flowers, garlands etc and remains indifferent to objects other than these.

The expression 'the attainment of all human ends' is equivalent to 'that which causes the attainment of all human ends.' The word 'attainment' (*siddhi*) is here used in the

7. As against the three types of objects—viz. *heya*, *upādeya* and *upekṣaṇīya*—mentioned by Vinītadeva, Dharmottara here speaks of the first two types only. He further contends that no third type is logically admissible, because the two types of *heya* and *upādeya* are mutually exclusive and cover up all existing objects. An object to be treated with indifference (*upekṣaṇīya*) being something other than what is to be desired can be easily included in the first type.

Jayanta (*NM* i, pp. 22f) however in his criticism of the general definition of right knowledge given by Dharmakīrti refutes a view similar to that of Dharmottara and defends the above threefold classification of objects. He argues that the existence of *upekṣaṇīya* objects cannot be denied, because such objects are proved on the basis of experience. When one comes across an object to be desired (e.g. a garland), one has a feeling of attraction. Again, when one comes across an object to be avoided (e.g. a snake), one has a feeling of repulsion. Further, when one comes across an object to be treated with indifference (e.g. a blade of grass on the road) one is moved by the feelings of neither attraction nor repulsion. The three types are thus to be admitted as corresponding to the three forms of reactions. Besides, an *upekṣaṇīya* object cannot be said to be *heya* simply on the ground that it is something other than *upādeya*. It can never be argued that a word in the neuter gender is to be considered as one in the masculine gender simply because it is other than a word in the feminine gender.

sense of 'that which causes the attainment' (*sādhaka*). It is shown thereby that right knowledge is necessarily the cause of the attainment of all human ends.

The word *iti* is used in the sense of 'therefore'. The two words *yat* and *tat* are invariably corelated. Thus, it is finally asserted that, since right knowledge invariably precedes the attainment of human end, it is here expounded.

In the expression 'it is expounded', the word 'it' is to be understood as referring to right knowledge,[8] because it is mentioned in the neuter gender. [The word 'it' should not be understood as referring to] the attainment of all human ends, though it is in 'immediate proximity' (*avyavahita*), because of its [relative] non-importance (*aprādhānya*). / 1 /

> Right knowledge is of two kinds—perception and inference. / 2 /

This right knowledge can be properly comprehended only when the four types af 'contradictory notions' (*vipratipatti*) regarding its nature are removed.[9] The four types of contradictory

8. A pronoun would naturally stand for a noun which is mentioned in closer proximity to it. The word *tat* would then stand for *siddhi* or attainment and 'it is expounded' would be equivalent to 'attainment is expounded'. But such a meaning is obviously not intended here. To remove the difficulty, Vinītadeva remarks that the word *tat* being in the neuter gender refers to the noun which also is in the netuer gender, viz. *samyag-jñāna,* and not to the noun which is in the feminine gender, viz. *siddhi.* A further ground for such an explanation is that 'right knowledge' is here undoubtedly more important than 'attainment'.

   The difficulty can however be avoided more easily by saying that *tat* here should refer to right knowledge, because in that case alone the intention of the author is adequately explained. The implication of a word is to be determined, not simply by its position or formal aspect, but in accordance with the intention of the speaker as well (cf. HBT p. 3 : *vaktur abhiprāyānuvidhāyitayā śabdavṛtteḥ* . . . . and the well-known verse : *arthāt prakaraṇāl liṅgād aucityād deśakālataḥ / śabdārthās tu vibhajyante na rūpād eva kevalāt //*).

9. The word *vipratipatti* literally means 'contradictory knowledge' (*viruddhā pratipattiḥ*). It is used here in the sense of the causes of

notions are the contradictory notions relating to its number (*saṃkhyā*), nature (*svarūpa*), object (*viṣaya*) and effect (*phala*).

Of these, the contradictory notions relating to its number are [the following]. Some logicians, namely, the followers of the Cārvāka school, maintain that [right knowledge] is of only one kind. Some others, namely, the followers of the Sāṃkhya school, maintain that it is of three kinds. According to the followers of the Nyāya school, it is of four kinds, while, the followers of the Mīmāṃsā school admit six kinds [of right knowledge].

The contradictory notions relating to its nature are [the following]. According to some, perception is determinate (*savikalpaka*). But according to others perception is only indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*).

The contradictory notions relating to its object are [the following]. Some say that the 'unique particular' (*svalakṣaṇa*) alone is the object of perception and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) alone is the object of inference. Other logicians speak of other kinds of objects [as the objects of perception and inference].

The contradictory notions relating to its effect are [the following]. Some logicians maintain that the effect of [employing] an instrument of knowledge is someting different, while others argue that there is no difference [between the instrument of knowledge and its effect].

contradictory notions, i.e. the views upheld by the philosophers belonging to other systems. One's own position becomes unassailable and quite properly established only when the views of others opposing it stand refuted.

There may also be a further logical justification for referring to the divergent views of other philosophers. According to Nyāya methodology, doubt is the very pre-condition for any critical discussion. As Vātsyāyana (*NBh* p. 35. cf. also *NS* 1. 1 41) puts it, "An argument (*nyāya*, lit. an inference for others) is to be advanced in respect of only what is not known for certain (*saṃśayita*) and not in respect of either what is completely unknown (*anupalabdha*) or what is already known for certain (*nirṇīta*)". Thus. the statements concerning the conflicting views of different philosophers would lead to a doubt and this doubt in its turn would justify a logical discussion.

Thus, [the nature of] right knowledge is comprehended, quite free from any error, only when these four types of contradictory notions are removed.

To remove, at the outset, the contradictory notions relating to its number, the author says, "Right knowledge is of two kinds". The expression 'is of two kinds' means that it has two different varieties. The word denoting the number is mentioned to express clearly the significance that [right knowledge] has only two kinds [and not more]. This excludes [the possibility of its being] of three kinds, of four kinds and so on.

[The word denoting] the number merely refers to its two-foldness. But what actually are the two kinds ? Why should knowledge be not regarded as of four kinds ? [In answer] to these queries, the author specifically mentions [the name of the two kinds], "Perception and inference."

The term *pratyakṣa* (perception) means etymologically 'dependent upon the senses'. This 'indeclinable particle' (*nipāta*) merely suggests that the object of knowledge also is a factor in the production of perception. [This, however, does not mean that the term *pratyakṣa* or perception is to be applied to that kind of perception only which is always dependent upon the senses.] For example, [a particular animal is called] *go* [i. e. a cow] because of its movement (*gamana*). But in this case movement is only an [accidental] indicator of cowness (*gotva*). Hence it is found that any particular 'lump of flesh' (*piṇḍa*), which is a locus of cowness, is to be denoted by the term *go* [irrespective of whether it moves or not].

Here also the fact of its [i. e. of perception] being dependent upon the senses merely suggests that the object of knowledge too is a factor in the production of perception and as such, all the four types of perception [including those which are not dependent upon the senses, e.g. mental perception etc] are denoted by the term 'perception'.[10]

10. The term *pratyakṣa* is a compounded word formed by the combination

The word *māna* [in the term *anumāna*] etymologically means 'that by which an object is measured [i.e. cognised].' That is to say, [*māna* means] an instrument which rightly specifies [the nature of an object]. The particle *anu* means 'subsequently' (*ānantarya*). Thus the term *anumāna* is equivalent in meaning to 'subsequent cognition'. That is, inference [is a form of knowledge] which appears subsequent to 'the perception of the reason as belonging to the subject' (*pakṣa-dharma-graha*) as well as the 'recollection of the invariable concomitance [between the reason and the inferable property]' (*pratibandha-smaraṇa*).[11]

The two terms *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* have been mentioned separately with different case-suffixes (*vibhakti*). That there

of the particle *prati* and the word *akṣa*. The particle *prati* here is equivalent to *pratigata* or dependent upon and the word *akṣa* signifies the five (external) senses. Thus, the term *pratyakṣa* would etymologically mean knowledge which is dependent upon the senses. But then the second form of perception (viz. *manovijñāna*) cannot be denoted by this term inasmuch as it is not produced by any of the senses and mind is not accepted to be a sense in the Buddhist view. To obviate this difficulty, Vinītadeva says that the term *pratyakṣa* only draws attention to the fact that the object cognised is one of the factors required for the production of perceptual knowledge. It does not specify that the characteristic of being dependent upon the senses is necessarily a pre-condition for being denoted by the term *pratyakṣa*. The word *go*, for instance, etymologically means an animal which is moving. But the word is applied to mean a cow even when it sits down or stands still. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 11) too argues in the same way, though he puts the answer in a more pointed and better form : 'Being dependent upon the senses' is only an 'indication of the etymology of the term' (*vyutpatti-nimitta*) and not an 'essential mark for its application' (*pravṛtti-nimitta*).

11. This account of inference should be taken only as an etymological analysis of the term *anumāna* and not as a definition too, for both Vinītadeva (under text 1, ch. 2) and Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 29) point out that a single definition covering both *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* is not possible. See however note 3, ch. 2.

is difference also in the nature of the objects[12] revealed by them follows by implication. That is, just as they are different

12. The tenet that each of the two sources of valid knowledge reveal quite specific type of objects is the very basis of the Buddhist objection to the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa-samplava*. An object of knowledge must be either a *svalakṣaṇa* or a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, for there is no other third type. If it is a *svalakṣaṇa* it would be an object of perception and if it is a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* it would be an object of inference. Just as perception cannot cognise a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, so also inference cannot cognise a *svalakṣaṇa*.

Following the account of Vācaspati (*NVTT* p. 13) and Jayanta (*NM* i, p. 28) the Buddhist view of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* may briefly be described as follows. Perception is capable of revealing an object (*artha*) only because it is produced through the efficiency (*sāmarthya*) of an object. And such a thing alone can be an object of perception as is able to attribute its own form (*pratibhāsa=ākāra*) to the piece of cognition. But a universal which is totally incapable of producing an 'action in respect of an object' (*artha-kriyā*) can never do so. It can be done only by the unique particular which is essentially real, for a thing is essentially real only when it is characterised by the capability of producing an action in respect of an object. It is to be admitted therefore that the unique particular alone is cognised by perception. On the other hand, the unique particular can never be cognised by inference. Inference results from the ascertainment of an invariable relation between two entities, which is established through either identity or causation. Such a relation however can never be established between two unique particulars and as such it is to be accepted as subsisting between two universals only. But a universal which is one and resides in different individuals at different times and under different conditions can never be a reality. Hence a universal is nothing but 'an object of mental construction' (*vikalpādhiṣṭhāna*) originating from a beginningless stream of ideation (*vāsanā*). In other words, perception cognises a unique particular or what is essentially real and inference cognises a universal or what is illusory. Since there is neither any other source of valid knowledge nor any other object to be cognised, one has got to admit the theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*.

Again, it is claimed by the Naiyāyikas that the same thing may be an object of different *pramāṇa*-s. As for instance, fire in the mountain is inferred by one at a distance, but the same is perceived by one after reaching the actual spot. To this, the Buddhist argues : Do both of the *pramāṇa*-s reveal the object exactly in the same way or in different ways ? If they reveal the object exactly in the same way, one of

as regards the case-suffix added to them, so also they are different as regards the nature of the objects revealed by them.[13]

The conjunction 'and' (*ca*) is used in the sense of aggregation (*samuccaya*). It gathers [the additional significance] that perception and inference have 'equal capability' (*samavalatva*).[14] Just as perception, being produced [directly] by an object,

them would be redundant. If they reveal the object in different ways, the cognition produced by the former would be contradicted by the cognition produced by the latter.

Besides, if perception and inference are admitted to have one and the same thing for their object, the cognition produced therefrom should also be of the same nature. But that is simply absurd. The sensations of burning as apprehended by the tactual sense and as apprehended through words are quite different. (For an annotated translation of the complete passage in *NVTT*, see *BL* ii, pp. 301-8).

13. The author of the *ṭippaṇī* (p. 16) quotes these lines almost *verbatim* and informs that Śāntabhadra too held the same view. He however rejects it with the remark that the two terms had to be shown separately because otherwise the particle *ca* cannot be added to bring out the implication that perception and inference have equal efficiency.

14. It appears from these remarks of Vinītadeva (which are very similar to those of Dharmottara) that the equal capability of perception and inference consists in their being equally non-erroneous and having thereby equal status as a source of valid knowledge. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (*TS* verse 460) also share the same view. These remarks are probably added also with a view to emphasising the point that inference, in spite of having for its object something which is only a mental construction and not real, must be considered a real source of valid knowledge.

Though Vinītadeva establishes the equal capability of perception and inference, and also refutes, in the same breath, the primariness of perception on the ground that both are equally non-erroneous, it does not seem quite convincing. Those who advocate the primariness of perception justify it by an altogether different argument, namely, that inference can never proceed except on the basis of a specific form of perception (cf. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* p. 5 ; *Upāyahṛdaya* p. 13) and this cannot be denied even by the Buddhists.

[Besides, the two words *samavalatva* and *mukhyatva* usually have quite different implications and the use of both in the same context seems somewhat confusing.]

becomes non-erroneous and is a real instrument of knowledge, similarly inference also, having invariable connection with the object through identity (*tādātmya*) and causation (*tadutpatti*), becomes non-erroneous and is a real instrument of knowledge. This repudiates the view, as held by some logicians, that, of all the instruments of knowledge, perception is the primary (*mukhya*) one. [Because], both of them are equally non-erroneous. There are, indeed, logicians who have tried to show the primariness of perception. / 2 /

> Of these (*tatra*), perception is [knowledge] which is 'free from construction' (*kalpanā-poḍha*) and is 'not illusory' (*abhrānta*).[15] / 3 /

To remove the contradictory notions relating to its

Arcaṭa (*HBT* p. 40) mentions no less than three grounds for establishing the 'extreme importance' (*prādhānya*) of inference. First, the ascertainment of the four noble truths (*āryasatya*) which leads to the 'highest' goal of human existence' (*pradhāna-puruṣārtha*) is possible only through inference. Secondly, if there arises any dispute regarding the nature of an object perceived, there is no other means except inference which can lead to a final ascertainment. Thirdly, inference alone is the cause of human activity (*pravṛtti*) in general. When one wishes to acquire or avoid an object, one must first determine it as a cause of either pleasure (*sukha*) or pain (*duḥkha*). But the presence of any such capability in an object which is yet to produce an effect in the form of a feeling of either pleasure or pain cannot be proved beforehand by perception. It is to be admitted therefore that the specific determination of an object as a (future) cause of either pleasure or pain can be made only through inference and as such, inference is the underlying cause of human activity in general.

As one of the instances in which inference is to be considered more authoritative than perception, Śrīdhara (*NK* p. 375) mentions the case of one having a 'mistaken notion regarding the directions' (*diṅmoha*) and quotes in support the words of the 'older people' (*vṛddha*).

15. This is the most celebrated Buddhist definition of perception. It has been quoted and discussed in almost every later work on logic or philosophy of all the systems.

nature, the author [gives the correct definition of perception, namely], "Of these, perception is [knowledge] which is free from construction and is not illusory". The word *tatra* is used in the sense of selection (*nirdhāraṇa*). Thus perception is here singled out from the two kinds of right knowledge with the help of its definition just mentioned. The term perception stands for 'what is to be defined' (*lakṣya*) and the expression 'free from construction and not illusory' stands for the definition (*lakṣaṇa*). Thus the meaning conveyed is: whatsoever is free from construction and is not illusory is to be viewed as perception.

The meaning as expressed by the component members [of the expression] taken individually [will now be stated]. The expression *kalpanāpoḍha* means that which is free 'from all kinds of construction' (*kalpanābhyaḥ*), i.e. [pure knowledge] as separated from construction. Or, the expression *kalpanāpoḍha* means that which is not connected 'with any kind of construction' (*kalpanayā*), i.e. [pure knowledge] as not mixed up with construction.[16] The word *abhrānta* means 'not illusory', i.e. which is not contradictory[17] in respect of [the knowledge] 'that makes one reach the object' (*prāpaka*).

Perception is generally of two kinds, indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*). Indeterminate perception is the perception of an object as such, without any qualification. Determinate perception is the perception of an object as qualified by name, class or the like.

Here perception is defined as knowledge free from construction (*kalpanā*), i.e. as a kind of pure sensation—a piece of cognition by which the object is revealed only in its simple and pure nature, bare of all attributes and associations. Like the sensation of a young child or of the dumb, such a piece of cognition can never be verbally communicated inasmuch as any connection with a 'verbal expression' (*abhilāpa*) would necessarily involve an element of construction. This definition of Dharmakīrti thus applies only to the indeterminate form of perception. (See also under supplementary notes).

16. Haribhadrasūri (*NPV* p. 35) dissolves the compound in *kalpanāpoḍha* in no less than three ways. In this connection also note the use of the word *alpaśaḥ* in Pāṇini ii. 1. 38.
17. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 12, 13) criticises Vinītadeva for his interpretation

What is the purpose of mentioning these two expressions qualifying [knowledge]? The answer is as follows. The expression 'not illusory' is mentioned to exclude the illusory knowledge of a person afflicted with 'morbid vision' (*timira*).[18] The expression 'free from construction' is added to exclude inference.

However, the expression 'not illusory' is to be understood 'in respect of [the knowledge] that makes one reach the object, (*prāpaka-viṣaya*) and not 'in respect of the object supporting a cognition' (*ālambana-viṣaya*). If the expression 'not illusory' is admitted to be in respect of the object supporting a cognition,

of *abhrānta* as identical with *avisaṃvādaka*, which is the view of Kamalaśīla (*TSP* verse 1312) also. Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla were led to such an interpretation because of their conviction that this definition of perception is intended to be acceptable to both the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika. Dharmottara's interpretation of *abhrānta* (viz. *arthakriyā-kṣame vasturūpe 'viparyastam*) is in contradiction with the Yogācāra view, for it involves the admission of the reality of *ālambana*. The author of the *ṭippaṇī* (p. 19) therefore solves the difficulty simply by stating that the definition given here is intended to conform to the Sautrāntika view only. (For a discussion on the absence of the word *abhrānta* in Dignāga's definition of perception, see *BL* i, pp. 155 ff.).

18. Śāntarakṣita (*TS* verse 1312) too holds the same view. According to Dharmottara however (*NBT* p. 12) the word *abhrānta* has been added to exclude such cases of erroneous knowledge as the vision of a moving tree (by one travelling in a speedy boat) etc. Such knowledge is free from construction and 'is also consistent knowledge in the sense that it actually makes one reach something which is nothing but a tree' (. . . *vṛkṣamātram avāpyata iti samvādakatvāt samyag-jñānam*). It may be asked, if the knowledge actually makes one reach something which is a tree, how can it then be considered to be erroneous? Dharmottara answers that (in spite of its consistency) it is erroneous, because the visual cognition reveals a tree as pertaining to different points of space, while what is actually reached is a tree as fixed to a particular point of space. Finally, he also offers an alternative explanation, namely, the word *abhrānta* is intended to exclude inference which is really erroneous and the expression *kalpanāpoḍha* serves only to remove misconceptions (*vipratipatti*) regarding the nature of perception (cf. *NBT* p. 13, n 2 and *BL* ii p. 17. n 4).

it would lead to the repudiation of the Yogācāra view. Because, in the Yogācāra view, all cognitions [so far as they refer] to any supporting object are false [i.e. no object as underlying a cognition does actually exist]. And thus, the composition of the treatise would result in the repudiation of the above view. But the treatise is going to be composed with the intention of explaining the views of both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra. The expression 'not illusory' in the sense of 'not contradicted in respect of [the knowledge] that makes one reach the object' is, however, acceptable to both.

In that case, even inference may come under [the category of] perception, for it is also admitted to be neither contradictory nor erroneous. Therefore, [it is justified] that the expression 'free from construction' is stated to exclude inference.

The purpose served by each of the qualifying expressions is thus explained. / 3 /

> Construction[19] is the cognition of a 'mental reflex' (*pratibhāsa*) which is capable of coalescing with a 'verbal expression' (*abhilāpa*). [Perception is knowledge] free from such construction. / 4 /

19. Construction or *kalpanā* is generally admitted to be of five forms : (i) construction of a universal (*jāti*), e.g. it is a cow ; (ii) construction of a quality (*guṇa*), e.g. it is white ; (iii) construction of an action (*kriyā*), e.g. Devadatta is moving ; (iv) construction of a name (*nāma*), e.g. this is Caitra and (v) construction of a substance (*dravya*), e.g. this is a man with a stick.

All these five forms of construction are to be considered false, because in the cases of the first three there is an attribution of difference to what are actually identical, and in the cases of the last two there is an attribution of identity to what are actually different. As for instance, though 'cowness' (*gotva*) is never perceived by anyone as a separate entity and is really identical with the cow itself, one wrongly constructs a difference between the two by saying 'it is a cow' (i.e. it is an animal characterised by cowness). Similar are the cases where we

Construction in its 'well-known sense' (*prasiddha*) has been refuted in *siddhānta*.[20] To explain the nature of construction in the 'ordinary sense' (*laukika*), the author says, "Construction

have the construction of a quality or of an action. Again, as in the example of construction of a name given above, we have really two different things. 'This' stands for the actual object and 'Caitra' is merely a naming word. But the two are represented as identical with each other. (cf. *NM* i, p. 87).

It may be objected that if construction is really false and imputes identity or difference to what are actually different or identical, there should subsequently appear some form of knowledge contradicting such false construction, as for instance, the false apprehension of silver in a shell is contradicted subsequently by the right knowledge of the shell. The answer to this objection would be as follows. A false apprehension is contradicted by a subsequent apprehension only when one real thing is represented as another real thing. The above objection therefore does not arise in the case of construction, for the universal etc. are themselves unreal in the Buddhist view. (cf. *NM* i, p. 88).

Śāntarakṣita (*TS* verses 1219 ff) however objects to this five-fold classification of *kalpanā*. He argues that *nāma-kalpanā* is the only form of genuine construction, and the other forms of *kalpanā* cannot be admitted on the grounds—(i) the universal etc. are themselves unreal and (ii) the universal etc., even if their reality be admitted, can never be perceived as distinct from their substrata and there can thus be no question of their being related (i.e. imputed) to anything, for a connection can be established only between two such entities as can exist separately from each other. As to the charge that this explanation would be in contradiction with the statement of Dignāga (viz. *nāma-jātyādyasaṃyutam*), Śāntarakṣita answers that Dignāga here actually refers to two classes of *kalpanā*—namely, *nāma-yojanā* and *jātyādi-yojanā*—with a view to explaining that the first one alone which conforms to his own doctrine is to be admitted (*upādeya*) and the second one which conforms to the views of others only is to be rejected (*heya*). The charge may also be answered as follows. Even in the cases of construction concerning a universal or the like the meaning is always conveyed through a *nāma* and thus all the forms of *kalpanā* may be included under the only class of *nāma-kalpanā*.

20. It is not clear as to what exactly Vinītadeva refers here by the word *siddhānta*. The fact that there existed earlier many divergent views regarding the nature of *kalpanā* among the Buddhists themselves is clearly indicated by the remarks of Kamalaśīla (*TSP* verse 1214) and

is the cognition of a mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal expression".

A verbal expression is that by which [anything] is verbally expressed, i.e. the denotative (*vācaka*) words in general. 'Coalescing with a verbal expression' is to become coalesced with a verbal expression. Coalescing is having connection (*sambandha*).[21] 'Capable of coalescing with a verbal expression'

the author of the *ṭippaṇī* (p. 21). The latter illustrates the different views as follows : 'According to the Vaibhāṣika, *kalpanā* is a sense-cognition intimately connected with (*samprayukta*) such properties of a mental state (*caitasika*) as deliberation (*vitarka*) and discrimination (*vicāra*). In the Yogācāra view, all cognitions—excepting the cognition of Tathāgata which is devoid of duality (*advaya*)—are constructions, for they are (falsely) conceived as comprising of two parts, namely, the cogniser and the cognised. Others maintain that construction means a mental cognition as mixed up with a universal etc.' In the context of perception, Dharmakīrti thus formulates a new definition of *kalpanā*.

21. According to the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas there exists a natural connection (*svābhāvika-sambandha*) between a word and the object denoted by it. The Buddhist and the Naiyāyika, though not in full agreement with each other ultimately, are united in their opposition to the above thesis.

In the Buddhist view only two types of natural connections are admitted—one through identity (*tādātmya*) and the other through causation (*tadutpatti*). The first one is illustrated by the relation between the properties of 'being a tree' (*vṛkṣatva*) and 'being a *śiṃśapā*' (*śiṃśapātva*) and the second one by the relation between fire and smoke. But none of these can hold good between a word and its object. There can be no identity between the two, for in that case it would have been enough to admit either the word or the object alone, and not both together. Besides, if the word were really identical with the object denoted, the utterance of the word 'fire' or the word 'knife' would have resulted in a burning sensation or a wound in the mouth.

A causal connection too is impossible. The assumption of such a connection may imply either that the object is produced from the word or that the word is produced from the object. The first alternative is absurd, because in that case there would be no poverty in the world—gold would be produced from the mere utterance of the word 'gold'.

means that which has the ability to unite with a verbal expression, i.e. the 'general meaning' (*arthasāmānya*). It [i.e. the general meaning] alone can be verbally expressed, because it [alone] is invariably connected with [the denotative words] through 'agreement in presence' (*anvaya*) and 'agreement in absence' (*vyatireka*). The 'particular meaning' (*arthaviśeṣa*) which is nothing but the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) cannot be verbally expressed, because it has no invariable connection [with the denotative words in general].

[Thus, a mental reflex capable of coalescing with a verbal expression is] a mental reflex—pertaining to a cognition—

The acceptance of the second alternative will lead to contradiction with fact—words (which are only particular forms of sound) are observed to be produced by the interaction of the various parts of the organ of speech. Besides, words like 'Rāma' or 'Rāvaṇa' can never be used in the present time, for the objects denoted by them have long ceased to exist. It is therefore better to admit that there is no natural connection between a word and its object.

What then would be the nature of such a connection ? It appears from the remarks of Vinītadeva here as well as under text 58 (ch. 3) that the connection between a word and its object consists of an arbitrary relation founded on a general convention, that such and such objects are denoted by such and such words. This relation which is ascertained through positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya-vyatireka*) is quite arbitrary, for, if there is general agreement, even the word 'moon' may be applied to mean a jar.

Pārśvadeva however remarks finally that an object produces a 'desire for conveying' (*vivakṣā*) it and such a desire is followed by (the application of) an appropriate word. An (indirect) causal relation may thus be admitted—through this desire for conveying—between the word and the object denoted by it. Still then, it must be clearly borne in mind that such a relation does never exist in reality. It is assumed just for the 'purpose of explaining the general practice of the common people in everyday life' (*samvyavahārārtha*).

According to Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 13), again, coalescence with a verbal expression means here the act of entering into the same piece of cognition—as an object apprehended (*grāhyākāratayā*)—by the thing to be denoted along with the word denoting it.

The above discussion is mainly based on *NPVP* pp. 76 f. See also *NS* ii. 1. 55 f and *NBh* thereon ; *NVTT* p. 177 for Dignāga's view; *NK* pp. 315, 516 f ; *SD* ch. 2, verse 4.

which can be united with a verbal expression, i.e. finally, the expressive aspect of the general meaning.

Alternatively, [all these may be explained as follows].[22] A verbal expression is that which is verbally expressed, i.e. the general meaning which is expressible (*abhidheya*). 'Coalescing with a verbal expression' is to become coalesced with a verbal expression. 'Capable of coalescing with a verbal expression' means what has the ability to unite with a verbal expression, i.e. the 'general term' (*śabdasāmānya*). It can express the meaning on the strength of its [invariable connection with the general meaning] through 'agreement in presence' and 'agreement in absence'. A 'particular term' (*śabdaviśeṣa*), however, cannot [express the meaning], because it is not general [in nature].

[Thus, a mental reflex capable of coalescing with a verbal expression] is a mental reflex—pertaining to a cognition—which can be united with a verbal expression, i.e. finally, the mere verbal aspect of the general term. It is shown, by interpreting the expression in two ways—i.e. through double meaning—that both these forms of constructive elements are to be understood [by the expression] 'a mental reflex capable of coalescing with a verbal expression'.

Cognition (*pratīti*) means awareness (*saṃvedana*), i.e. knowlegde (*buddhi*).

The expression 'free from it' (*tayā rahitam*) means free from construction, i.e. finally, free from the vitiating elements of construction.

These remarks, therefore, show that perception as an instrument of valid knowledge is the cognition which has no

22. The word *abhilāpa* has been explained by Vinītadeva in two ways. The suffix forming the above word may be taken in the sense of either the instrumental (*karaṇavācya*) or the accusative (*karmavācya*). In the first case, *abhilāpa* would stand for the term denoting an object and *abhilāpasaṃsarga-yogya* would refer to the object that can be denoted by a term. In the second case, *abhilāpa* would stand for the object denoted by a term and *abhilāpasaṃsarga-yogya* would refer to the term that can denote an object. (Also see *BL* ii, p. 19, n 4 and p. 23, n 2).

connection with [any of these] aspects of the general term as well as the general meaning. / 4 /

> Perception is knowledge 'which is not falsified by' (*anāhita-vibhrama*) morbid vision (*timira*), rapid movement (*āśu-bhramaṇa*), travelling on a boat, physical disorder (*saṃkṣobha*) and the like.[23] / 5 /

In the expression 'not falsified by morbid vision, rapid movement, travelling on a boat, physical disorder and the like', morbid vision is a kind of disease that affects the eyes ; rapid movement is [the movement of] a circling firebrand etc ; travelling on a boat is moving from one place to another by a boat and physical disorder is exhaustion caused by the disturbance of the gaseous (*vāyu*) and the bilious (*pitta*) elements [in the body].

The expression *timirāśubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṃkṣobha* [is formed by a *dvandva* compound which is to be dissolved as] *timira* and *āśubhramaṇa* and *nauyāna* and *saṃkṣobha*. 'Morbid vision, rapid movement, travelling on a boat, physical disorder and the like' means [the causes] beginning with all these. The expression 'and the like' covers the cases of those who are blind, who are afflicted with jaundice and such others. The word 'falsified' means that in which an 'illusory element' (*vibhrama*) is produced (*āhita*). The expression 'not falsified' means that in which an illusory element is not produced.

The expression 'not falsified by *timira*, *āśubhramaṇa*, *nauyāna* and *saṃkṣobha*' means that form of knowledge in

23. Four causes falsifying knowledge have been explicitly mentioned here. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 16) points out the peculiarity of each as follows : (i) *timira* illustrates a cause of illusion located in the sense-organ ; (ii) *āśubhramaṇa* illustrates a cause of illusion located in the object of knowledge ; (iii) *nauyāna* illustrates a cause of illusion belonging to the object (where the knower is) situated and (iv) *saṃkṣobha* illustrates an internal (*adhyātmagata*) cause of illusion. He however adds that all these causes finally impair the sense-organ, for there can be no illusory perception if the sense-organ remains quite normal (*avikṛta*).

which no illusory element is produced by [any of the causes like] morbid vision, rapid movement, travelling on a boat and physical disorder. Thus, for example, due to morbid vision, two moons are seen at the same time ; due to the movement of the boat, the trees on the bank of the river are found to be running ; and, due to the disturbance of the gaseous and the bilious elements in the body, objects look fiery.

"Perception is knowledge." The word 'knowledge' (*jñāna*) is not mentioned in the *sūtra* [i.e. text 3].[24] How then is it available ? [The answer to this query is given as follows]. Construction is always [found to be] related to knowledge only and illusoriness also is found to be an attribute of knowledge only. Therefore, what is free from construction and not illusory must be nothing but knowledge. As, for example,

24. Though Dharmakīrti does not add the word *jñāna* to the text of the actual definition of perception (in text 3), he explicitly mentions it here. Dignāga's definition of perception (*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ nāmajātyādyasaṃyutam*) also does not contain any such word. He was thus strongly criticised by Uddyotakara (on *NS* i. 1. 4, p. 130) that there is nothing that can be referred to by the term *pratyakṣa* or perception. This perhaps accounts for the anxiety of Vinītadeva for proving that the word *jñāna* is definitely understood from the implication of the definition as already stated and there can be no objection against its explicit mention in the present *sūtra*. (cf. *BL* ii, p. 25. n 3).

It may however be noted that in the case of Dharmakīrti the absence of the word *jñāna* in the definition cannot be objected to, for its presence can easily be understood, even without the comments of Vinītadeva, from the very context and sequence of the statements made by Dharmakīrti himself : 'Right knowledge is here expounded', 'Right knowledge is of two kinds, perception and inference' and 'Of these, perception is what is free from construction etc'.

Commenting upon the above objection of Uddyotakara, Vācaspati (on *NS* i. 1. 4, p. 131) also remarks that Dignāga does not state his definition of perception in the same way as Kīrti (i.e. Dharmakīrti) who gives the definition of perception etc., after including them into the general class of right knowledge and hence the expression ***kalpanāpoḍha*** (in Dignāga's definition) cannot be said to refer specifically to a piece of cognition on the strength of such inclusion.

when it is said, "Bring an animal without its calf", what is brought is not a mare [without her foal]; because the cow only is found to be related to a calf.

Similarly, here also, illusoriness and construction are found related to knowledge alone and nothing else, and as such, [when it is said that perception is what is free from construction and not illusory], perception is regarded as nothing but knowledge. / 5 /

It [i.e. perception] is of four kinds. / 6 /

"It is of four kinds". Perception that has been defined above is to be understood as classified under four heads, namely, produced by the sense (*indriyajñāna*), mental (*mānasa*), self-cognised (*ātmasamvedana*) and the knowledge of the *yogin* (*yogijñāna*). This specific division is explicitly stated here to remove contradictory notions.

According to some, the sense itself is to be viewed as the agent (*kartṛ*) of perception. The first variety [is mentioned] to discard such a view. Perception [as the instrument of valid cognition also] is knowledge that is produced by the sense, and not the sense itself.

Others find fault with the mental perception. The second variety [is mentioned] to refute such objections. There are others who do not admit that consciousness (*citta*) and mental phenomena (*caitta*) are self-cognised. The third variety [is mentioned] to discard such a view. Some others do not admit [the possibility of] the knowledge of the *yogin*. The fourth variety of perception is mentioned to discard such a view. / 6 /

[The first variety of perception] is knowledge produced by the sense. / 7 /

"Knowledge produced by the sense". Only the five organs of knowledge, like the eye etc., are to be accepted as the senses.

The mind is not [to be considered] as a sense,[25] because mental perception is shown separately [as a form of perception].

Therefore, perception as knowledge produced by the senses means knowledge which is dependent upon the senses, namely, the eye and others. / 7 /

25. In the Buddhist view mind is not considered as a separate sense-organ. As Vinītadeva points out, it follows from the mention of mental cognition as a special form of perception over and above sense-cognition.

Dignāga also takes exception to the Nyāya thesis that mind is a separate sense-organ. It has thus been urged against the Naiyāyikas that Gautama in his list of objects of knowledge (*NS* i. 1. 9) mentions 'sense-organ' and 'mind' separately and again, in the enumeration of sense-organs (*NS* i. 1. 12) refers only to the external ones and leaves out mind.

The Naiyāyikas may try to meet the objection by pointing out that Gautama's tacit admission of mind as a sense-organ is proved by the fact that he questions nowhere the validity of such a view which has been upheld by many other thinkers. As against this, Dignāga contends that Gautama's admission of the other sense-organs (besides mind) may also be understood in the same way and his statement enlisting the five external sense-organs would be quite redundant.

It may further be argued from the Nyāya point of view that mind is not mentioned along with the other sense-organs in the same list (*NS* i. 1. 12 : *ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvak-śrotrāṇi indriyāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ*), because in contrast with the other sense-organs it is not composed of material elements. In refuting, the Buddhist would ask : what exactly is sought to be established by the above *sūtra* (*NS* i. 1. 12) of Gautama ? It cannot be claimed that it is intended to be a mere enumeration of the sense-organs, because then *manas* should have been included therein. Moreover, there would be no justification for the use of the word *bhūtebhyaḥ*. Nor can it be claimed that it is intended to point out simply that the five sense-organs like *ghrāṇa* and the rest are composed of material elements, because then the word *indriyāṇi* in the *sūtra* would become useless. The intended implication would be very well conveyed by a simpler expression : *ghrāṇādīnī bhūtebhyaḥ*. Lastly, it would also be quite illogical to contend that the *sūtra* is intended to convey a twofold implication, namely, that *ghrāṇa* and the rest are both sense-organs and composed of matter, because, as has been already pointed out, the fact that all these are sense-organs can be established even without any specific *sūtra*, as in the case of mind.

Mental perception is [the knowledge] produced by sense-cognition—as being the 'immediate and homogeneous cause' (*samanantara-pratyaya*)—which has for its accessory (*sahakārin*) the object which is the immediately following [prototype] of its own object [i.e. the object of the first sense-cognition].[26] / 8 /

26. This special form of perception peculiar to the Buddhist view is first mentioned by Dignāga who, however, does not offer any further indication as to its exact nature or a full-fledged definition. The long definition given here has been framed very carefully to meet the objections raised against *manovijñāna* in later times.

The author of the *ṭippaṇī* (p. 26) who associates the objections with the name of Kumārila explains them in the following words : "If the piece of mental perception pertains to the same object as is revealed by the sense-cognition, it would not be a source of valid knowledge at all, for it would cognise what has been already cognised. Again, if it is supposed to be a perception of what is intervened (*vyavahita*, i.e. a prototype of the object of the sense-cognition—a prototype belonging to the second moment of the object's existence and thereby intervened by the prototype belonging to the first moment of the object's existence), (the opponent would put forward the following two alternatives) : 'Does mental perception require the assistance of the sense-organ for its production ? Or is it produced independently of such assistance ?' (Neither of the alternatives is admissible). If it depends on the assistance of the sense-organ, it should better be called a sense-cognition. If, again, it does not require such assistance, we shall have to admit a cognition in the form of mental perception even for one whose sense-organ is damaged (because one's mind remains unimpaired at that time). This would finally lead to the absurdity of a total absence of the blind, the deaf or the like (because in spite of having no sense-cognition they can easily be assumed to have the mental perception of such objects as colour, sound and the like)".

It follows from the above definition that *manovijñāna* i) must be preceded by a sense-cognition and ii) the object it reveals must be an exact reproduction appearing in the second moment. The first condition refutes the objection of a total absence of the blind or the deaf, for such persons can never have the respective previous sense-cognitions. The second condition refutes the objection of cognising what is already cognised, for the object pertaining to the piece of mental perception

"Mental perception is [the knowledge] produced by sense-cognition—as being the immediate and homogeneous cause—which has for its accessory the object which is the immediately following [prototype] of its own object".

[The compounded word] *svaviṣaya* [literally, own-object] is to be expounded as *svasya viṣayaḥ* [literally, the 'underlying object' (*ālambana*) of its own]. [That is, the term *svaviṣaya* here stands for the underlying object of the first sense-cognition].

is not identical with the object of preceding sense-cognition—it is an exact reproduction that appears immediately in the next moment. According to Vinītadeva, this also refutes the further objection that mental perception apprehends an object which is quite dissimilar to the one apprehended by sense-cognition, because the object of sense-cognition and the object of mental perception would be the exact reproductions of each other.

As Dharmottara points out, it would be a genuine case of mental perception only when the sense after cognising an object in the first moment ceases, from the very next moment, to function in respect of the same object; if the sense continues to function in respect of the same object even in the following moments, the subsequent cognitions would be nothing but sense-cognitions, for they cannot be regarded as depending on mind alone.

Two further points to be noted in this connection are i) in relation to the mental perception, the sense-cognition is to be regarded only as *samanantara-pratyaya* and ii) both the mental perception and the sense-cognition producing it must belong to the same stream (*santāna*) of consciousness. The definition would not then unduly apply to the perception of a *yogin* who, through his extraordinary powers, may have the direct knowledge of the sense-cognition of even another person, for in such a case the sense-cognition would be *ālambana-pratyaya* and moreover, the two cognitions would belong to two different streams.

This mental perception is admitted by the Buddhists only on the basis of *siddhānta* and there is no independent ground to establish it (cf. *NBT* p. 19; *BL* ii, p. 28, n 3 and p. 315). Kamalaśīla, though adhering to this general opinion, identifies *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, at least on one occasion (*TSP* verse 1330), with *yogi-pratyakṣa*.

See also *PVBh* (p. 305) for a somewhat different account.

V. 14

The expression 'the immediate prototype of its own object' (*svaviṣayānantara*) means the one immediately following its own object. The term immediate (*anantara*) refers to [the object] which is produced immediately in the second moment and is also a complete prototype (*sarūpa*). The expression 'the object which is the immediately following prototype of its own object' (*svaviṣayānantara-viṣaya*) means that which immediately follows its [i.e. of the first sense-cognition] own object and is also itself an object of knowledge.

'A sense-cognition which has for its accessory the object which is the immediately following prototype of its own object' (*svaviṣayānantaraviṣaya-sahakāri-indriyajñāna*) refers to that piece of sense-cognition which is assisted by such knowledge. And mental perception is nothing but the knowledge which is produced by such a sense-cognition—which sense-cognition, again, acts as the immediate and homogeneous cause; because it [i.e. the perception] is dependent on the mind alone.

Here the expression 'the object which is the immediately following prototype of its own object' is added to refute the [two] charges [against mental perception], namely, that [mental perception] does not impart real knowledge, because it reveals what is already revealed, and that [mental perception] reveals an object which is dissimilar in kind. Thus, mental perception is regarded as having for its object the object which originates in the second moment and is the immediately following prototype of the object of the sense-cognition. How can, therefore, there be the revealing of what is already revealed? The term immediate (*anantara*) refers to an object which is of a similar kind. As such, how can there be the objection of revealing an object which is dissimilar in kind?

The objection that there will be the absurdity of the absence of the blind, the deaf and the like is refuted by stating that [mental perception] is produced by sense-cognition as being the immediate and homogeneous cause. In the mental perception of the blind or the deaf there is no immediate and homogeneous cause in the form of sense-cognition. Therefore,

the contention of some—namely the perception of external object is admitted to be produced through mental perception and thus there will be the absurdity of the absence of the blind, the deaf and the like—is refuted hereby. / 8 /

> Every consciousness (*citta*) and every mental phenomenon (*caitta*) are self-cognised. / 9 /

"Every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-cognised". [The compounded expression] *sarva-citta-caitta* is to be explained as signifying the states of consciousness as well as the mental phenomena taken in their entirety. By mentioning the word 'all' the cases of false knowledge also are taken into consideration. [Perception in the form of] the self-cognised is nothing but the revealing of the nature of all these. All these forms of consciousness and mental phenomena reveal their own nature, because they are themselves of the nature of cognition (*pratīti*).

Just as a lamp, because of being of the nature of the luminous, reveals its own self also and does not stand in need of any other lamp to reveal its own qualities, so also the states of consciousness and mental phenomena do not require any further piece of cognition to reveal their nature. Therefore, all these, proving, as they do, their own nature, themselves become perception as an instrument of valid knowledge. / 9 /

> The knowledge of the *yogin* [which constitutes the fourth type of perception] results from the 'culmination of the excellences' (*prakarṣa-paryanta*) of deep meditation on the 'objects as they are in reality' (*bhūtārtha*).[27] / 10 /

27. See under supplementary notes.

"The knowledge of the *yogin* results from the culmination of the excellences of deep meditation on the objects as they are in reality." [The expression *bhūtārtha* means literally], objects as they are in reality, i.e. 'not opposite to what is their actual nature' (*aviparīta*)—[in other words], the four 'noble truths' (*āryasatya*). [The compounded expression] *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā* means deep meditation on these. 'Deep meditation' (*bhāvanā*), again, means the repeated performance of the above act.

[The compounded expression] *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa* means the states of excellence of this [deep meditation], i.e. the stages of *smṛtyupasthāna*, *uṣmagata*, *mūrdhan* and *kṣānti*.[28] [The compounded expression] *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryanta* means the culminational points reached in these [stages]. The 'culminational points' (*paryanta*) are the stages of *agradharma*. [The compounded expression] *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantaja* means that which results from it [i. e. the culmination of the excellences of deep meditation on the real nature of objects].

The word *yoga* means absorption (*samādhi*). A *yogin* is a person who has [the capacity for] absorption. The knowledge of the *yogin* is the knowledge of such persons. Thus, there is born [in such persons] an infallible light [i.e. knowledge] which is produced through the power of absorption and reveals quite correctly [the nature of] all the objects—past, present and future.

Just as due to the influence of the descent (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of a deity etc., there is produced, in the states of dream, knowledge about the various past and future objects, which is true and non-contradictory ; so also, there is produced, through the power of *yoga,* knowledge in the form of light which reveals all kinds of objects meditated upon—past, future, distant, obstructed (*sāntara*) and of an atomic magnitude. And that is why, it is regarded as an instrument of valid perception.

Here is the inferential form [of the argument] : the

28. See *BL* ii, p. 31, n 2 and *MV* p. 101.

knowledge of the great *yogin*-s having their minds fixed, which relates to the past and the future objects is an instrument of valid cognition, because it is the cause of rightly indicating the nature of the innumerable past and future objects, as for instance, the knowledge of one possessed by a demon or a spirit. Whatever knowledge is not a real instrument of valid cognition is not the cause of rightly indicating the nature of innumerable past and future objects, as for instance, the knowledge of an insane person.[29]

If, even [a piece of knowledge] which does not actually lead to [the object] is regarded as the cause of rightly indicating the innumerable past and future objects, then [a piece of knowledge] which is improper (*ayogya*) and 'leads to harm' (*apakāraka*) would also become an instrument of valid cognition.

It may further be explained thus. Just as, in the case of one possessed by a spirit, [we get from one] correct instructions regarding the past and the future objects, so also, in the case of the *yogin*-s, [we get from them] correct instructions [in the form of prophecies] regarding the past and the future objects. As, for example, we get the instruction from the saints (*muni*) like Pāka and others that *haritakī* etc. are capable of preventing future diseases. Or, for example, in the instructions of Lord Buddha, we find various prophecies—which are not contradicted—regarding the ten future signs (*bhāvidaśanimitta*), the attainment of truth (*satyopalabdhi*), Mātṛceṭa, Kālakṣaya, King Aśoka and countries like Āśāvana, Kashmir etc. / 10 /

Its [i.e. of perception] object is the 'unique particular' (*svalakṣaṇa*).[30] / *11* /

29. The inference along with the statements of the positive and the negative concomitances may be put in a simpler form : the knowledge of a *yogin* is *pramāṇa*, because it rightly indicates the objects. Whatever rightly indicates an object is *pramāṇa*, e.g. the knowledge of one possessed by a spirit, and whatever is not *pramāṇa* does not rightly indicate an object, e.g. the knowledge of an insane person.

30. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 22) explains that the term *svalakṣaṇa* etymologically means : a characteristic, i.e. an essential property which belongs

To remove the contradictory notions regarding the object, [the author] says, "Its object is the unique particular". Thus, it is to be noted that the object of perception as an instrument of valid cognition, [the nature of] which perception has just been explained, is the unique particular alone and not the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). This is because the universal does not constitute the real nature of an object, while perception reveals the real nature of an object. / 11 /

What, again, is to be understood as the unique particular ? To this, the author says—

> The unique particular is an object the proximity (*sannidhāna*) and the non-proximity (*asannidhāna*) of which produces difference in the reflex relating to the knowledge. / *12* /

Proximity means presence in the 'proper ken' (*yogyadeśa*). Non-proximity means presence 'beyond the proper ken' (*ayogyadeśa*) and 'total absence' (*sarvathā abhāva*) everywhere. The compounded expression *sannidhānāsannidhāne* means proximity as well as non-proximity. These two produce the specific qualities of distinctness (*visphuṭatva*) and indistinctness (*asphuṭatva*) in a piece of knowledge.

If there is proximity, there is produced a piece of knowledge which possesses a distinct reflex. If there is non-proximity, there is produced a piece of knowledge which possesses

to (an object's) own self alone, i.e. (a property) which is exclusively particular (*svam asādhāraṇaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tattvaṃ svalakṣaṇam*). He further adds that an object has indeed two sorts of properties—one extremely particular (*asādhāraṇa* or real) and the other commonly shared (*sāmānya* or imagined). The term has also been interpreted in a slightly different way (*SDS* comm. by A. Sastri, under *bauddha-darśana*) : *svalakṣaṇa* means what is characterised only by its (i.e. of an object) own essence, i.e, by a unique property (*svena asādhāraṇena rūpeṇa lakṣyate*).

an indistinct [reflex]. [Thus], the unique particular is nothing but the object which produces difference in the reflex relating to a piece of knowledge. / 12 /

Let the object of perception be a thing (*vastu*) which is 'essentially real' (*paramārtha-sat*). But how can the unique particular be the object [of perception] ? To this, the author says—

> It [i.e. the unique particular] alone is essentially real. / *13* /

The compounded word *paramārtha* means the element (*artha*) [constituting a thing] which is essential (*parama*). The word 'essential' means 'not accidental' (*akṛtrima*), i.e. finally, devoid of any attribution (*āropa*). The expression 'essentially real' means that which is real in its essential nature.

The unique particular alone is essentially real and hence there is no scope for the objection as previously mentioned. / 13 /

Why the unique particular alone is essentially real ? To this, the author says—

> Because a real thing is that which is characterised by the capability of producing an action in respect of an object.[31] / *14* /

31. According to the Buddhists, the only criterion for the reality (*vastutva*) of an object is its 'capability of fulfilling some purpose' (*arthakriyā-sāmarthya*) and it is proved in the cases of different existing objects by direct experience (*SDS* p. 7). It is observed that whatever fulfils some purpose is real or existent, e.g. a jar or a piece of cloth and, again, that whatever does not fulfil some purpose is unreal or non-existent, e.g. horns growing on the head of a hare or a flower blooming in the sky. Besides, such a view is supported by the practice of the common people (*laukika-vyavahāra*). As for instance, a person in spite of having a son is observed to remark 'I have no son', if his son fails to perform the

The word *artha* means here purpose (*prayojana*). The word *kriyā* means fulfilment (*niṣpatti*). The compounded expression *arthakriyā* literally means an action in respect of an object, i.e. finally, the fulfilment of a purpose. The expression *arthakriyā-sāmarthya* means the capability of producing such [fulfilment of a purpose].

The expression *arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇa* means a thing which possesses the characteristic of—i.e. is of the nature of—being capable of producing the fulfilment of a purpose. The expression *arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatva* means the general property of such a thing. The expression *arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvāt* means 'because of such [a property]'.

Thus, by the assertion 'whatever is capable of producing the fulfilment of a purpose is a real thing', it is shown that an action in respect of an object is made possible only through the instrumentality of the unique particular. And, therefore, the unique particular alone is essentially real. / 14 /

The universal is the other kind [of object].[32]
It is the object of inference. / *15* /

proper duties, and again, a person though actually childless, is observed to remark 'I have got a son', if anybody else performs the proper duties of a son for him. (cf. *NM* ii, p. 17).

32. It has already been stated (in n 12 above) that in the Buddhist view there are only two types of objects of knowledge, viz. *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. An objection may be raised against this theory. By what *pramāṇa* is the twofoldness of objects proved? Is it proved by the two *pramāṇa*-s (i.e. perception and inference) recognised by the Buddhists or by a *pramāṇa* different from the two? Neither of the alternatives can be logically defended. In the first alternative, there would be the fallacy of mutual dependence: the existence of only two *pramāṇa*-s would be proved after it has been proved that there are only two kinds of objects and, again, the existence of only two kinds of objects would be proved only when it has been proved that there are only two *pramāṇa*-s. In the second alternative, it would be necessary to admit a third form of *pramāṇa* and this would go against the position of the Buddhists themselves. In answer to the above objection, Prajñākara (*PVBh* pp. 170f) says that the twofoldness of objects is proved by perception. The awareness

"The universal is the other kind [of objects]". The objects of knowledge (*prameya*) which are different from the objects possessing the nature of the unique particular which has just been explained are the universal. [In other words, the universal is] an object, irrespective of the proximity or non-proximity of which, the knowledge remains the same.

"It is the object of inference". The universal is the object of inference alone, because it is always connected through agreement in presence and agreement in absence.

Though this is not the proper context, still, apprehending that otherwise too elaborate an explanation would be necessary later, [the author] here discusses the nature of the universal also. To make it clear, due to its [i.e. of the discussion of the nature of universal] introduction here—on the occasion of explaining the nature of the unique particular—the understanding of [the nature of the universal] which is opposite in nature to it [i.e. the unique particular] becomes easier and that is why the universal is mentioned [in this connection]. It can hence be stated briefly in a few words, "It is the object of inference". Otherwise, it would have been later necessary to repeat all these words once again on the occasion of explaining what is the object of inference.[33] / 15 /

of the similar and the dissimilar is a property of cognition (*pratīti*) itself and this property (as present in cognition) is proved by self-cognition (*svasamvedana-pratyakṣa*). [The idea seems to be : when perception cognises on object as *svalakṣaṇa*, it also reveals the same as distinct from *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and thus would be established the two classes].

33. cf. the following verse enumerating the six types of concordance (*saṅgati*), current among the later Naiyāyikas :

saprasaṅga upodghāto hetutā'vasaras tathā /
nirvāhakaikyakāryatve ṣoḍhā saṅgatir iṣyate //

The concordance in the present case may be included under the first one, viz. *prasaṅga*.

To remove the contradictory notions relating to the effect, the author says—

> And that perceptual knowledge only is the effect [produced by] the instrument of valid cognition, because it is identical with the ascertainment of the object.[34] / 16 /

34. Although there is unanimity on the point that *pramāṇa* and its effect (*phala*) are not distinct from each other, it is clear from the remarks of Dignāga (*PS* i, verses 10-12) that in the Buddhist tradition two different views were current as to the exact nature of the effect of *pramāṇa*. According to one, the effect consists in the 'cognition of an object' (*viṣayādhigama*) and according to the other, it consists in the 'cognition of the self' (*svasaṃvitti*). Dharmakīrti subscribes to the former view.

Śāntarakṣita (*TS* verse 1344) mentions both the views and endeavours to bring out the difference between the two in clearer terms. His commentator Kamalaśīla who logically justifies each says that if the object of knowledge (*prameya*) be admitted to be something external, the effect would consist in the cognition of the object and *pramāṇa* would consist in its co-ordination with the object. There may be a cognition of the self in this case also, still it would not be considered as the effect, because the cognition of the object alone appears as endowed with the form (*ākāra*) of the object cognised. If, on the other hand, the object of knowledge is regarded as identical with knowledge itself (i.e. if the reality of an external object is denied), the effect would consist in the cognition of the self and *pramāṇa* would consist in its peculiar capability, namely, that such a piece of cognition alone and nothing else, like a jar etc., can reveal the self.

In explaining the identity of *pramāṇa* with its effect, Dignāga (*PS* i, verse 11) says that *pramāṇa*. its object and the effect are not actually three different entities. They can all be represented by a single piece of cognition. The object would be the cognised aspect (*grāhyākāra*), *pramāṇa* would be the cognising aspect (*grāhakākāra*) and the cognition itself would constitute the effect.

The above Buddhist view has been assailed on various grounds. It is thus objected that the term *pramāṇa* carries also the sense of being an instrument (*karaṇa*) and an instrument is always observed to possess a 'functional intermediary' (*vyāpāra*), e.g. an axe which is the instrument in the act of cutting has the functional intermediary in the form of a violent conjunction with the wood. But what would

The connection [i.e. the underlying intention of the opponent] is here as follows. If it is really intended that perception is to be regarded as an instrument of valid cognition, there must also be an effect produced by that instrument of valid cognition in the form of the ascertainment [of the nature of] the objects of knowledge, like colour etc.; as, for example, in the act of cutting down a tree with an axe, the effect is found to be the division [of the trunk] into two pieces.

constitute the functional intermediary in the case of a piece of cognition which itself is supposed to be an instrument of valid knowledge? The answer is that the very act of revealing may be accepted as representing the functional intermediary.

A further objection against the Buddhists is that their view is in contradiction with the practice of the common people. Does anybody ever claim that the axe which is an instrument is identical with the effect it produces (viz. the division into pieces)? The answer to this lies in the fact that in the Buddhist view the relation subsisting between *pramāṇa* and its effect is one of 'the determined and the determinant' (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka*) and not one of 'the instrument and the effect', because, all the entities being momentary (*kṣaṇika*), there can be no real (*pāramārthika*) connections in the form of being an agent (*kartṛbhāva*) or being an instrument (*karaṇabhāva*) or the like. A piece of cognition appears as endowed with the specific form of the object cognised and this co-ordination alone specifically establishes it as the cognition of the same and nothing else. Besides, there is really no contradiction with the practice of the common people, for it is observed that the same thing is often designated in different ways. As for instance, the same bow may be represented as possessing quite different characteristics (like *kartṛtva, karaṇatva* etc.) by such assertions as 'The bow strikes', 'One strikes with a bow', 'Coming out of the bow, the arrow strikes' and so on. The charge of contradiction may be avoided in a still different way. In the act of cutting down a tree with an axe, the effect in the form of division into parts also implies penetration (*anupraveśa*) into the object divided and this penetration being a property of the axe itself, there is actually no contradiction in maintaining that the effect (viz. division into parts) is identical with the instrument (viz. the axe).

In this context, Śaṅkarasvāmin (according to Kamalaśīla) opposes the Buddhist view by offering the following inference: *pramāṇa* must perform an action (*kriyā*) different from its own self, because it is the 'means for an action' (*kāraka*), as for instance, an axe.

As against this, the author says, "And that perceptual knowledge only is the effect produced by the instrument of valid cognition". [It means] that the piece of perceptual knowledge alone is the effect produced by the instrument of valid cognition and there is no other effect over and above that piece of perceptual knowledge.

How is it that perceptual knowledge alone constitutes the effect ? To remove such an apprehension, the author says, "Because it is identical with the ascertainment of the object". Ascertainment (*pratīti*) means definite cognition (*niścaya*). 'Identical with' (*rūpa*) means 'of the nature of' (*svabhāva*). The expression *arthapratīti-rūpa* means perception as having this characteristic [i.e. perception which is identical with the ascertainment of the object]. The expression *arthapratīti-rūpatva* means the general property of such perception. The expression *arthapratīti-rūpatvāt* means because of such a property.

And thus, when there is an 'imaginary reference' (*āropa*) by using the terms *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, the effect that follows is in the form of 'an ascertainment of an object' (*arthaviniścayana*). Knowledge is of the nature of an ascertainment of an object. Perception also is intended to be of the nature of knowledge.

Therefore, as the author finally intends to put it, it is to be

Śāntarakṣita points out that the inference is faulty in many respects. Thus, the instance of the axe does not corroborate the intended thesis, because it has already been shown above that there is no contradiction in assuming an identity between the axe and the effect produced by it. Besides, what exactly is the implication of the expression 'means for an action' ? If it implies having a cause-effect relation, there would be the fallacy of the unproved (*asiddha*), for in the Buddhist view, the relation between *pramāṇa* and its effect is admitted to be a different one. If, on the other hand, it implies the relation of determined-determinant, there would be the fallacy of the irregular (*anaikāntika*), for, in that case, there would be no contradiction. (cf. *TS* verses 1344ff). See also *MV* (ch ii, n 102) for the controversy 'among the second generation of the Vijñānavādins'.

noted, that since perception is of the nature of the ascertainment of an object, perception alone would constitute the effect. / 16 /

If perception alone is to constitute the effect, what then is actually to be regarded as the instrument of valid cognition ? To remove such an apprehension, the author says—

> Its [i.e. of perception] instrumentality consists in the co-ordination (*sārūpya*) with the object, because the ascertainment of an object is accomplished by force of it [i.e. co-ordination]. / 17 /

'Co-ordination' is having identical form (*sādṛśya*). 'Its' means 'of perception'. It thus follows that the instrument of valid perceptual cognition is constituted by the perception 'that represents the form of the object' (*arthākāra*).

Why should only co-ordination with the object be regarded as the instrument of valid cognition ? Apprehending such [an objection], the author says, "Because the ascertainment of an object is accomplished by force of it". [The meaning is] : the ascertainment is accomplished on the strength of the co-ordination with the object, and that is why the co-ordination alone would constitute the instrument of valid cognition.

And thus, it can be 'specifically indicated' (*vyavasthāpyate*) that it [i.e. a certain piece of cognition] is a cognition of the blue, and not of the yellow. That [particular factor] which is the cause thereof [i.e. in the act of specification] is intended to be the instrument of valid cognition. The sense-organ is not capable of making such specific indication.

To explain, a sense-organ is the common cause of all the cognitions [produced by it] and hence how can it be capable of specifically indicating each particular ascertainment ? If any sense-organ would have been the cause of the knowledge of the blue alone and would have never produced the knowledge of the yellow and the like, then only it [i.e. the

sense-organ] would have been capable of specific indication. Proximity, too, cannot be the cause of specific indication, because, just like the sense-organ, it also is a common cause.

But co-ordination, since it is never common, can be the cause of the specific indication of each particular ascertainment. To make it clear, [in that case], there would be specific indication, because the blue-form (*nīlākāra*) which belongs to the knowledge of the blue does not belong to the knowledge of the yellow and the like. A cognition of the blue is expressed as 'it is blue' and the cognition is never expressed as 'it is yellow', because the cognition is of the form of the blue and that is why [it must be admitted] that co-ordination alone is the instrument of valid cognition. / 17 /

Here ends the first chapter of the 'elucidatory comments' (*vistara-ṭīkā*) on the *Nyāyabindu*, 'composed for the benefit of the pupils' (*śiṣyahitā*).

CHAPTER TWO

ON INFERENCE FOR ONESELF

Inference is twofold—for one's own sake (*svārtha*) and for the sake of others (*parārtha*). / 1 /

Right knowledge has been explained to be of two kinds, namely, perception and inference. Of these, perception has already been explained in details. To begin the explanation of inference, the author says, "Inference is twofold". It is to be noted that there are only two types of inference.

There can be no general definition[1] covering both *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* which are respectively of the nature of 'cognition' (*jñāna*) and 'verbal communication' (*abhidhāna*).[2] [This shows that the two are different by nature].

1. This contention however does not seem to be convincing. A general definition of inference may be given as 'a cognition produced by the apprehension of a mark having the three characteristics or a mark having invariable concomitance with the inferable property' (cf. Vinītadeva under ch. i, text 2; *NP* p. 7; *NV* pp. 161, 163). The objection that it would not apply to *parārthānumāna* as consisting of only a group of propositions would be simply out of the place, because the definition is not at all intended to cover it. The group of propositions does not really constitute the essence of an inference which is admitted only as a form of right cognition. Dharmakīrti himself points out at the beginning of the third chapter that the term *parārthānumāna* is applied to a proposition conveying a valid mark only in a secondary sense (*upacāra*) on the ground that 'through an indirect chain of causal connections' (*paramparayā*), it also helps to produce a cognition in somebody else (which actually constitutes *parārthānumāna* and to which the above definition applies). cf. also *VD* p. 375.
2. This peculiar Buddhist tenet of an essential distinction between *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*—as a process of thought and as a mode of communicating it—was first set forth by Dignāga himself. See *BL* ii, p. 47, n 2 and also *Fragments*, p. 82.

How can, therefore, a general definition be stated first? On the other hand, it would be easier to state the definitions pertaining to each class when they have been classified. That is why the classification has been mentioned first.[3]

The terms *svārtha* and *parārtha* are added to show specifically that inference is of two kinds only. The word *artha* here means purpose (*prayojana*). Finally, [the terms *svārtha* and *parārtha* therefore respectively] mean 'what serves one's own purpose' and 'what serves the purpose of somebody else'.

Thus, it is to be noted that a *svārthānumāna* is what is the cause of one's own cognition, and a *parārthānumāna* is what is the cause of the cognition of somebody else. / 1 /

> Of these, a *svārthānumāna* is knowledge which is produced through a mark (*liṅga*) having three characteristics (*trirūpa*) and pertains to an 'inferable object' (*anumeya*). / 2 /

The compounded word *trirūpa* means what possesses three characteristics. The word 'mark' (*liṅga*) means that by which an object is indicated (*liṅgyate*). An inferable object is what is known through inference.

Thus, a *svārthānumāna* means a cognition which is produced through a reason (*hetu*) having three specific characteristics and pertains to the inferable object.

Even a cognition which is produced through a pseudo-mark (*liṅgābhāsa*) would have become inference and hence, to exclude it [from the purview of proper inference] the expression 'having three characteristics' has been added.

The cognition of the mark itself would have become inference and hence, to exclude it [from the purview of proper

3. The violation of the accepted logical procedure that a general definition should precede classification is thus justified. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 29) further points out that here the statement of classification actually becomes a 'precondition for the statement of the definitions' (*lakṣaṇanirdeśa-aṅga*) and that is why classification is given first.

inference] the expression '(which) pertains to an inferable object' has been added.

The mark itself would have become inference and hence, to prevent [such a possibility] the word 'cognition' has been added.[4] / 2 /

If the cognition of the inferable object itself is admitted to be the instrument of valid knowledge, what, then, would be the effect (*phala*) [produced by it]? Apprehending such an objection, the author says—

> Here [i.e in the case of inference] also the arrangement (*vyavasthā*) with regard to the effect [produced by] an instrument of valid knowledge and [the instrument itself] is just the same as in the case of perception.[5] / 3 /

4. Vinītadeva here shows the justification for the separate mention of each of the three terms (*pratipadavyāvṛtti*) in the general definition of *svārthānumāna*, which states that it i) would be produced through a mark having three characteristics, ii) would pertain to the inferable object and iii) would be a piece of cognition.

The first clause prevents the definition from being applied to a piece of (false) cognition produced through a pseudo-reason (*liṅgābhāsa*), for a pseudo-reason is always deficient in one or several of the three characteristics.

If the second clause is omitted, *svārthānumāna*, according to the definition, would be simply a cognition produced through a mark having three characteristics. It would apply even to the mere perception of such a mark, for—the object cognised also being one of the causes producing perceptual knowledge—the perception of the mark also would be a cognition produced through the mark itself.

The third clause is added to point out specifically that, as against the claim of some, inference (as an instrument of valid knowledge) is represented only by the cognition produced through a mark and not by the mark itself.

5. See *BL* ii, p. 49, n 3.

Just as in the case of perception the cognition itself has been said to be the effect, so also here the inferential cognition itself would be the effect [produced by] the instrument of valid knowledge, because it [i.e. the cognition] is of the nature of the ascertainment of an object.

Just as the instrumentality of perception consists in its co-ordination with the object, so also the instrumentality of inference, too, consists in its co-ordination with the object, because the ascertainment of an object is accomplished by force of it [i.e. co-ordination]. / 3 /

It has been said that [inference is cognition produced through] a mark having three characteristics. What, then, are these three characteristics ? In answer to such a query, the author says—

> The three characteristics[6] of a mark are just (*eva*) its presence in the inferable object, its presence only (*eva*) in a 'similar case' (*sapakṣa*) and just (*eva*) its absence in a 'dissimilar case' (*asapakṣa*). And [all these must be] properly ascertained. / 4 /

The word *trairūpya* etymologically means the general property of what possesses three characteristics [i.e. the three characteristics themselves].

"Just its presence in the inferable object": The first characteristic [of a valid mark] is its presence in the inferable object which will be defined subsequently.

By mentioning the word *sattva* (presence) there, [the author] excludes [the pseudo-reasons] like 'because it is

6. Praśastapāda (*PBh* pp. 478, 480) who ascribes the view to Kāśyapa states the same thing in slightly different terms :

> *yad anumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite |*
> *tadabhāve ca nāstyeva tal liṅgam anumāpakam ||*

perceived by the visual sense' (*cākṣuṣatva*)[7] [in the inference of non-eternality in sound] and such others.

By mentioning the additional [word *eva*]. [the author] excludes [the pseudo-reasons] like 'one whose presence is unproved in some of the cases under the scope of the subject' (*pakṣa-ekadeśa-asiddha*)[8] and such others.

"Its presence only in a similar case". The second characteristic [of a valid mark] is its presence only in a similar case.

7. i.e. a mark in spite of its presence in a similar case (*sapakṣa*) as well as its absence in a dissimilar case (*vipakṣa*) would be a pseudo-reason and not a valid mark, if it is absent in the subject (*anumeya=pakṣa*). As an illustration, Vinītadeva refers to the following false inference cited by Dharmakīrti himself as an example of *ubhayāsiddha* (ch. 3, text 68) : sound is non-eternal, because it is visible. Here the reason 'visibility' is not present in 'sound', which is only audible.

8. i.e. the particle *eva* has been added to emphasise the point that the mark must cover by its presence the whole class comprising the subject and not merely a part of it. The violation of this condition would lead to the pseudo-reason known as *pakṣaikadeśāsiddha*. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 31) illustrates it with the following Jaina inference that seeks to establish the animation of plants : trees are conscious beings, because they sleep. In the case of trees, 'sleep' which has been offered here as the mark means the closing of the leaves at night. But such sleep is proved as related to only a part of the subject, because only some kinds of trees—and not trees in general—close their leaves at night.

   Praśastapāda's enumeration (see note 7 above) does not contain any such additional word. In its explanation, Śrīdhara (*NK* p 478f) who uses the term *bhāgāsiddha* in place of *pakṣaikadeśāsiddha* and gives a different illustration shows that even then there is no scope for the definition being applied to a case involving the above-mentioned pseudo-reason. According to the line of argument indicated by him, the objection against the above illustration of Dharmottara would be that, in the inference cited, the subject actually is 'trees in general' and not trees as particular members. 'Sleep' is present only in some kinds of trees and not trees in general. In other words, the reason 'sleep' is not present in the actual subject and as such no objection is possible.

   Dharmottara draws attention also to the position of *eva* in the *sūtra*. The particle has been intentionally placed after the word *sattva* and not before it. If it were placed before the word *sattva*, it would

By mentioning the word *sattva* (presence) here, [the author] excludes [the pseudo-reason known as] the 'extra-ordinary irregular' (*asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*).[9]

By mentioning the additional [word *eva*], [the author] excludes [the pseudo-reason known as] the 'ordinary irregular' (*sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*).[10] By mentioning both of these together, [the author] excludes [the pseudo-reason known as] the contradicted (*viruddha*).[11]

have syntactical connection with the word *anumeya* and the meaning finally would be that a mark is something which belongs exclusively to the subject and nothing else. In other words, a mark should always be something which is an 'exclusive property' (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*) of the subject. Thus, in the inference of non-eternality in sound one would have to state as the reason nothing but the property of audibility (*śrāvaṇatva*). To avoid such an absurdity the particle *eva* has been so placed.

The above interpretation of Dharmottara however does not seem to have much significance, for the difficulty mentioned by him is avoided by the second characteristic of a valid mark, viz. its presence in a similar case. 'Audibility' being an exclusive property of sound cannot belong to any other non-eternal object and as such, its presence in a similar case is also not established.

9. i.e. the violation of this second condition would lead to the fallacy of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*. This fallacy occurs when the mark is present only in the subject and neither in a similar case nor in a dissimilar case. An illustration would be : sound is non-eternal, because it possesses sound-ness (*śabdatva*). Here the reason 'sound-ness' is located exclusively in the subject 'sound'. According to Dharmottara, the second characteristic excludes a reason involving the fallacy of *viruddha* (cf. note 11 below).

10. The particle *eva* coming immediately after the word *sapakṣa* implies that the mark must be located in a similar case only and not also in a dissimilar one. It therefore excludes a reason involving the fallacy of *sādhāraṇānaikāntika* which is present in both similar and dissimilar cases. An illustration would be : sound is non-eternal, because it is provable (*prameya*). Here the reason 'provability' is present in all entities—both eternal and non-eternal.

11. The fallacy of *viruddha* occurs when the mark has an invariable connection with the absence of the inferable property, i.e. when the mark is present always in a dissimilar case and never in a similar

"Just its absence in a dissimilar case". The third characteristic [of a valid mark] is its absence in all the dissimilar cases.

By mentioning the word *asattva* (absence) here, [the author] excludes [the pseudo-reasons known as] the ordinary irregular and the contradicted.[12]

By mentioning the additional [word *eva*], [the author] excludes [the pseudo-reason] 'which is present in some of the instances under the scope of a dissimilar case' (*vipakṣa-ekadeśa-vṛtti*).[13]

The expression 'properly ascertained' is to be understood as related to all the three [characteristics], because it has been mentioned in the end All the three characteristics are to be accepted only when they are properly ascertained by one's own self through the instruments of valid knowledge.

one. An illustration would be : sound is eternal, because it is something produced. Here the reason 'being produced' is present only in non-eternal entities.

By the word *ubhaya* Vinītadeva seems to refer to the words *sapakṣa* and *eva*. His explanation that they are mentioned together to exclude a pseudo-reason in the form of *viruddha* is quite unnecessary.

Dharmottara further explains that the significance of putting the particle *eva* just before the word *sapakṣa* is to indicate that a mark even if 'it is not present in *all* the similar cases but only in *some* of them' (*sapakṣāvyāpi*) is to be regarded as a valid reason. Thus, for instance, in the inference 'sound is non-eternal, because it is produced by conscious effort (*prayatnāntarīyaka*),' the reason 'being produced by conscious effort' is valid', though it is absent in some similar cases such as the flash of lightning etc.

12. A *sādharaṇānaikāntika* reason is present in both similar and dissimilar cases, while a *viruddha* reason is present only in dissimilar cases.

13. As an illustration of *vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti* Dharmottara cites the following inference : sound is produced by conscious effort, because it is non-eternal. Here the reason 'non-eternality' is present only in some of the dissimilar cases such as lightning etc. (which are not produced by conscious effort and are non-eternal), while it is absent in some other dissimilar cases such as space etc. (which are not produced by conscious effort and are eternal). In other words, the reason here involves the fallacy of *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*.

Otherwise it would be impossible to have any faith [in the efficacy of the mark] in the case of the inferable object.[14] / 4 /

What is the nature of an inferable object ? To answer such a query, the author says—

> An inferable entity here means a substratum (*dharmin*)—the property of which is 'sought to be known' (*jijñāsita*). / 5 /

The word 'here' means 'while [considering] the definition of the reason'.[15] The expression 'sought to be known' means 'desired to be ascertained'. The word 'property' means 'a distinguishing characteristic'. The compounded expression *jijñāsita-viśeṣa* means [something] the property of which is sought to be known. A substratum is an object which possesses some characteristic. Thus, by the term 'inferable entity' is meant a substratum—some property of which one desires to ascertain.

It is also stated hereby that this [definition of a substratum] is to be understood in the context of the definition of a reason. Elsewhere[16] an inferable entity is simply a substratum as possessing a property. / 5 /

14. i.e. all these three characteristics must be ascertained by the knower beforehand. Otherwise even if a person apprehends a valid mark in a certain place, he would not be able to deduce the presence of the inferable property there, for the efficacy of the mark would remain doubtful to him.
15. i.e. in the preliminary stage when a person with a view to formulating an inference determines the presence of a mark in a certain substratum in respect of which he seeks to establish a certain property, that substratum alone would represent the *anumeya*, for the presence of the particular property there is yet to be established.
16. i.e. in the final stage when one has established through a valid mark the presence of the property sought to be established, the *anumeya* would be represented by the substratum (i.e. *pakṣa* or *dharmin*) as possessing that particular property (i.e. *sādhyadharma*).

    Dharmottara adds a further alternative : at the stage of ascertaining the invariable concomitance between the reason and the inferable

What is [to be understood as] a similar case ? To answer such a query, the author says—

> A similar case is an object which is similar (*samāna*) through the possession of the 'general inferred property' (*sādhya-dharma-sāmānya*). / 6 /

The word *samāna* (similar) literally means [what] possesses equal measure (*māna*). In other words, it means what is perceived through an analogous piece of knowledge,[17] i.e. finally, similar (*sadṛśa*). Thus, by a similar case is to be understood an object which possesses such simalarity.

But how is it that the two [i.e. the similar case and the subject of inference] are similar in kind ? To this, the author says, "Through the possession of the general inferred property."[18] An inferred property (*sādhyadharma*) is something which is a property and which is also sought to be proved by inference.

property, the *anumeya* would be represented by a property (*dharma*). Thus, when one determines 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire' and 'wherever there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke', the inferable fact is the invariable relation of smoke which is a property of fire.

As to the actual object of inference, divergent views have been held. For Dignāga's view which is identical with that of Kumārila, see *Fragments* pp. 18-21.

17. Thus in the inference *parvato vahnimān* the similar cases would be the kitchen (*mahānasa*), the cowshed (*goṣṭha*), the yard (*catvara*) and the like. Every one of them can be the object of an apprehension in the same form 'It possesses fire' (*vahnimān*). A simpler definition current in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts (cf. *Tarkasaṃgraha* p. 43) is : *sapakṣa* is an indisputable locus of the inferable property (*niścita-sādhyavān*).

18. i.e. the point of similarity between *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* would consist in the common possession of the inferred property alone and nothing else. Thus, in the inference of fire in the hill, a lake would not be *sapakṣa* in spite of being similar to the hill by the common possession of the property of knowability (*jñeyatva*) which is not sought to be established.

The general inferred property means such a property considered in its general aspect.

The inferred property is actually different [in every case], because its connection is restricted to that particular object only. Thus, the inferred property being different [in every case], it would be inconsistent [to maintain that the two are similar through the possession of the inferred property only] and that is why [the two are said to be similar] through the possession of the inferred property considered in its general aspect. / 6 /

What is [to be understood as] a dissimilar case ? To answer such a query, the author says—

> A case which is not similar[19] is dissimilar—
> [it can be] different from it, contrary to
> it or its absence. / 7 /

By the term 'dissimilar case' is [to be understood] each and every one of the cases which are not similar. The expression 'different from it' means what is different from a similar case. As for example, in the inference of warm touch, [a dissimilar case of this form] is a substance characterised by temperate touch.

The expression 'contrary to it' means contrary to a similar case. As for example, in the inference of warm touch, again, [a disimilar case of this form] is a substance characterised by cold touch.

The expression 'its absence' means the absence of a similar case. As, for example, in the inference of non-eternality in

19. According to grammarians the particle *nañ*(=*a*- or *an*- in compounds) admits of six meanings :

> *tatsādṛśyam abhāvaś ca tadanyatvaṃ tadalpatā /*
> *aprāśastyaṃ virodhaś ca nañarthāḥ ṣaṭ prakīrtitāḥ //*

The meanings of *sādṛśya*, *alpatva* and *aprāśastya* being obviously inapplicable in the present case all the other three have been taken. (cf. also *Tarkasaṃgraha* p. 44).

the Sautrāntika view, [a dissimilar case of this form] is [a substance characterised by] the absence of non-eternality [i.e. a substance which is eternal], because [in the Sautrāntika view] even *ākāśa* and the like are not admitted to be characterised by eternality.

A dissimilar case is thus to be understood as not similar in each of the three senses. [In the sense of] absence, it is [understood as] not similar actually. But [in the sense of] difference or contrariety, it is [understood as] not similar in an indirect way.[20] / 7 /

How many are the marks that possess the characteristics of a valid mark as already mentioned ? To answer such a query, the author says—

> There are only (*eva*) three varieties of the marks which can have the three characteristics. / 8 /

The three characteristics, as already mentioned, can relate to only three and not to any greater [number of marks]. This is the meaning conveyed by the additional [word *eva*]. It is to be noted that each one of the three varieties of the marks must possess all the three characteristics and not merely any one or any two of them.[21] / 8 /

What, then, are the three marks ? To answer such a query, the author says—

20. For a clearer explanation of the point, see *NBT* p. 34f.
21. This is because deficiency in one or several such characteristics would invalidate the reason and make it a pseudo-reason. cf. Praśastapāda's remark (following the enumeration of the three essential characteristics of a valid mark) :

    viparītam ato yat syād ekena dvitayena vā /
    viruddhā'siddhasandigdham aliṅgaṃ kāśyapo 'vravīt //

> [The three marks are] non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), identity (*svabhāva*) and causation (*kārya*). / 9 /

Here the three marks are specifically mentioned by their names. / 9 /

> Of these, a case of non-apprehension, for example (*yathā*), is : There is no jar on a particular spot somewhere, because there is non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) of 'what fulfils the conditions of cognisability' (*upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpta*). / 10 /

[The author begins] the explanation of the nature of non-apprehension with the words, "Of these, a case of non-apprehension" etc. The word *yathā* means generalisation (*upapradarśana*) [i.e. it is used here to signify that there may be many other similar cases of non-apprehension].

In the expression 'there is no jar on a particular spot somewhere', the spot referred to is a spot which is in close proximity [to the observer]. The implication here is as follows. In the expression 'there is no jar on a particular spot somewhere', the word 'somewhere' refers to the subject (*dharmin*= *pakṣa*). The expression 'a particular spot' specifies the scope of it. [Thus the meaning is] : There is no jar on the spot indicated by the speaker (*vādin*).

If [the subject] is simply mentioned as 'a spot', each and every spot would come under the scope of the subject and it would be impossible to prove the absence of a jar. Besides, it [i.e. each and every spot anywhere] is also not 'capable of being cognised' (*yogya*).

The expression 'which fulfils the conditions of cognisability' has been mentioned as a qualification to the reason. The word *upalabdhi* [in *upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta*] means [perceptual] knowledge. The word *lakṣaṇa* [in the same expression] means what 'is marked' (*lakṣyate*) [through a piece of cognition], i.e.

finally, an object of knowledge. The compounded expression *upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa* means an object which can be revealed by a piece of cognition ; and lastly, the compounded expression *upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta* means what has attained [the status of] such an object, i.e. finally, anything that can be an object of sense-cognition.

The expression 'because of non-apprehension' is equivalent in meaning to 'because of non-perception'. The full meaning is thus as follows : because there is non-perception of a cognisable jar on the spot or any such locus, i e. finally, because of the perception of a spot without a jar.[22] / 10 /

22. It is to be noted that in the Buddhist view, the term *anupalabdhi* does not signify simply a total absence of cognition. The particle *nañ* (=*an*-) forming a part of the above term is to be taken, as Dharmakīrti points out (*HB* p. 64), as a *paryudāsa*. In a *paryudāsa-nañ*, the force of affirmation is predominant and the force of negation is subordinate (cf. *prādhānyaṃ tu vidher yatra niṣedhe cā'pradhānatā*). As for instance, the expression *abhakṣyā grāmya-kukkuṭāḥ* (literally, domestic fowls are non-eatables) actually implies that all other fowls except the domestic ones—i.e. the wild ones—are eatable (cf. *Mahābhāṣya* p. 41). Similarly, the term *anupalabdhi* also really signifies the cognition of something else, i.e. of an entity other than the absent one—but similar to it in a certain respect. That is why Vinītadeva here equates 'non-perception of a cognisable jar on the spot' with 'the perception of a spot without a jar'. Dharmottara's concluding remark (*NBT* p. 36, ll. 18f) also is virtually the same.

Arcaṭa (*HBT* p. 167) informs that the opposite view was held by logicians like Īśvarasena and others who maintain that the particle *nañ* in the above term is to be taken as a *prasajyapratiṣedha* in which the force of negation is predominant and the force of affirmation is subordinate (cf. *aprādhānyaṃ vidher yatra niṣedhe ca pradhānatā*) and hence *anupalabdhi* should be regarded as nothing but a total absence of cognition. One of the objections against such a contention is that it would lead to the absurdity of infinite regress (*anavasthā*). The absence of a jar is to be established by 'non-apprehension of the jar'. But this 'non-apprehension of the jar' can lead to such establishment only when it is itself ascertained. Thus a second non-apprehension would be necessary for the ascertainment of the first one (i.e. the non-apprehension of the jar). On similar considerations, a third non-apprehension would be required for the

But what exactly is meant by this fulfilment of the conditions of cognisability ? To answer such a query, the author says—

> The fulfilment of the conditions of cognisability[23] consists in the presence of the totality of all the conditions (*pratyaya*) of cognition (*upalambha*) other than [the object itself] and an 'object characterised by a distinct nature' (*svabhāva-viśeṣa*). / 11 /

The word *upalambha* means cognition. The compounded expression *upalambha-pratyayāntara* means the other conditions of such cognition.[24] The object-condition (*upalambha-pratyaya=ālambana-pratyaya*) there is the jar itself. The other conditions different from it are the 'immediate homogeneous condition' (*anantara-pratyaya*) and the like.

The totality of the conditions of cognition means the aggregate of all such [conditions]. By the word 'totality' is meant their 'collective presence' (*samāveśa*). An object characterised by a distinct nature means what has its own peculiar nature and is as well distinguished from other objects. These two [namely, the totality of conditions and the peculiar

ascertainment of the second one, a fourth one for the third one and so on. As a result, it would be necessary to assume an endless series of non-apprehensions. (cf. *NM* i, p. 54).

23. Arcaṭa (*HBT* p. 167) quotes these lines of Dharmakīrti (texts 11-12) almost *verbatim* and remarks that these conditions of cognisability are explained (under the discussion of non-apprehension) to remove the misconception of the Naiyāyikas according to whom such conditions consist in the possession of i) an intermediate magnitude (*mahattva*), ii) many component parts (*anekadravyavattva*) and iii) a manifest colour (*udbhūta-rūpa*).

24. The four *pratyaya*-s admitted by the Buddhists (as for instance in the perception of a jar) are : i) *hetu-pratyaya*—light etc., ii) *samanantara-pratyaya*—a preceding piece of cognition, iii) *adhipati-pratyaya*—the visual organ etc., and iv) *ālambana-pratyaya*—the jar etc. cf. Durveka (p. 381) on *HBT*.

object] are here referred to by the expression 'the fulfilment of the conditions of cognisability'. / 11 /

Now what is exactly meant by an object characterised by a distinct nature ? To answer such a query, the author says—

> It is a thing which being present as characterised by a distinct nature is necessarily perceived—when all the other conditions of cognition are available. / 12 /

By the term *svabhāva-viśeṣa* is meant an entity which is not rendered inaccessible (*viprakṛṣṭa*) by any of the three preconditions of inaccessibility and thus, which, being present, can be perceived when [the necessary factors, namely,] the visual organ and the like are available.

Thus, the meaning finally conveyed is that there is no jar here, because, in spite of the presence of the visual organ etc., there is non-apprehension of a perceptible jar. / 12 /

To state the definition of a reason based on identity, the author says—

> Identity is the reason in relation to an inferable property which exists in its own [i.e. of the reason] existence only. / 13 /

The expression 'its own existence only' means the existence of the reason only. The expression [*sva*]-*sattāmātra-bhāvini* means what always exists in its own [i.e. of the reason] existence only. Thus, it is to be noted that a reason based on identity is [employed to infer] such an inferable property as owes its existence only to the existence [of the reason]. As for example : this is a tree, because it is of the nature of *śiṃśapā*. Here the tree is related to every form of *śiṃśapā* and hence [the existence of the tree] is deduced from it [i.e. from being of the nature of *śiṃśapā*]. / 13 /

> A reason based on causation (*kārya*) is, for example, there is fire here, because there is smoke. / 14 /

Here the author gives an illustration of a reason based on causation. It is ascertained that wherever there is smoke there is also fire, because the generation of smoke is dependent on fire. / 14 /

But how then can it be specifically established that the marks are only of three kinds ? To answer such a query, the author says—

> Of these three, two [forms of the reasons] establish a positive entity (*vastu*) and the other is the cause for establishing negation (*pratiṣedha*). / 15 /

Since the inferable entity is only of two kinds, namely, positive (*bhāva*) and negative (*abhāva*), the reasons also are of two kinds—what proves a positive entity and what proves negation. The inferable entity which is positive in nature is, again, of two kinds, namely, different [from the reason] and identical [with the reason].

As the inferable entity which is positive in nature is of two kinds, the reason proving such a positive entity also is of two kinds. To explain : [a reason] identical [with the inferable entity] cannot prove the inferable entity, if the inferable entity and the reason are different in nature. Again, [a reason] different [from the inferable entity] cannot prove the inferable entity, if the inferable entity and the reason are identical in nature.

When the reason and the inferable entity are identical in nature, we have a reason based on identity, and when the inferable entity and the reason are different in nature, we have a reason based on causation. [The reason in the form of] non-apprehension is the cause for establishing negation.

Hereby it is shown that, since two forms [of the reason]

establish a positive entity and the other one is the cause for establishing negation, the reason also is of three kinds—two proving positive entities and one proving negation. / 15 /

But how is it that only two forms of the reason prove positive entities ? To this, the author says—

> A thing can indicate [the existence of] another thing only when there is a 'connection through one's intrinsic nature' (*svabhāva-pratibandha*). / 16 /

The compounded expression *svabhāva-pratibandha* means being connected through one's intrinsic nature. Thus, finally, the implication is that the thing offered as the mark can establish the existence of the thing sought to be inferred, when it is found [that the two are connected with each other by their own nature]. / 16 /

How is it that a thing can indicate the existence of another thing, only when there is a connection through one's intrinsic nature ? To this, the author says—

> Because there can be no invariable and necessary concomitance in the case of one that is not so connected [i.e. through one's intrinsic nature]. / 17 /

Since what is not connected [through one's intrinsic nature] cannot invariably and necessarily lead to the ascertainment of the other object, the 'relation of the indicator and the indicated' (*gamya-gamaka-bhāva*) is to be understood [as subsisting between two things] only when there is [such an invariable] connection ; and not otherwise. / 17 /

To show what the connection pertains to and also the manner in which the connection is established, the author says—

> Such a connection is [a connection] of the mark with the inferable object and [it is established] on the ground that [the mark] is actually identical with the inferable entity or that [the mark] actually originates from the inferable entity.[25] / 18 /

Since the mark is sometimes identical in nature with the

25. cf. the famous stanza in *PV*:

    kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt /
    abinābhāvaniyamo' darśanānna na darśanāt //

From the above and similar other remarks (in texts 18-20) it appears that the invariable concomitance is established through either identity (as in the case of a *svabhāva-hetu*) or causation (as in the case of a *kārya-hetu*). But neither Dharmakīrti nor Vinītadeva here gives any indication as to the nature of the invariable concomitance in the case of an *anupalabdhi-hetu.*

According to Prajñākara the invariable concomitance in the case of *anupalabdhi* is one based on identity, because *anupalambha* and *pratiṣedha* are identical in nature (*PVBh* p 230 : *anupalambha eva hi pratiṣedha iti tanmātrānubandhitvāt tādātmyam eva pratibandhaḥ*).

Jayanta's account (*NM* i, p. 53) also indicates the same position. He moreover mentions a possible objection to it and gives the answer of the Buddhist as follows. An invariable concomitance through identity is possible only when the inferred fact (*sādhya*) and the ground of inference (*sādhana*) are identical in nature. In the case of non-apprehension, the two are completely different from each other. The inferable fact is the 'behaviour in respect of an absence' (*asadvyavahāra*) which consists of a cognition (represented by the words *nāsti*), its verbal communication (*abhidhāna*) etc, and all these can never be identical with the reason, namely, non-apprehension. The answer to this objection lies in the fact that non-apprehension does not actually establish such behaviour itself. What it actually establishes is the potentiality (*yogyatā*) of such behaviour and this potentiality is not different from non-apprehension itself.

In this connection, Arcaṭa (*HBT* p. 9) says that *svabhāvānupalabdhi* is really included in *svabhāva-hetu* and hence the invariable concomitance there is based on identity. In the cases of *vyāpakānupalabdhi* and *kāraṇānupalabdhi*, the negations of the pervaded (*vyāpya*) and the effect (*kārya*) are proved respectively on the basis of invariable concomitance through identity and causation.

inferable entity itself, it must therefore be invariably connected with that [inferable entity]. "Because it actually originates from the inferable entity". Since the mark sometimes originates from the inferable entity itself, it must be invariably connected with that [inferable entity]. / 18 /

But how is it maintained that the mark has invariable connection, because of its identity with the inferable entity or because of its origination from the inferable entity ? To this, the author says—

> Because an entity [i.e. the mark] which is not identical in nature with it or which does not originate from it cannot be necessarily and invariably connected with it [i.e. the inferable entity]. / 19 /

How can it [i.e. the supposed mark] be said to have invariable connection with that [inferable entity], if it is something which is not identical in nature with the inferable entity or if it is something which does not originate from the inferable entity ? But anything which is not invariably connected cannot be a mark, because absurdities would follow. It is to be admitted therefore that invariable connection is established through identity and causation, and not otherwise. / 19 /

Let it be so. What does then follow from it ? To this, the author says—

> These relations of identity and causation belong respectively to [a mark] which has an identical nature and [a mark] which has a causal connection, and that is why the existence of a positive entity is proved by them. / 20 /

'Identity' establishes invariable connection in the case of a reason having an identical nature. 'Causation' establishes invariable connection in the case of a reason having a causal relation. And hence it has been said that these two alone prove the existence of a positive entity.

Since identity and causation belong only to a reason having either an identical nature or a causal relation, it is possible to prove the existence of a positive entity by these two alone, and not by anything else which is not invariably connected. Thus, it is to be concluded that a positive entity is established only by two forms [of the reason]. / 20 /

It has already been said that [of the three forms of the reason] one is the cause for establishing negation (text 15). What is the nature of this [third form of the reason] ? To this, the author says—

> The establishment of negation[26] also is accomplished by the same non-apprehension as has just been mentioned. / 21 /

It has already been said : [there is no jar on this particular spot], because there is non-apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability (text 10) and these two factors

26. cf. *PV* (p. 230, verse 85) : *pratiṣedhas tu sarvatra sādhyate'nupalambhataḥ.* Prajñākara comments thereon : "How is it simply said that everywhere non-apprehension establishes negation ? It is often observed that opposition (*virodha*) too leads to the establishment of negation, e.g. in the inference 'no sensation of cold exists here, because there is fire'—where 'fire' negates 'sensation of cold' because of their mutual opposition". The objection is to be answered as follows : "What exactly is meant by opposition in the above ? It implies, where one of the two is present the other is absent. But how is this absence determined at the time of ascertaining the opposition between the two ? It is established by nothing but non-apprehension. That is, it follows (that even in the case of negation established through opposition) the negation is actually proved on the basis of an underlying non-apprehension".

[viz. non-apprehension as well as the cognisability of the object] are the causes that prove the negation [of an object]. / 21 /

How is it so ? To this, the author says—

> Because there can be no such non-apprehension when an entity is actually present. / 22 /

That is, if an entity is actually present, its non-apprehension would not be possible. / 22 /

How is it that the same non-apprehension as previously mentioned is also the ground for one's 'behaviour in respect of the absence of an entity' (*vastu-abhāva-vyavahāra*) ? To this, the author says—

> Because, otherwise in the case of objects which are 'temporally, spatially or by nature inaccessible' (*deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa*) and which do not fulfil the conditions of cognisability—there can be no ascertainment of an absence even when one's own perception has ceased to function. / 23 /

If the above-mentioned specific condition [viz. non-apprehension and cognisability taken together] is not admitted, there can be no ascertainment of an absence in the case of objects which are inaccessible—temporally, spatially or by nature, [objects] which do not thus fulfil the conditions of cognisability, even though the perception of a knower has ceased to function. The particle *ca* is to be understood as meaning 'because'.

The compounded expression *deśa-kāla-svabhāva* means space, time and nature—taken together. [The expression *deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa*] thus means objects which are

inaccessible in these three ways. Of these, the objects which are made distant by immense intervening space are the objects spatially inaccessible. The objects which are made distant by immense intervening amount of time are the objects temporally inaccessible. And the objects which are imperceptible are to be understood as objects inaccessible by nature.

Thus, the expression 'what does not fulfil the conditions of cognisability' (*anupalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta*) is used here to signify the absence of the totality of the conditions of cognisability. The expression 'inaccessible—spatially, temporally and by nature' is added to show that there may be absence due to the presence of certain peculiar circumstances. It is to be concluded therefore that an absence is proved by the same non-apprehension as previously mentioned.[27]

It is also stated hereby that in certain cases when there is non-cognition (*agraha*) relating to some particular period of time, the absence is proved by the same non-apprehension as has just been mentioned. / 23 /

To show how an absence is proved by non-cognition relating to some particular period of time—which fact has been referred to above—the author now says—

> The cause of [successful] behaviour in respect of an absence is the cessation (*nivṛtti*) of the perception of a knower (*pratipattṛ*) referring to the past or the present provided the 'reminiscent impression' (*smṛti-saṃskāra*) has not been obliterated (*amūḍha*). / 24 /

27. According to *HB* which classifies non-apprehension under three heads only—i) *svabhāvānupalabdhi* establishes simply the behaviour in respect of an absence, ii) *vyāpakānupalabdhi* establishes the absence of the pervaded as well as the behaviour in respect of it and iii) *kāraṇānupalabdhi* establishes the absence of the effect as well as the behaviour in respect of it.

The term 'reminiscent impression' means an impression which is the cause of recollection—in other words, the 'root cause' (*vīja*) of recollection. The expression *amūḍha-smṛti-saṃskāra* means anything—a jar or the like—in respect of which the reminiscent impression has not been obliterated.

"The cessation of the perception of a knower referring to the past or the present". The two words 'past' (*atīta*) and 'present' (*vartamāna*) refer to an object—a jar or the like which is as cognisable as the particular spot etc.—that is, an empty spot or the like which constitutes the object of a cognition occurring in the past or at present. Otherwise, when there is an absence of a jar on some spot etc., how can there be a reference as 'past' or 'present' ?

A knower means any person such as Devadatta or somebody else. An object—a jar or the like—is characterised as 'perceived' when it is rightly revealed in the perceptual cognition of such a person. Here also the term 'perception' refers to a perceptible jar or the like, because it is also equally capable of being cognised just as the particular spot etc. which are revealed in a perceptual cognition. If there is the absence of a jar in reality, [i.e. if the jar is something imperceptible] how can there be perception [at all] ?

Thus, in the said manner, the cessation of the perception of a knower referring to the past or the present—being founded on an absence—becomes a pointer to something else, i.e. finally, [points to something] which is nothing but a particular spot, where a jar or the like is absent.

The behaviour in respect of an absence consists of a cognition in the form 'no jar is present here', the statement of this cognition in words and the activity (*pravṛtti*) in the form of movement towards the spot etc. without any misgiving (*śaṃkā*). The cause of successful behaviour in respect of an absence signifies the means (*sādhanī*) by which such behaviour in respect of an absence—consisting of a cognition, a statement in words and a [certain form of] activity —can be accomplished.

It is also stated hereby that the cause of successful

behaviour in respect of an absence is only that form of non-apprehension which has for its object anything produced either in the past or at present ; and not [also that form of non-apprehension] which has for its object anything [to be produced] in future.

To explain, the substratum related to the future time, namely, the spot [related to the future] or the like is not yet perceived, and there cannot also be any non-apprehension in the form of the cognition of an empty spot [as related to the future]. But the substratum related to the past had been perceived and the spot having no jar is also recollected.

The expression 'provided the reminiscent impression has not been obliterated' is added to collect both [these conditions, namely, the previous cognition and the recollection]. Hence, the behaviour in respect of an absence becomes successful when there is a recollection of the spot etc. having no jar as related to the past days.

Again, the substratum related to the present, namely, the spot having no jar, is itself revealed by perception and hence the behaviour in respect of an absence in such a place is easily [successful].

By adding the expression 'that in respect of which the reminiscent impression has not been obliterated', [the author] removes [the fallacy of] the 'unproved reason' (*hetvasiddhi*). Otherwise, if there is no recollection of an empty spot etc. non-apprehension itself would not be possible. The words 'past' and 'present' refer to the particular periods as mentioned above.

By adding the expression 'the perception of a knower' [the author] leaves out of scope the perception of all the knowers [i.e. perception in general]. Had there been a reference here to the perception of all the knowers, the reason itself would have been unproved. The cessation of the perception of all the knowers [is a fact] which is not admissible even to the opponent (*prativādin*).[28] / 24 /

28. For this fallacy see ch. 3, text 68.

How is it that only the same non-apprehension as has just been mentioned is to be regarded as the cause of successful behaviour in respect of an absence? To this, the author says—

> Because an absence is ascertained exclusively on the basis of such [non-apprehension]. / 25 /

An absence can be ascertained only through the cessation of the perception of a knower which has for its object anything produced either in the past or at present, provided the reminiscent impression [*smṛti-vīja*, lit. the root-cause of recollection] thereof has not been obliterated. But [such an ascertainment is not possible] through any other form of non-apprehension which has for its object anything to be produced in future.[29] / 25 /

The author has thus explained, with the help of the reason mentioned earlier [under text 10], the nature of non-apprehension and the particular periods of time [to which it may refer]. To show the different varieties of its formulation, the author now says—

> This [non-apprehension] is of eleven kinds according to the difference in the formulation (*prayoga*). / 26 /

The term 'formulation' means expressing through words a reason having three characteristics. Thus, non-apprehension—following the difference in such formulation—may assume eleven forms. / 26 /

To mention the different forms [one by one], the author says—

29. As Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 47) explains, the very existence of a future non-apprehension is uncertain and thus being itself unproved, it cannot lead to the ascertainment of an absence.

> [The first form is *svabhāvānupalabdhi*] : the non-apprehension of the perceptible. / 27 /

The term *svabhāvānupalabdhi* literally means the non-apprehension of the nature (*svabhāva*), i.e. the essential properties of an object [i.e. ultimately, the object itself]. / 27 /

To give an illustration of the above, the author says—

> As for example, smoke does not exist here. / 28 /

The expression 'as for example' is used to indicate that it is just an illustration. This is to be understood in all the cases [of non-apprehension mentioned subsequently]. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The expression 'smoke does not exist' refers to the entity to be inferred. / 28 /

> [Smoke does not exist here], because there is the non-apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability [i.e. of smoke which is a perceptible object]. / 29 /

That is, [the above finally means] : because, in spite of the presence of the other conditions of cognition, there is non-apprehension of smoke which is perceptible by nature. / 29 /

> [The second form is *kāryānupalabdhi*] : the non-apprehension of the effect, as for example, 'the efficient (*apratibaddha-sāmarthya*) causes of smoke do not exist here, because there is no smoke'. / 30 /

The term *kāryānupalabdhi* [is now explained]. The compound is to be expounded as *kāryasya* (of the effect) *anupalabdhiḥ* (non-apprehension). The illustration is given by the words : as for example, the efficient causes of smoke do not exist here. The efficient causes of smoke are the fire, fuel

and such other things whose productive capacity has not been impeded. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The expression 'the efficient causes of smoke do not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred.

"Because there is no smoke". [It means finally] : since there is the absence of smoke itself, [there must also be the absence of its causes]. If the causes of smoke having their productive capacity not impeded would have been present, [the effect, viz.] smoke, would also have been produced.[30] / 30 /

> [The third form is *vyāpakānupalabdhi*] : the non-apprehension of the pervader, as for example, 'a *śiṃśapā* does not exist here, because there is no tree'. / 31 /

The term *vyāpakānupalabdhi* [is now explained]. The word 'pervader' means what pervades (*vyāpaka*) [i.e. what has greater extension] and [the compounded term] non-apprehension of such a pervader.

The illustration is given by the words : as for example, a *śiṃśapā* does not exist here, because there is no tree. The tree is a pervader of *śiṃśapā*, [because the term *vṛkṣa* refers to all kinds of trees while the term *śiṃśapā* refers to a particular kind of tree only] and its denial leads to the denial of the other [i.e. of *śiṃśapā*]. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The expression 'because there is no smoke' states the reason. The expression 'a *śiṃśapā* does not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred. / 31 /

30. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 48) adds further that *kāryānupalabdhi* is resorted to when the cause is invisible (*adṛśya*) ; if the cause is visible (*dṛśya*) it would be a case of the non-apprehension of the perceptible (*dṛśyānupalabdhi=svabhāvānupalabdhi*). He also gives an elaborate description of the exact circumstances under which *kāraṇānupalabdhi* would become effective. He makes similar remarks under the explanation of the subsequent forms of non-apprehension also.

> [The fourth form is *svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi*] : the apprehension of the incompatible (*svabhāva-viruddha*), as for example, 'sensation of cold does not exist here, because there is fire'. / 32 /

The term *svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi* [is now explained]. The compounded word *svābhava-viruddha* means what is opposed (*viruddha*) by nature (*svabhāva*). [The whole expression thus] means the apprehension of such [an incompatible object].

An illustration is given : as for example, sensation of cold does not exist here, because there is fire. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The reason is given by the expression 'because there is fire'. The expression 'sensation of cold does not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred. Thus, fire and sensation of cold being incompatible with each other, cold touch is negated by the presence of fire. / 32 /

> [The fifth form is *viruddha-kāryopalabdhi*] : the apprehension of an effect produced by the opposite, as for example, 'sensation of cold does not exist here, because there is smoke'. / 33 /

The term *viruddha-kāryopalabdhi* [is now explained]. The compounded word *viruddha-kārya* means an effect produced by the opposite. [The whole expression thus] means the apprehension of such [an effect].

It is illustrated by the words : as for example, sensation of cold does not exist here, because there is smoke. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The reason is given by the expression 'because there is smoke'. The expression 'sensation of cold does not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred. Fire is intrinsically opposite to sensation of cold and smoke is an effect produced by it. Therefore, wherever there is smoke, there is also fire. How then can sensation of cold exist in a place where fire exists ? / 33 /

> [The sixth form is *viruddha-vyāptopalabdhi*] : the apprehension of the invariable concomitant of the opposite, as for example, 'the destruction of even a produced entity (*bhāva*) is not something constant (*dhruvabhāvin*), because it depends on a further cause'. / 34 /

The term *viruddha-vyāptopalabdhi* [is now explained]. The compounded word *viruddha-vyāpta* means what has invariable concomitance with the opposite. [The whole expression thus] means the apprehension of such [an invariable concomitant].

An illustration is given : as for example, the destruction of even a produced entity is not something constant.[31] The term 'constant' ultimately means 'what has the characteristic of being existent *always*'. The expression 'even of a produced entity' means 'even of an entity which is something originated'.

The expression 'the destruction of even a produced entity' refers to the substratum. The expression 'is not something constant' refers to the entity to be inferred. Thus, the final implication comes to this : it cannot be maintained that the destruction of even an entity which is produced is something constant.

What is the ground for [such a conclusion] ? To this, the author says, "Because it depends on a further cause". This dependence on a further cause is explained [to be the ground as follows]. Whatever has dependence on a further cause is not necessarily constant, as for example, the red colour in [a piece of cloth made of] cotton.

Here the property of 'being constant' is opposite to the property of 'being not constant'. The characteristic of 'having dependence on a further cause' is invariably connected with the property of 'being not constant'. Therefore, whatever is dependent upon a further cause is also not constant. And how can anything possessing the property of 'being not constant' be characterised by the property of 'being constant' ? / 34 /

31. See *BL* ii, p. 92, n 1 and n 2.

> [The seventh form is *kārya-viruddhopalabdhi*] : the apprehension of what is opposed to the effect, as for example, 'the efficient causes of cold do not exist here, because there is fire'. / 35 /

The term *kārya-viruddhopalabdhi* [is now explained]. The compounded word *kārya-viruddha* means what is opposed in nature to the effect. [The whole expression thus] means the apprehension of such [an entity]. An illustration is given : as for example, the efficient causes of cold do not exist here, because there is fire. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The reason is given in the words : because there is fire. The expression 'the efficient causes of cold do not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred.

Here the effect produced by the causes of cold is [sensation of] cold. [Sensation of] cold is opposed to fire. How can there be sensation of cold if there is fire ? The efficient causes of cold can never be present where there is no sensation of cold, because, had such causes been present sensation of cold too would have been necessarily experienced. / 35 /

> [The eighth form is *vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi*] : the apprehension of what is opposed to the pervader, as for example, 'the touch inhering in ice does not exist here, because there is fire'. / 36 /

The term *vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi* [is now explained]. The compounded word *vyāpaka-viruddha* means what is opposed to the pervader. [The whole expression thus] means the apprehension of such an entity.

An illustration is given : as for example, the touch inhering in ice does not exist here, because there is fire. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The reason is given in the words : because there is fire. The expression 'the touch inhering in ice does not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred. The

touch inhering in ice is touch inhering in frozen water. Sensation of cold in general is the pervader of such touch. Fire is opposed to [sensation of cold in general]. Therefore, how can there be sensation of cold if there is fire, and there can never be any touch inhering in ice where sensation of cold in general does not exist. / 36 /

> [The ninth form is *kāraṇānupalabdhi*] : the non-apprehension of the cause, as for example, 'smoke does not exist here, because there is no fire'. / 37 /

The term *kāraṇānupalabdhi* [is now explained]. The compound is to be dissolved as *kāraṇasya* (of the cause) *anupalabdhiḥ* (non-apprehension).

An illustration is given : as for example, smoke does not exist here, because there is no fire. The word 'here' refers to the substratum. The expression 'because there is no fire' gives the reason as free from any fallacy. The expression 'smoke does not exist here' refers to the entity to be inferred. Here smoke is the effect produced by fire and as such smoke can never exist where there is no fire. / 37 /

> [The tenth form is *kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi*] : the apprehension of what is opposed to the cause, as for example, 'this person does not betray any special symptom of cold —e.g. having erect hair etc.—because there is a specific form of fire nearby'. / 38 /

The term *kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi* [is now explained]. The compounded word *kāraṇa-viruddha* means what is opposed to the cause. [The whole expression thus] means the apprehension of such an entity. An illustration is given : as for example, this person does not betray any special symptom of cold such as having erect hair etc. The words 'this person' refer to the substratum. The expression 'does not betray any special symptom of cold such as having erect hair etc.' refers

to the entity to be inferred. 'Having erect hair' means that the hair stands on its end. 'Having erect hair etc' means the various symptoms beginning with it. The term 'etc.' covers the other symptoms like the chattering of the teeth, shivering of the body and so on.

The expression *romaharṣādiviśeṣa* means nothing but these special symptoms of having erect hair and the like. Hair may stand erect due to various other causes, such as fear, joy etc. The word 'special' has been added to exclude such cases. Thus, [having erect hair] here is to be understood as referring only to one who is afflicted by cold wind.

In the expression *sannihita-dahana-viśeṣatvāt* (lit. because there is nearby a specific form of what burns), the word *dahanaviśeṣa* means a specific form of fire. The word *sannihita* means what stands nearby. The expression *sannihita-dahana-viśeṣa* means an object which has a specific form of fire nearby. [The expression *sannihita-dahanaviśeṣatva* signifies] the general characteristic of such an object. The expression *sannihita-dahanaviśeṣatvāt* means because of such [general characteristic]. The words 'a specific form' have been added to indicate the presence of that particular type of fire which is actually capable of removing the sensation of cold.

Thus, in this case, sensation of cold is the cause of the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair and the like, and fire is opposed to it, for heat produced from fire removes sensation of cold. And, if sensation of cold is negated, the special symptoms like having erect hair etc. also can never exist. / 38 /

> [The eleventh form is *kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhi*] : the apprehension of the effect produced by what is opposed to the cause, as for example, 'this spot is not characterised by a person who has the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair and the like, because there is smoke'. / 39 /

The term *kāraṇaviruddha-kāryopalabdhi* [is now explained]. The word *kāraṇa-viruddha* means what is opposed to the cause. The word *kāraṇa-viruddha-kārya* means the effect produced by it. The whole term *kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhi* means the apprehension of it [i.e. of *kāraṇa-viruddha-kārya*].

An illustration is given : as for example, this spot is not characterised by a person who has the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair etc., because there is smoke. The words 'this spot' refer to the substratum. The expression 'because there is smoke' gives the reason. The expression 'is not characterised by a person who has the special symptoms such as having erect hair etc.' refers to the entity to be inferred. The expression *romaharṣādiviśeṣa-yukta* means one possessing the special symptoms such as having erect hair etc. The expression *romaharṣādiviśeṣayukta-puruṣa* means an individual as is characterised by the special symptoms of having erect hair etc. The expression *romaharṣādiviśeṣayukta-puruṣavat* means the spot characterised by an individual who has the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair etc.

Here the cause of the special symptoms of having erect hair etc., is the sensation of cold. Fire is opposed to it and smoke is the effect produced by fire. Therefore, wherever there is smoke, there is fire and wherever there is fire, there is no sensation of cold. If there is no sensation of cold, how can there be any special symptoms such as having erect hair etc., which are but the effects of the sensation of cold ? / 39 /

At the outset, only one form of non-apprehension—that is, non-apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability—has been mentioned as the cause for establishing an absence. But how is it stated now that an absence [is proved by] the non-apprehension of the effect and the like as well as the apprehension of the incompatible and the like ?

To this, the author says—

> All these ten forms of formulation based
> on non-apprehension—beginning with

> *kāryānupalabdhi*—can be included indirectly into [the first form, namely,] *svabhāvānupalabdhi*. / 40 /

The word 'these' means the ones mentioned just now. The word 'all' means the ten forms [of non-apprehension] without any exception. All the ten forms of formulation based on non-apprehension can be included into the non-apprehension of the perceptible.[32] / 40 /

But [it may be objected] that a formulation based on the non-apprehension of the perceptible is something quite different [from the formulation based on the non-apprehension of the effect and the like] and, again, [any formulation based on] the non-apprehension of the effect is something quite different [from the formulation based on the non-apprehension of the perceptible]. Thus, in the case of the non-apprehension of the effect and the like, something else is negated ; but in the case of the apprehension of the incompatible and the like, something else is affirmed.

How can therefore [all the forms of formulation based on non-apprehension] be included in it [i.e. the non-apprehension of the perceptible] ?

To this, the author says—

> Although there is difference [in the nature of] the various forms of formulation, because they either affirm or negate something else, still, [such inclusion is possible] in an indirect way. / 41 /

32. It is very difficult to state the exact number of non-apprehensions admitted by Dharmakīrti. Jayanta who generally offers a very faithful account of the views of Dharmakīrti as well as other Buddhist philosophers quotes (*NM* i, p. 53) these eleven forms almost in the same order, along with the same illustrations (only occasionally substituting synonyms for certain words). But in *HB* (p. 68) only three forms of non-apprehension have been recognised (see note 27 above), while *PVS* (p. 4) speaks of eight forms in all.

Although the various forms of formulation actually differ from one another—since they either affirm or negate something else—still their inclusion in it [i.e. the first form] is intended to be in an indirect way and not in reality. Thus, for example, in the case of the non-apprehension of the effect, an absence is apprehended when the absence of the efficient causes of smoke has been proved on the basis of the absence of smoke. [It may also be put thus] : wherever there is the absence of smoke, there is the non-apprehension of the causes of smoke which fulfil the conditions of cognisability, and thus it can be included in the non-apprehension of the perceptible.

This difference is due to the difference in the mental processes of the various knowers. Some persons ascertain the absence of the cause on the basis of the absence of the effect, while others [ascertain the same] on the basis of the absence of something perceptible by nature. Similarly is to be understood the indirect inclusion of the non-apprehension of the pervader as well as the non-apprehension of the cause.

In the case of the apprehension of the incompatible, the absence of the sensation of cold is ascertained through [the existence of] fire. [It may also be put thus] : wherever there is fire, there is the non-apprehension of the sensation of cold which fulfils the conditions of cognisability, and thus it can be included in the non-apprehension of the perceptible. In the case of the apprehension of the invariable concomitant of the opposite, the emergence of the various colours due to their dependence on various further causes can be likened to the non-apprehension [of the perceptible].

Also in the case of the apprehension of the effect produced by what is opposed to the cause, fire is first proved through the existence of smoke. [Thus] the sensation of cold being negated there, the absence of a person possessing the special symptoms of cold such as having erect hair etc.—which is opposed to it [i.e. presence of fire] is ascertained. This however is nothing but the non-apprehension of such a person—

who fulfils the conditions of cognisability and thus it can be included in the non-apprehension of the perceptible. / 41 /

[It may be objected that] in the case of the apprehension of the incompatible and the like, absence [of an object] is conveyed by a source of knowledge quite different in nature, and thus what can be likened to what [i.e. the formulations are actually different] ? [Besides], there can be no formulation in the case of *svārthānumāna*. How is it then mentioned [in the chapter on *svārthānumāna*] that there are eleven forms of formulation based on non-apprehension ? To this, the author says—

> [These formulations] are specially mentioned here—even under the discussion on inference for one's own sake—because due to repeated consideration of the formulations one can oneself have the ascertainment of an absence in a similar way [i.e. just in any of the forms stated above]. / 42 /

'Consideration of formulation' (*prayoga-darśana*) means cognising [in the form of a formulation]. Its repetition (*abhyāsa*) means having such a cognition again and again. Thus, due to proficiency in the act of formulation, even when one has oneself an ascertainment of an absence, the ascertainment is produced just in the form of a formulation. That is why the formulations based on non-apprehension are specially mentioned even under the discussion of inference for one's own sake.

The word *vyavaccheda-pratīti* means the ascertainment of an absence. Or, the word *vyavaccheda-pratīti* may be understood as the cognition of some distinguishing character. / 42 /

The distinct nature of *svabhāvānupalabdhi* has been explained. But, in the cases of *kāryānupalabdhi* etc., it [i.e. the distinct nature which makes *svabhāvānupalabdhi* non-erroneous]

is absent and as such, how can they also be regarded as non-erroneous ? To this, the author says—

> In these various cases of non-apprehension which is the cause for successful behaviour in respect of an absence, the absence is said to be proved by either the apprehension of the incompatible etc., or the non-apprehension of the cause etc. In all these cases, it is to be understood that such apprehension or non-apprehension means only [the apprehension or non-apprehension of the incompatible or the cause] which actually fulfils the conditions of cognisability. / 43 /

Various forms of non-apprehension have been mentioned as the cause for successful behaviour in respect of an absence. But all these are to be understood virtually as some particular forms of [the non-apprehension of the perceptible], because the absence of an effect etc. can be proved only when there is the non-apprehension of a cause etc., which fulfil the conditions of cognisability, and not otherwise. / 43 /

[The apprehension of] the incompatible can prove the absence of the opposite only if it fulfils the conditions of cognisablility and not otherwise. Why is it so ? To this, the author says—

> Because, in the case of others, the existence and non-existence of opposition (*virodha*) as well as the causal relation are not established. / 44 /

The expression *virodha-kāryakāraṇabhāva-abhāva* means opposition, causal relation and their non-existence—taken together. The non-establishment of all these is meant here. It is thus shown that in the case of those which do not

fulfil the conditions of cognisability—opposition is unproved, non-existence of opposition is unproved, the causal relation is unproved and lastly, the non-existence of the causal relation is unproved.

To explain, if an object is found to be non-existent in the presence of any of the objects that are invariably connected with something that fulfils the conditions of cognisability, it is to be understood that the object [absent] is opposed to [the one present] and, again, the object present is also so [i.e. opposed to the one absent]. If it [i.e. one of the two] is found to be existing [in the presence of the other], it is ascertained that there is no opposition between the two.

Similarly, if an entity—previously absent—is found present when there appears another entity that fulfils the conditions of cognisability and, again, it is not found present when the other entity is absent, [it follows] that the one is produced by the other and hence a causal relation is established between the two. The non-existence of a causal relation is established between two entities, if one of them is found to appear even in the absence of the other.

In this way, here also it is maintained that successful behaviour in respect of an absence is based on the non-apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability. / 44 /

[It may be objected] however, let [behaviour in respect of an absence] be based somewhere on something else. To this, the author says—

> The non-apprehension of an inaccessible object which by nature negates the possibility of [its] perception and inference is only a source of doubt. / 45 /

An object which is inaccessible (*viprakṛṣṭa*) and by nature negates the possibility of being perceived or being inferred becomes only a source of doubt and cannot be the cause for successful behaviour in respect of an absence. / 45 /

Why is it so ? To this, the author says—

> Because the negation of *pramāṇa* does not necessarily prove the absence of an object.[33] / 46 /

The non-apprehension of an inaccessible object implies the negation of *pramāṇa*. But the negation of *pramāṇa* does not necessarily prove the absence of an object. *Pramāṇa* [i.e. knowledge] is an effect produced by the object cognised and hence the negation of *pramāṇa* [i.e. the effect] does not prove the absence of the cause [i.e. the object].[34] / 46 /

Here ends the second chapter of the elucidatory comments on the *Nyāyabindu*, composed for the benefit of the pupils.

33. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 60) explains the point as follows : when the cause or the pervader is absent there follows the absence of the effect or the pervaded. But *pramāṇa* is neither a cause nor a pervader of an object of knowledge and as such, even if there be an absence of *pramāṇa* the absence of an object of knowledge would not be established.
34. The argument here seems to be as follows. The absence of the effect does not necessarily indicate the absence of the cause, as for instance, a stick producing a jar may be present on a particular spot even if the jar itself is absent there. Here *pramāṇa* (which is nothing but a piece of valid cognition) is the effect and the object cognised is the cause. Hence the absence of *pramāṇa* (=effect) does not indicate the absence of the object (=cause).

CHAPTER THREE

ON INFERENCE FOR OTHERS

While discussing the nature of right knowledge, the author has admitted two kinds of inferences—one for one's own self and another for the sake of others. Of these, the one for one's own self has been discussed in details.

To begin the discussion on inference for the sake of others,[1] the author states—

> An inference for the sake of others is the statement of a mark having three characteristics. / 1 /

The word 'statement' means by which something is stated, i.e. [a group of] words. The expression 'having three characteristics' refers to something which possesses three characteristics. The expression 'a mark having three characteristics' means what is a mark and possesses as well all the three characteristics. [An inference for the sake of others] means the statement of such a mark. / 1 /

1. Jayanta (*NM* ii, p. 130) and Śrīdhara (*NK* p. 504) mention and discard a view according to which the very idea of *parārthānumāna* is an absurdity. The objection may briefly be put as follows. Even in the case of an alleged *parārthānumāna* there is no difference in the inferential process and the knowledge is acquired by the hearer himself and not by anybody else. Just as sometimes one may oneself perceive a mark having invariable concomitance and ascertain the presence of the inferable property, so also sometimes one may oneself ascertain a valid mark through the statement of another person and come to know of the presence of the inferable property. Nor can it be argued that *parārthānumāna* is so called on the ground that in such a case there is a statement made for the benefit of others. Thus, for instance, when one communicates one's own perceptual cognition to somebody else for the benefit of the latter, it would never be recognised as *parārtha-pratyakṣa* on a similar ground.

Inference has been mentioned as a form of right knowledge. How is it now stated that it is [a group of] words ? To this, the author says—

> Because the cause is applied metaphorically[2] to express the effect. / 2 /

'Word' is the cause and 'inference' is the effect and thus by metaphorically attributing 'inference' [i.e. the effect] to 'word' [i.e. the cause], word itself is characterised as inference. That is, [word is] characterised as inference since it is the cause of inference. / 2 /

> It is of two kinds—according to the difference in formulation. / 3 /

In the statement 'it is of two kinds', the word 'it' stands for inference for the sake of others. [It has been said that] it is only a statement of a mark having the three characteristics. How can it be then of two kinds ? To this, the author says, "According to the difference in formulation". 'Formulation' means expressing through words and inference is admitted to be of two kinds, because of the difference in such formulation. / 3 /

In answering the above objection Jayanta says that it is quite true that the inferential knowledge in the case of *parārthānumāna* also pertains only to the hearer himself. Still it is so called because the hearer becomes aware of a mark having invariable concomitance—which he himself does not ascertain—through the words of somebody else who has already ascertained it, and he is subsequently led to the inference. The basis of the inference is thus furnished by a different person. With regard to the hearer, it is *svārthānumāna*; but with regard to the speaker, it is *parārthānumāna*. As to the case of the communication of a piece of perceptual cognition, there is no question of similar admission, because there the words of the speaker do not help the hearer to have any subsequent perceptual knowledge.

2. An instance of similar secondary application would be the expression *annaṃ prāṇāḥ*, where *prāṇa* or life (i.e. the effect) is denoted by the word *anna* or food (i.e. the cause). cf. *NS* ii. 2. 62 for an enumeration of the different cases of *upacāra*.

What are the two forms ? The author says—

> They are the one based on similarity (*sādharmyavat*) and the other based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmyavat*). / 4 /

An object which possesses characteristics common [to something else] is said to be similar. Similarity means the general property of similar objects. An inference is called *sādharmyavat* when it is based on such similarity.

An object which possesses characteristics not common [to something else] is said to be dissimilar. Dissimilarity means the general property of dissimilar objects. An inference is called *vaidharmyavat* when it is based on such dissimilarity.

Finally, [the two forms of *parārthānumāna*] are those based on 'positive concomitance' (*anvaya*) as well as those based on 'negative concomitance' (*vyatireka*). / 4 /

If a formulation based on similarity is characterised by positive concomitance, and if again, a formulation based on dissimilarity is characterised by negative concomitance, there should be some difference between them in point of fact also. How can it be maintained, therefore, that it is of two kinds just because of the difference in formulation ?

To this, the author says—

> There is no difference between the two in point of fact (*arthataḥ*),[3] except the difference in formulation. / 5 /

A formulation based on similarity is dependent on a mark having three characteristics and a formulation based on dissimilarity too is dependent on a mark having three characteristics.

3. As Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 63) points out, the word *artha* here stands for the 'object sought to be conveyed' (*prakāśayitavyaṃ vastu*), i.e. the mark having three characteristics.

As such, a mark having three characteristics being present in every case, there is not the least amount of difference in point of fact.

"Except the difference in formulation". It means that the difference here concerns the mode of formulation only and is not in other respects.[4] Thus, in the first form, though actually positive concomitance is expressed, negative concomitance too is understood through implication. In the second form, though actually negative concomitance is expressed, positive concomitance too is understood through implication. / 5 /

> Of these, [the illustration of] an inference based on similarity is : anything which in spite of satisfying the conditions of cognisability is not found present [at some moment] is accepted to be an object of successful behaviour[5] concerning the non-existent (*asat*), e.g. something like the horns on a hare's head etc., established (*dṛṣṭa*) [as objects of such behaviour]. / 6 /

4. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 63) explains the point as follows. The two forms of inferences are different with regard to only the verbal structure and not with regard to the implication they are intended to convey. The verbal structure which follows only the 'ordinary meaning' (*abhidheya*) may vary. But it does not mean that the implication 'intended to be conveyed' (*prakāśya*) also becomes different. As for instance, the two expressions 'this plump Brahmin does not eat at daytime' and 'this plump Brahmin eats only at night' have different ordinary meanings. But the implication they convey is the same. Similarly, the two forms of *parārthānumāna* also vary only with regard to the verbal arrangement, but they are identical with regard to the implication intended to be conveyed, namely, revealing a mark having three characteristics.
5. The word *vyavahāra* means also 'verbal expression' (*śabda-prayoga*). We may thus have an alternative meaning here : whatever in spite of satisfying the conditions of cognisability is not found present is accepted to be an object denoted by the term 'non-existent' (*asat*).

Of the two forms [of *parārthānumāna*], the one based on similarity is mentioned first. "Anything which in spite of satisfying the conditions of cognisability is not found present is accepted to be an object of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent". Positive concomitance in the case of non-apprehension is mentioned here.

"For example, something like the horns on a hare's head etc., established [as objects of such behaviour]". There are things which are established as objects of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent. An example of such an object is the horn on a hare's head or the like. The word *dṛṣṭa* [lit. seen] means established (*siddha*), i.e. finally, examined through the instrument of valid knowledge.[6] It is therefore offered as an example.[7] / 6 /

> And a jar in spite of satisfying the conditions of cognisability is not found on this particular spot. / 7 /

The above text indicates the 'presence of the mark in the subject' (*pakṣadharma*). / 7 /

> [An example of] a formulation based on identity is 'whatever[8] is existent is non-eternal, e.g. a jar or the like' and this is a formulation showing an unqualified (*śuddha*) reason based on identity.

6. As Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 64) explains, no horn on the head of a hare is ever cognised through the eyes ; but it is proved to be an object of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent through *dṛśyānupalambha* (=*svabhāvānupalabdhi*).
7. i.e. an object can be offered as an example only when the characteristic sought to be illustrated is already proved to be present in it. That is why the subject (*pakṣa*) of an inference can never be offered as an instance corroborationg the invariable concomitance.
8. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 65) says that the word *sarva* (whatever) has been added to specify that whatever is real must be non-eternal and (as

[Another example of such a formulation is]: 'whatever is characterised by origination is non-eternal' and this is a formulation showing a reason based on identity, in which the property constituting the very nature [of something] is viewed as different [from it].

[A further example of such a formulation is]: 'whatever is a product is non-eternal' and this is a formulation [showing a reason] with a special qualification (*upādhi*).

A product means a positive entity which depends on the function of something else for the production of its nature. / 8 /

"A formulation based on identity". It illustrates a formulation showing the second form of reason as based on similarity. "Whatever is existent is non-eternal, e.g. a jar or the like". Here 'whatever' stands for any existent entity that is perceptible. All such entities, without exception, are non-eternal. This is a statement of the positive concomitance.

"A formulation showing an unqualified reason based on identity". It means finally a formulation showing a reason based on identity—having no qualifying attribute. The statement 'whatever is characterised by origin is non-eternal' shows the positive concomitance as in the case of the second type of the reason based on identity.

"A formulation showing a reason based on identity, in which the property constituting the very nature is viewed as something different". A formulation is given here to show a reason based on identity, by viewing the essential properties of an object as something different from it. Thus, origin (*utpatti*)

against the views of some other philosophers) there is no entity which is both real and eternal. Reality (*vastutva* or *arthakriyākāritva*) can co-exist with non-eternality alone, and never with eternality. cf. *TS* verse 394.

of an object means its coming into existence and [the two] are actually the same. But here [the existent] is sought to be mentioned as a different kind of object—as something characterised by origination.

The statement 'whatever is a product is non-eternal' shows the positive concomitance of the third type of the reason based on identity. In the expression *upādhi-bhedena*, the word *upādhi* means a qualifying attribute. Thus, finally, [the third type of the reason based on identity] means a reason based on identity, having a qualification not expressly stated.[9]

How does it have a qualification not expressly stated ? To this, the author says, "A product means a positive entity which depends on the function of something else for the production of its nature". The compound in *apekṣita-para-vyāpāra* is to be expounded as meaning what has dependence on the function of something else, i.e. a positive entity which depends on the function of the causes for the production of its peculiar nature.

But here such an entity is referred to by the simple term 'product' and as such, it is admitted to be another particular type of the reason based on identity, viz. one having a qualification not expressly stated. / 8 /

> The expressions 'being produced by conscious effort', 'having concomitant variation with a change in the cause' and the like are to be understood as similar. / 9 /

These [expressions as mentioned above] also are to be considered as reasons based on identity, having some particular qualifying attribute.

An entity is said to be produced by conscious effort when it is caused through conscious effort, i.e. after the appropriate

9. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 66) applies slightly different terms. According to him, the three varieties of reasons here are—i) *śuddha* or a reason without any attribute, ii) *avyatirikta-viśeṣaṇa* or a reason with an attribute which is not separable from it and iii) *vyatirikta-viśeṣaṇa* or a reason with an attribute which is separable from it.

causes have been made to function. Hence the formulation 'it is non-eternal, because it is produced by conscious effort' is [to be understood as showing] a reason based on identity, having a qualification not expressly stated.

[The expression *pratyaya-bheda-bheditva* is now analysed.] *Pratyayabheda* means a change in the cause. *Pratyaya-bheda-bhedin* means what always varies concomitantly with a change in the cause. *Pratyaya-bheda-bheditva* means the general property of such a thing, i.e. finally, having a form varying according to the change in the cause.

For example, when the lump of clay is small, the jar produced from it is also small. But [when the lump of clay] is bigger, [the jar produced from it] also becomes bigger. Again, if [a jar is produced] through the activity of an expert potter, it looks nice. But if [it is produced] through the activity of a potter who is not expert, it does not look nice.

Therefore, the formulation 'it is non-eternal, because it varies concomitantly with a change in the cause' [is also to be understood as showing] a reason based on identity, having a qualification not expressly stated. / 9 /

> The presence of the marks in the subject is shown as follows : sound is existent, is characterised by origination or is a product. / 10 /

In the preceding texts, only the positive concomitance of the three types of reasons based on identity has been mentioned. Following the same order, the presence of each in the subject is now shown.

The word 'or' is used to indicate three separate formulations : (i) sound is existent, (ii) sound is characterised by origination and (iii) sound is a product. / 10 /

> All these characteristics offered as the reasons are to be considered [as logical marks] in relation to an inferable property

> with which the invariable concomitance of nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason has been established properly by the appropriate instruments of valid knowledge. / 11 /

The definition of a reason based on identity has already been mentioned : identity is the reason in relation to an inferable property which is invariably connected with nothing but it [*i*.e. the characteristic offered as the reason]. To show when [and how] it is to be applied, the author says, "All these characteristics offered as the reasons (etc.)". That is, the three types of reasons based on identity—the presence of which in the subject has just been shown.

"Properly by the appropriate instruments of valid knowledge". It means 'by its own instrument of knowledge', i.e. the instrument of knowledge as appropriate for each one.

"To be considered in relation to an inferable property with which the invariable concomitance of nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason has been properly established". [The expression *siddha-sādhana-dharmamātrānubandha* is now analysed]. *Sādhana-dharmamātra* means nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason. *Sādhanadharma-mātrānubandha* means invariable concomitance with nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason. *Anubandha* means invariable connection, i.e. finally, positive invariable concomitance.

[Thus, the meaning of the whole expression is] : in relation to an inferable property with which the invariable concomitance of nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason has been properly established. The characteristics present in the subject can be considered as real logical reasons only when it has been established that the inferable property is invariably connected with nothing but these characteristics offered as the reasons. / 11 /

How is it that the inferable property would be invariably connected with nothing but the characteristic offered as the reason ? To this, the author says—

> Because it [i.e. the reason] is really identical in nature with that [i.e. the inferable property]. / 12 /

It is the very nature of a product that, in reality, it is non-eternal. It can never be said 'it is a product, [but is different from the non-eternal]' or 'it is non-eternal, [but is different from a product]'.

Why is it so ? Because whatever is produced by causes and such other factors must be subject to destruction. / 12 /

> Also because the characteristic offered as the reason constitutes the very nature [of the inferable entity]. / 13 /

Here an essential property of the inferable entity has been given as the reason. How can it be not connected with the inferable entity ? Thus, [it is proved] that it must be invariably connected with nothing but such [a characteristic, offered as the reason]. / 13 /

What again is the ground for [the above assertion] ? To this, the author says—

> Because, if an entity [i.e. the inferable property] does not emerge even when the other entity [i.e. the reason] has emerged, it cannot be admitted as identical in nature. / 14 /

If the inferable property, e.g. non-eternality or the like, is not established even when the property offered as the reason, e.g. being a product or the like, is established, the two properties of non-eternality and being a product cannot be [viewed as] identical. / 14 /

> Also because there would arise the possibility of 'irregular connection' (*vyabhicāra*). / 15 /

If it [were possible] that a product is first brought into existence and afterwards the property of non-eternality is created in it by certain other causes such as a stick or the like, then there would have been an irregularity of the connection ; because a stick and the like also depend for their coming into being on their own causes. Hence it follows that whatever is not a product can also never be destroyed. / 15 /

> A formulation showing a reason based on causation [is now given] : 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in the kitchen or any similar place. And smoke exists here'. / 16 /

"A formulation showing a reason based on causation". Here is shown a formulation with a reason having causal relation—as in an inference based on similarity. "Wherever there is smoke, there is fire". [The statement beginning with] 'wherever' shows the positive concomitance, viz. whatever particular spot is characterised by smoke is always characterised by fire.

"For example, in the kitchen or any similar place". It refers to a corroborative instance. "And smoke exists here". This shows the presence [of the reason] in the subject, viz. in the particular spot intended (*abhimata*) smoke is found to be present. / 16 /

> Here also, a reason based on causation [i.e. the effect] can be offered [as a mark] when the inferable entity represents the cause—[and this can be done] only if the causal relation has already been established. / 17 /

In the case of a reason based on causation also, the causal relation must first be established and only afterwards, the effect can be offered as the reason for inferring the cause. That is, something can be taken as a mark only when its nature has been rightly determined and never if it is not rightly determined. / 17 /

> The formulations based on dissimilarity [will next be shown]. / 18 /

[The examples of inferences based on similarity have been stated and as such, the examples] of inferences based on dissimilarity should be mentioned next. / 18 /

> A formulation showing non-apprehension [as the reason] is : 'whatever is existent and satisfies the conditions of cognisability is apprehended, e.g. any particular object like the blue etc. But no jar in spite of its satisfying the conditions of cognisability is apprehended here'. / 19 /

"Whatever is existent and satisfies the conditions of cognisability is apprehended". That is, if an entity really exists and also fulfills the conditions of cognisability, it is necessarily apprehended. This states the negative concomitance. "For example, any particular object like the blue etc". It gives a corroborative instance based on dissimilarity.

"But no jar in spite of its satisfying the conditions of cognisability is apprehended here". That is, a jar similar in nature to any particular object like the blue etc. which are actually perceived does not exist here. 'Here' refers to the particular spot selected.

"A formulation showing non-apprehension". That is, it is a formulation having non-apprehension as the reason and is based on dissimilarity. / 19 /

> Formulations showing reasons based on identity are : 'whatever is non-eternal is neither existent, nor characterised by origination, nor a product. Sound is existent, is characterised by origination and is also a product'. / 20 /

The statement 'whatever is non-eternal is neither existent, nor characterised by origination, nor a product' shows the negative concomitance in the case of the three types of reason based on identity. The presence of the reason in the subject is stated by 'sound is existent, is characterised by origination and is also a product'. "Formulations showing reasons based on identity". That is, all these are formulations having reasons based on identity and are based on dissimilarity. / 20 /

> A formulation showing a reason based on causation is : 'wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke. But smoke exists here'. / 21 /

The statement 'wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke' gives the negative concomitance. The presence of the reason in the subject is stated by '[smoke] exists here'.

"A formulation showing a reason based on causation". That is, here is illustrated a formulation having the effect as the reason and it is based on dissimilarity. / 21 /

In the case of an inference based on similarity the three characteristics [of a valid reason], namely, positive concomitance (*anvaya*), presence in the subject (*pakṣadharma*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) are not found. How, then, can it be said that an inference for the sake of others is a statement of a mark having the three characteristics ?

To this, the author says—

> Dissimilarity is understood by implication,[10] even when the formulation is based on similarity. / 22 /

There is no scope for the objection mentioned above, because even when the formulation is based on similarity, dissimilarity is understood on the strength of implication. / 22 /

But what is this strength of implication ? To this, the author says—

> Because in its absence even the positive concomitance between the inferable property and the reason is not proved. / 23 /

If there is no negative concomitance, the positive concomitance of the reason with the inferable property, too, cannot be established. / 23 /

> The positive concomitance, too, is similarly understood [when the formulation is based on] dissimilarity. / 24 /

Even when the formulation is based on dissimilarity, the positive concomitance is understood on the strength of implication. / 24 /

But what is this strength of implication ? To this, the author says—

> Because in its absence the non-existence of the reason cannot be established by the non-existence of the inferable property. / 25 /

If there is no positive concomitance of the reason with the inferable property, how can it, then, be [a fact that] 'wherever

10. The same view is expressed in *HB* (p. 56).

there is the absence of the inferable property, there is the absence of the reason'? / 25 /

If there is no positive concomitance, there can also be no negative concomitance. Why is it so? To this, the author says—

> If there is no 'natural connection' (*svabhāva-pratibandha*) [i.e. *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance], the negation of one does not necesssarily lead to the negation of the other. / 26 /

If there is no natural connection—i.e. a connection through one's own essential properties—the negation of one would not necessarily lead to the negation of the other. As, for example, the absence of a horse does not [lead] anywhere to the absence of a cow. / 26 /

> As it has already been said,[11] it is everywhere of two kinds—one through identity and one through causation. / 27 /

"It is everywhere of two kinds". Whenever such a natural connection is observed to exist among various entities, it is to be included in either of these two kinds.

"As it has been already said—one through identity and one through causation". The word *tadātman* means one's own self. *Tādātmya* means the general property of one's own self [i.e. the essential properties of an object]. Thus, 'one through identity' means [invariable concomitance] which consists in the identity [of the *sādhya* and the *hetu*].

The word *tadutpatti* means being produced from it. Thus, by expounding the compound in the expression *tadutpattilakṣaṇa,* [we get that 'one through causation'] means [invariable concomitance] which consists in the production [of the *hetu*] from it [i.e. the *sādhya*]. This has already been mentioned. / 27 /

11. Ch 2, texts 18-19. See also note 25 thereon.

> It follows therefore that a statement revealing the negation [of two terms] also expresses the [invariable] connection [between the two]. / 28 /

When the reason negates a certain entity, there follows the negation of another entity and this is because, only when there is [invariable] connection [between two entities] the negation of one can lead to the negation of the other. Thus, it is shown that [invariable] connection exists between 'what is negated (*nivartya*)' and 'what negates' (*nivartaka*) / 28 /

> Thus, stating the negation means nothing but indicating, by suggestion, the [invariable] connection. / 29 /

That is, the [invariable] connection is suggested, when there is a statement of the negation. / 29 /

Let it be so. But, what does actually follow from it ? To this, the author says—

> This indication of the [invariable] connection is nothing but [a statement of] the positive concomitance. / 30 /

The very indication of the [invariable] connection amounts to [a statement of] the positive concomitance. / 30 /

> Thus, the formulation of a single proposition—pointing to either the positive concomitance or the negative concomitance—is capable of showing the presence or the absence of the mark in a similar or a dissimilar case and as such, it is not indispensable to mention both the propositions. / 31 /

"Thus the formulation of a single proposition—pointing to either the positive concomitance or the negative concomitance—is capable of showing the presence or the absence of the mark in a similar or a dissimilar case." It is undoubtedly proper that when there is a statement pointing to the positive concomitance, there should also be [a statement] pointing to the negative concomitance. But, still, the presence or the absence [of the mark] is clearly revealed, in the said manner, through the indirect indication of the presence or the absence [of the mark] in similar or dissimilar cases. Hence it must be admitted that either of the marks [based on similarity or dissimilarity] can refer to each [of the positive and the negative concomitances].

"As such, it is not indispensable to mention both the propositions." [This means :] It is not indispensable therefore to mention both the propositions based on similarity [i.e. pointing to the positive concomitance] as well as dissimilarity [i.e. pointing to the negative concomitance] in the same formulation.[12] / 31 /

12. In the Nyāya view inferences are classified into three groups according to the nature of the invariable concomitance the reason (*hetu*) therein may admit of. First, if the reason admits of only the positive concomitance, the inference would be called *kevalānvayi*, e.g. the jar is nameable (*abhidheya*), because it is knowable (*jñeya*). Here the negative concomitance in the form 'whatever is not nameable is not knowable' can never be ascertained, because there is no entity existing which is not characterised by the property of nameability and as such, it is impossible to find any instance to corroborate the concomitance.

Secondly, if the reason admits of only the negative concomitance, the inference would be called *kevalavyatireki*, e.g. the living body possesses a self, because it is characterised by vital breath (*prāṇa*). Here the positive concomitance in the form 'whatever is characterised by vital breath possesses a self', can never be ascertained because (besides the living body) there is no other entity which is characterised by the possession of vital breath and as such, it is impossible to find any instance to corroborate the concomitance. A living body cannot be cited to be the instance, because it is included in the inference as the subject and the presence of a self is yet to be established there.

Thirdly, if the reason admits of both the positive and the negative

Thus the mutual indirect indication of positive and negative concomitances—as in the case of the reasons based on identity and causation—is explained.

To explain it as in the case of the third kind of reason, the author says—

> [Such indication is possible] in the case of non-apprehension also. / 32 /

concomitances the inference would be called *anvaya-vyatireki*, e.g. the mountain contains fire, because it contains smoke. Here the positive concomitance—wherever there is smoke there is fire—is ascertained in the instance of the kitchen and the like, while the negative concomitance—wherever there is an absence of fire there is an absence of smoke—is ascertained in the instance of the lake or the like.

In other words, in a *kevalānvayi* inference there is no *vipakṣa* and in a *kevalavyatireki* inference there is no *sapakṣa*. An *anvayavyatireki* inference however has both.

It is quite clear from the preceding remarks of Dharmakīrti, that in the Buddhist view, a valid inference can only be *anvayavyatireki* and neither *kevalānvayi* nor *kevalavyatireki*. The basis for the Buddhists' objection to the validity of the last two forms of inferences seems to be their strict adherence to the principle that a valid reason must *always* be characterised by the three properties of *pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva* and *vipakṣāsattva*—deficiency in any one or several of these properties would invalidate the reason. Thus, in a *kevalānvayi* inference the absence of the reason in a dissimilar case is never ascertained and in a *kevalavyatireki* inference the presence of the reason in a similar case is never ascertained. Just as a reason which is not ascertained as present in the subject becomes a pseudo-reason and does not lead to valid inferential cognition, so is the case with a reason which is not ascertained to be either absent in a dissimilar case or present in a similar one. (cf. *HBT* p. 73. Also note 32 below).

Praśastapāda also does not mention any such classification of inferences. Śrīdhara (*NK* p. 489) does not state anything about his own position in this regard, but refers to two different views of others that seek to explain the absence of such a classification there. According to the first, the tacit admission of the two forms of *kevalānvayi* and *kevalavyatireki* follows from their acceptance in the allied (*samānatantra*) system (i.e. the Nyāya system). According to the second, the enumeration of the three characteristics of a valid reason (see note 6, ch 2) does not refer as a whole to the valid reasons in

That is, [in the case of the reason] not included under the two kinds of reasons based on causation and on identity. / 32 /

> When it is said 'an entity which is existent and fulfils the conditions of cognisability is necessarily apprehended', it is ascertained thereby that such an entity if not apprehended must be absent, and thus positive concomitance becomes established / 33 /

When the negative concomitance—viz., if an entity which fulfils the conditions of cognisability had been present here, it should also have been apprehended—is stated, and an entity in spite of its fulfilling the conditions of cognisability is not apprehended, it is ascertained by logical implication that [such an entity] is absent here. Therefore, [it is shown] that the positive concomitance is established by indirect indication.

Here the indirect indication of the positive concomitance only is stated. An indirect indication of the negative concomitance in the case of non-apprehension may be understood by [the reader or the student] himself.[13] / 33 /

general. The first and the second (viz. *yad anumeyena sambaddham*= *pakṣasattva* and *prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite*=*sapakṣasattva*) constitute the definition of *kevalānvayi* only. The first and the third (viz. *yad anumeyena sambaddham*=*pakṣasattva* and *tadabhāve ca nāsty eva*= *vipakṣāsattva*) constitute the definition of *kevalavyatireki* only. The three characteristics taken as a whole constitute the definition of *anvaya-vyatireki* only.

13. i.e. when it is stated 'an entity which in spite of satisfying the conditions of cognisability is not apprehended is accepted to be an object of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent' (=positive concomitance) it follows from implication 'an entity which is existent and satisfies the conditions of cognisability is necessarily apprehended' (=negative concomitance).

There is no statement of the thesis in any [example] of the inferences based on similarity or dissimilarity. Is it to be concluded therefrom that there should never be a statement of the thesis ? To this, the author says—

> When the two[14] [propositions expressing the concomitance and the presence of the mark in the subject] are stated, it is not always necessary to make a 'statement of the thesis' (*pakṣa-nirdeśa*).[15] / 34 /

That is, there is no hard and fast rule to the effect that the thesis must be mentioned. / 34 /

> As for example, in the case of a formulation based on similarity, [there is a statement of the concomitance] : whatever, in

14. Nyāya logicians admit five propositions—stated in a fixed order—as the essential constituents of *parārthānumāna*. Each of these propositions has specific justification of its own and in the absence of any one of them there can be no inferential cognition (*NS* i. 1. 32 ff)

According to the Buddhists, only two propositions are necessary for yielding an inferential cognition. They are : (i) statement of the invariable concomitance (which corresponds to the third Nyāya proposition, viz. *udāharaṇa*) and (ii) statement of the presence of the reason in the subject (which corresponds to the fourth Nyāya proposition, viz. *upanaya*). In this regard, there is also no difference between *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*. In both the cases the inferential cognition is produced simply by these two propositions. Thus, for instance, when the two statements—viz. 'wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen' and 'this mountain contains smoke'—are made one after another, the hearer at once concludes that here the fact sought to be established is nothing but 'the mountain contains fire.' (See also note 16 below).

In the following texts (35-38) Dharmakīrti explains the above with the illustration of an inference based on non-apprehension.

15. The expression *pakṣanirdeśa* here is synonymous with the first Nyāya proposition, viz. *pratijñā*. It also covers by implication the fifth Nyāya proposition, viz. *nigamana*.

> spite of fulfilling the conditions of cognisability, is not apprehended must be an object of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent. / 35 /

The positive concomitance is to be understood as taking into consideration the whole class of [such objects] : each and every object that fulfils the conditions of cognisability and is not apprehended, must invariably be an object of successful behaviour concerning the non-existent. / 35 /

> [And] the presence of the mark in the subject is also stated : here also the jar in spite of fulfilling the conditions of cognisability is not apprehended. [When these two propositions are mentioned], it follows, by implication, [that the thesis is] 'no jar exists here'. / 36 /

When the 'positive concomitance as taking into consideration the whole class' as well as the 'presence of the mark in the subject' are explicitly stated, the thesis to be established there is actually conveyed by implication. What, then, is the use of stating the thesis ? / 36 /

> Similarly, in the case of a formulation based on dissimilarity also, [there is a statement of the concomitance] : whatever is an object of successful behaviour concerning the existent [i.e. simply 'existent'] and fulfils the conditions of cognisability is always apprehended. / 37 /

The above text mentions the negative concomitance : each and every object which fulfils the conditions of cognisability and is an object of successful behaviour concerning the existent must invariably be apprehended. / 37 /

> [And] the presence of the mark in the subject is also stated : such a jar however is not apprehended here. [When these two propositions are mentioned], it follows, by implication, [that the thesis is] 'no object of successful behaviour concerning the existent is present here'. / 38 /

When the negative concomitance as taking into consideration the whole class as well as the presence of the mark in the subject are explicitly mentioned, the thesis to be established is conveyed through the implication [of the propositions] expressing the two, and as such there is no statement of the thesis. Otherwise—had it not been conveyed—[the author] would have stated it explicitly. When the thesis to be established is already understood from the implication [of the two propositions], who would have any interest, even on repeated request, for listening to the proposition expressing the thesis to be established ?

Thus, when the subject of debate is clearly conveyed through logical implication and the thesis to be established is ascertained by the propositions expressing 'invariable concomitance' and the 'presence of the mark in the subject', there is no use of mentioning the thesis.

This [restriction on the statement of the thesis] is, however, to be understood as referring to the statement of the propositions that lead to the ascertainment [i.e. the inferential knowledge]. If anybody mentions the thesis for the purpose of explaining, there is no objection.[16] And that is why, it has

16. This is however not in full agreement with the view expressed by Dharmakīrti in *HB* (pp. 55f) where he discusses the problem in greater details, and after a strong criticism of the Nyāya position finally rejects the claim of *pratijñā* as one of the essential inference-components. His criticism is mainly based on the contention that the thesis to be established in *parārthānumāna* too is understood, just in the same manner as in *svārthānumāna*, where the knower himself perceives the mark in the subject, recollects its invariable concomitance with the

been said [in text 34] that there is no hard and fast rule. Because, it follows, if the intention of [the author] would have been complete prohibition of the statement of the thesis, all these would not have been mentioned at all. / 38 /

It has been concluded that it is not necessary to have a statement of the thesis in the propositions that lead to the inferential ascertainment ; it may be stated, however, for the purpose of explaining. But then—

> It is to be stated what exactly is to be meant by a thesis. / 39 /

inferable property and finally acquires the inferential cognition—without anyone categorically pointing out to him 'such is the thesis sought to be established.'

It may be argued against the above that in *svārthānumāna* the knower himself has the perception of the mark and as such he may also ascertain the thesis to be established without the assistance of anybody else. But in *parārthānumāna* the knower himself does not perceive the mark, but comes to know of it only through the words of somebody else. As such, it would only be proper that he should ascertain the thesis also through the statement of somebody else. To this, Dharmakīrti replies that even then the statement of the thesis is quite useless, for it has nothing to do with the actual establishment of the inferable fact. In the preliminary stage the statement of the thesis expresses only some doubtful meaning and it cannot be the basis for any valid or certain knowledge. In fact, in *parārthānumāna* also the inferential cognition follows from the same two factors, namely, the knowledge of the mark as present in the subject and the recollection of the invariable concomitance between the mark and the inferable property. It is therefore necessary to state only those propositions which make the hearer aware of these two facts.

There are others who maintain that the statement of the thesis is necessary for indicating the nature of the inference, namely that it is a formulation based on similarity or a formulation based on dissimilarity. But this claim also is untenable, for the nature of the formulation is very well determined by the 'statement indicating the presence of the reason in the subject' (*pakṣadharma-vacana*). As for instance, when the statement of the concomitance in the form 'whatever is produced is non-eternal' is followed by the further assertion 'sound

What are the characteristics of [a statement] that is to be called a thesis ? To this, the author says—

> By a thesis is to be understood a statement which is accepted by [the disputant] himself (*svayam*) 'just as such' (*svarūpeṇa eva*) and which is not contradicted.[17] / 40 /

A thesis means the statement [of any topic] which is admitted [for discussion] according to the intention of the disputant (*vādin*), which is accepted only as a 'point to be established' (*sādhya*) and which moreover is not contradicted by perception or the like. This is the meaning in brief. / 40 /

The detailed meaning [is now stated]—

> 'As such' (*svarūpeṇa*) means accepted only as a point to be established. / 41 /

[At the time of a debate] it is proper to take a point only as a point yet to be established and not in any other way. As such, by a thesis is to be understood only such a statement as refers to a point yet to be established. / 41 /

> 'Just as such' means accepted only as the point to be established and not as the reason (*sādhana*) as well. / 42 /

The above remark shows that a thesis means the statement of a point accepted exclusively as something yet to be established, and not as anything else. / 42 /

is something produced', it becomes clear that the formulation is based on similarity. If, on the other hand, the same statement of the concomitance is followed further by the assertion 'sound is eternal', it becomes clear that the formulation is based on dissimilarity. (cf. for details *HBT* pp. 63ff).

17. This definition of *pakṣa* originally comes from Dignāga (cf. *Fragments* p. 27n). Uddyotakara elaborately refutes it under *NS* i.1.33 (p. 281).

What can be the example of a statement referring to a point accepted as something other than yet to be established ? To this, the author says—

> As for example, the reason—viz., the property of being visible—in the inference of non-eternality in sound is also a fact to be established, because visibility in sound is unproved. / 43 /

When it is sought to be inferred 'sound is non-eternal, [because it is visible]', the property of visibility being unproved in relation to sound becomes same as an inferable property. Hence if no such condition [viz., accepted only as a point to be established] were mentioned, this statement of visibility [in sound] also would have become a thesis. / 43 /

If it [i.e. the reason mentioned in the above example] is also the same as an inferable property [i.e. something yet to be established], let it also be considered as a thesis. To this, the author says—

> Here it is stated also as a reason and as such [it is not a point accepted] only as yet to be established. / 44 /

It is true that the property of being visible [in relation to sound] is something yet to be established. Still, it is not exclusively something yet to be established, because, being stated as the ground, it also shares the characteristic of being a reason. Thus, the statement of something which, though identical with an inferable property, shares the additional characteristic of being the reason is not to be regarded as a thesis, since it expresses an additional significance. / 44 /

> 'Himself' means by the disputant (*vādin*) who sets forth the argument at that time. / 45 /

That is, finally, a thesis is [a statement] of only that topic which the disputant himself seeks to establish by providing arguments for it, and not what is established by the 'original author of the system' (*śāstrakāra*). 'Who etc'. That is, a thesis must be something sought to be established by only the disputant. / 45 /

> Even if one sets forth the arguments—adhering to any particular system. / 46 /

It may be argued that when one [i.e. the disputant] adheres to any particular system, one is already certain of the conclusion regarding the point of dispute. There may be such an ascertainment [on the part of the disputant]. But, still [his statement is to be considered as a thesis], if he seeks to examine critically any point—taking it up from the original system. / 46 /

> The original author of that system, however, may admit several characteristics in relation to the same subject (*dharmin*). / 47 /

The original author of a particular system—adhering to which the disputant sets forth his arguments—may admit several properties characterising the subject the nature of which is being disputed. Still then—

> It is stated hereby that in such a case, that property alone which the disputant himself seeks to prove would constitute the inferable property and not anything else. / 48 /

An inferable property is a property which is sought to be proved by the disputant alone and not simply what is intended by the original author of the system. The implication of the above remark is as follows. An inferable property means only that property [the admission of which] is essential [for the system] and which is sought to be clarified by the disputant in

adherence to his system ; this is because a thesis means [a statement] of a property which is accepted [for discussion] only by the disputant. Thus, [a thesis is not constituted by] whatever the original author of the system admits. / 48 /

> 'Accepted' means an entity which is subject to dispute and with a view to establishing which [the disputant] sets forth the arguments. / 49 /

The meaning of the word 'accepted' is given here. That is, an object is said to be accepted if there is a dispute about the nature of that object—which thus becomes a subject of dispute, and also, if [the disputant] with a view to proving it rightly, puts it as an inferable property. / 49 /

> Such an [accepted] object would be the inferable entity, even though it is not expressed in words. / 50 /

Even if such an object which is actually the topic of debate is not mentioned in words, it is to be regarded as the inferable entity. / 50 /

Why is it so ? To this, the author says—

> Because it is the very basis of the dispute. / 51 /

It is the very fact from which the dispute proceeds, and as such, how can the fact to be established be something other than this disputed subject ? / 51 /

How is it that the topic which is the basis of the dispute is to be regarded as the fact to be established—even if it is not stated in words ? To this, the author says—

> As [in the formulation] 'the visual organ and the like are for the use of someone else, because they are composite substances ; just like the various implements (*aṅga*) such as a bed, a chair and so on.' / 52 /

The meaning of the formulation is : just as the various implements like a bed, a chair and others are found to serve the needs of other persons, because they are of the nature of composite substances ; so also, the visual organ and the like —being of the nature of composite substances—exist for the use of someone else. / 52 /

> Here it is not explicitly mentioned [that the visual organ and the like] are 'for the use of the self' (*ātmārtha*). But, still, it is understood that the point to be established here is nothing but—[these] are for the use of the self. / 53 /

In the above formulation, though it is not clearly stated 'the visual organ and the like are for the use of the self', still the point to be established here is 'their use by the self'. Otherwise, if the point to be established were merely 'their use by someone else', there would be [the fallacy of] 'proving what is already proved' (*siddhasādhana*). There being dispute regarding [their use by] the self, *it* is put as the topic in a debate and as such, it alone becomes the point to be established. / 53 /

> The implication thereby is that the point to be established is not merely what is explicitly stated. / 54 /

It has been shown thus that some point, though not explicitly mentioned to be so, should be regarded as the point to be established—if it is only intended to be the subject [of a

debate] ; and as such, [it follows] that a point to be established is not merely what is explicitly stated. Why is it so ? Because, what is intended to be the subject [of a debate] is nothing different from what is to be established. / 54 /

> The expression 'not contradicted' (*anirākṛta*) is mentioned to point out that, in spite of conforming to the above definition, [the statement referring to] the entity which is sought to be established by [the disputant] is not to be regarded as a thesis—if it is contradicted by perception, inference, general usage (*prasiddhi*) or one's own statement. / 55 /

If [the statement concerning] an entity, which in spite of conforming to the definition as mentioned above, is contradicted at the stage of formulation by perception, inference, general usage or one's own statement is not to be accepted as a thesis. The expression 'not contradicted' is added to point out this fact. / 55 /

> Of these, an example of a statement contradicted by perception is : sound is inaudible (*aśrāvaṇa*). / 56 /

The word *śravaṇa* here means hearing, i.e. a cognition through the sense of hearing. Or, [the word] may mean an auditory sensation. Audible (*śrāvaṇa*) means what is apprehended by *śravaṇa*. Inaudible means 'not audible'.

Here the substratum (*dharmin*) is sound, and the property to be inferred is inaudibility. The thesis 'sound is inaudible' is contradicted by perception. It is ascertained by the living beings themselves that sound is revealed by a cognition received through the sense of hearing. Thus, audibility in sound being revealed by one's own cognition, inaudibility there is contrdicted [by perception]. / 56 /

> An example of a statement contradicted by inference is : the jar[18] is eternal. / 57 /

Here 'eternality' is being sought to be proved in sound. But it is contradicted by the inference '[the jar is non-eternal, because it is] a product'. Whatever is a product is found to be non-eternal. The jar also is a product. How can it therefore be eternal ? / 57 /

> An example of a statement contradicted by general usage is : the hare-marked (*śaśin*) is not denoted by the word 'moon'. / 58 /

If somebody states a thesis, viz. the hare-marked is not denoted by the word moon, it would be contradicted by the general usage that the hare-marked is denoted by the word 'moon'.

Moreover, it is also contradicted by the fact that every word has the capability of denoting every meaning, because the relation between a word and its meaning is determined by convention (*saṃketa*).[19] As for instance, even the word 'jar' may denote the moon. / 58 /

> An example of a statement contradicted by one's own statement is : inference is not an instrument of valid knowledge. / 59 /

If anybody states as a thesis 'inference is not an instrument of valid knowledge', it would be in contradiction with his own statement. If inference is [actually not to be regarded as] an instrument of valid knowledge, one should never assert all these. A group of words [as a source of valid knowledge] is included-

18. Dharmottara reads the text as *nityaḥ śabdaḥ*. Vinītadeva's reading is definitely better. For details, see *BL* ii, p. 163, n 1.
19. See note 21, ch. 1.

in the class of inference. If inference were not really an instrument of valid knowledge, how can a group of words be a source of right knowledge ?

Again, if a group of words is not really a source of right knowledge. why would it be stated at all by anybody ? And thus [the above statement of the disputant] would result in the contradiction of his own statement. / 59 /

> All these four[20] types of 'pseudo-thesis' are thus excluded [from the scope of real theses]. / 60 /

A statement contradicted by *āgama* is to be included in statements contradicted by one's own statement and that is why the author says 'all these four types of pseudo-theses'.

Besides, *āgama* cannot be adhered to as against inference which proceeds from the strength of actual observation of facts and as such, there can really be no question of contradiction. For this reason also [the pseudo-theses are] said to

20. The author of *NP* (p. 2) mentions nine types of *pakṣābhāsa*. Of the four types mentioned here by Dharmakīrti, he leaves out *prasiddhinirākṛta* and adds the following six : i) *āgama-viruddha* (contradicted by an accepted thesis), e.g. the thesis 'sound is eternal' when advanced by the Vaiśeṣika ; ii) *loka-viruddha* (contradicted by general practice), e.g. the thesis 'a human skull is sacred'; iii) *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa* (a thesis in which the qualifying attribute is unproved), e.g. in the expression 'sound which is destructible etc.' when advanced by the Buddhists to the followers of Sāṃkhya ; iv) *aprasiddha-viśeṣya* (a thesis in which the qualified entity is unproved), e.g in the expression 'the (eternal) self characterised by consciousness etc' when advanced by the followers of Sāṃkhya to the Buddhists ; v) *aprasiddhobhaya* (a thesis in which both the qualifier and the qualified are unproved), e g. in the expression 'the (eternal) self which is the inherent cause of pleasure etc.' when advanced by the followers of Vaiśeṣika to the Buddhists ; vi) *prasiddha-sambandha* (a thesis too well-known to be proved through inference). e.g. the thesis 'sound is audible'. For an account of the different views in this regard, see *ILM* pp. 94-97. Also *BL* ii, p. 170, n 2.

be of four types.[21] 'This' (*iti*) means 'in the manner shown above'. / 60 /

> Thus, a point to be established means something which is opposite to—what is already established ; what is not yet proved, but is intended to be the reason ; what is not sought to be proved by the disputant at that time ; what is necessarily stated in words and lastly, what is contradicted. / 61 /

The expression 'opposite to' is to be added to each [of the preceding expressions] and as such, the meaning implied is : by a thesis is to be understood [the statement] of a point which is opposite to what is already established ; opposite to what is not yet proved, but is intended to be the reason ; opposite to what is not sought to be proved by the disputant at that time ; opposite to what is necessarily stated in words and lastly, opposite to what is contradicted. In other words, the definition of a thesis is stated here by way of contrast (*vaiparītya*). / 61 /

21. The word *āgama* may mean either a doctrine accepted in one's own system or a view simply mentioned in the scriptures. If the first meaning is accepted, *āgama-viruddha* would come under *svavacana-viruddha*, because when one offers a thesis which goes against the very doctrine accepted in one's own system it is just like contradicting one's own words. It may however be noted that in this sense, *āgama-viruddha* may also be considered as included under *anumāna-viruddha*, for the doctrines accepted in the different systems are generally founded on inferential grounds and if there is any contradiction with them, it ultimately pertains to the underlying inference. (cf. Uddyotakara's remarks under *NS* i. 1. 33, p. 278)

If again the second meaning is accepted, there can really be no possibility of contradiction, because a view simply mentioned in the scriptures—being not founded on the observation of actual facts—can never be powerful enough to oppose an inference that proceeds from the observation of actual facts.

> An excellent [i.e. free from all errors] definition of a thesis is itherefore shown [by stating that] 'a thesis is a statement of something which is intended *just as such* by the disputant and is not contradicted'. / 62 /

'Just as such' means only as a point to be established. The expression 'intended by the disputant' is added to exclude what is intended by the original author of the system. The word 'intended' is mentioned [to show that the thesis is] not necessarily what is stated in words.

"Not contradicted". That is, not rejected. "A thesis". That is, what is sought to be established. "An excellent definition of a thesis is therefore shown". That is, the definition of a thesis as has been mentioned here is free from all errors.

This concludes the discussion of the valid forms of inference. / 62 /

To begin the discussion on formulations simulating inference, the author says—

> It has been already said that an inference for the sake of others is a statement of a mark having three characteristics. / 63 /

The expression 'it has been already said' is added to show the relevance of [the discussion] of the pseudo-reasons [under inference]. / 63 /

> If anyone of the three characteristics is not mentioned, [there would be a fallacy]. / 64 /

[If any of the three characteristics is not mentioned], the reason would be vitiated by the fallacy of deficiency (*nyūna*). / 64 /

> [There would also be a fallacy] if [any of the characteristics], though mentioned, is not established or is doubtful for either the disputant (*vādin*) or the opponent (*prativādin*). / 65 /

It would also be an example of a pseudo-reason, if any one of the three characteristics of [a valid reason]—though mentioned—remains unproved or doubtful for either the disputant or the opponent. Here the connection with a pseudo-reason is shown [in a general way]. / 65 /

To mention the pseudo-reasons specifically, the author says—

> When one of the three characteristics, viz. the connection [of the reason] with the subject, is either unproved or doubtful, there would be the pseudo-reason called the unproved.[22] / 66 /

The expression *dharmi-sambandha* means the connection with the subject, i.e. presence in the substratum. If it is unproved or is doubtful, there would be the pseudo-reason called the unproved. / 66 /

To give an example, the author says—

> As for instance, when it is sought to be proved 'sound is non-eternal', a reason in the form 'because it is visible' is unproved for both [the disputant and the opponent]. / 67 /

The property of visibility in sound is admitted by neither the disputant nor the opponent. / 67 /

22. For an account of the different divisions of *asiddha-hetvābhāsa*, see *ILM* pp. 100f.

> Again, when it is sought to be proved 'trees are conscious beings', a reason in the form 'because they die when the entire bark is taken off' is unproved for the opponent [viz. the Bauddha]. / 68 /

If the proposition of the Digamvara—trees are conscious beings, because they die when the entire bark is taken off—is sought to be proved [as against] the Bauddha, the death of trees due to the peeling of the entire bark is unproved for the Bauddha. / 68 /

Why is it unproved ? To this, the author says—

> Because the Buddhists admit death in the form of the extinction of sensations, sense-organs and life. / 69 /

The expression *vijñānendriyāyuḥ* is to be expounded as [meaning] sensation, sense-organs and life—all taken together. *Vijñānendriyāyur-nirodha* means the extinction of all these. Death in the form of the extinction of sensations, sense-organs and life means death as characterised by such extinction. According to the Buddhist, death means such a state only and not merely drying up. / 69 /

> And such a death is not possible in the case of trees. / 70 /

Death in the form described above does not exist in the case of trees. / 70 /

> When a follower of the Sāṃkhya seeks to prove 'pleasure and the like are unconscious', a reason in the form 'because it is characterised by origin' or 'because it is non-eternal' is unproved for the disputant himself. / 71 /

If the Sāṃkhya proposition 'pleasure and the like are unconscious, because they are characterised by origin or because they are non-eternal' is debated by the Buddhists, [there would be a pseudo-reason, because] origin, (*utpatti*) or non-eternality in relation to pleasure and the like is unproved for the Sāṃkhya followers themselves. In the Sāṃkhya view, nothing can originate, and nothing can perish. / 71 /

> Similarly, [there would be a pseudo-reason in the form of] the unproved when there is doubt regarding the nature of the reason itself or regarding its location. / 72 /

If doubt prevails regarding the nature of the reason itself or regarding its location, there would be a pseudo-reason called the unproved. / 72 /

An example [of the first form is given]—

> As for instance, in proving fire [a reason in the form of] an 'assemblage of material elements' (*bhūta-saṃghāta*) suspected to be of the nature of vapour or the like. / 73 /

The word *vāspādi* means objects beginning with vapour. *Vāspādibhāva* means the general characteristic of such objects, i.e. finally, being identical in nature with any of the objects like vapour etc. *Bhūta-saṃghāta* means an assemblage of material elements.

When such an object is offered as the reason for proving the existence of fire, there would be doubt [by seeking] to identify it [alternatively] with any one of the objects like vapour and others : 'it is vapour' or 'it is a column of dust' or 'it is smoke' or 'it is fog'. Hence it would be a case of the pseudo-reason called the unproved. / 73 /

To illustrate a case where doubt prevails regarding the location of the reason, the author says—

> As for instance, there is a peacock in this mountain-grove, because its cries are heard. / 74 /

'Its cries' means a continuous flow of the sound of a peacock. 'Mountain-grove' is a particular spot located in the mountain. If anybody seeks to prove 'there is a peacock in this mountain-grove, because its cries are heard', [there would be fallacy] because the presence of the peacock's cries in that very mountain-grove intended by the speaker is doubtful. / 74 /

Why is it doubtful ? To this, the author says—

> There may be a mistake regarding the exact spot from which it flows. / 75 /

There is doubt regarding the exact spot from which the peacock's cries follow, because it cannot be specifically determined from which of the various mountain-groves the sound of the peacock is coming. / 75 /

> [There would be] unproved pseudo-reason, when the substratum (*dharmin*) itself is not proved. As for instance, [the reason] 'having qualities that are apprehended everywhere', when it is sought to be established 'the self is ubiquitous'. / 76 /

Ubiquitous means what pervades everything i.e. omnipresent. The expression *sarvatropalabhamāna-guṇa* means an entity the qualities of which are apprehended everywhere, and *sarvatropalabhamāna-guṇatva* means the general characteristic of such an entity. There are some logicians who prove the ubiquity of the self by the reason 'having qualities that are apprehended everywhere'. But such a reason [would be fallacious], because the substratum is unproved. An entity in the form of the self in respect of which the property of 'having qualities that are apprehended everywhere' is affirmed does not exist.

The position of the opponent here is as follows. It is well-known that pleasure (*sukha*) and the like are the qualities of the self. They are apprehended [as characterising] Devadatta [i.e. any living person] in whatever places may he be present. Because of the absence of motion the self cannot go about from one place to another. But its qualities are apprehended everywhere, and it follows therefrom that the self must be present everywhere.[23] / 76 /

> When another characteristic [of a valid reason], viz. the absence of the reason in a dissimilar case, is unproved, there would be the pseudo-reason called the irregular (*anaikāntika*). / 77 /

That is, there would be the pseudo-reason called the irregular when the negative concomitance is not established. / 77 /

To give an example, the author says—

> As for instance, when the property of eternality or the like is sought to be proved [by such reasons as] the property of provability (*prameyatva*) or the like—which exist in each one of the similar and the dissimilar cases or in some of such cases only.[24] / 78 /

'Eternality and the like' means properties beginning with

23. Jayanta (*NM* ii, p. 40) discusses and defends this argument in details. In the Vaiśeṣika view, the argument is actually advanced to establish the ubiquity of *ākāśa*. But on the basis of analogy it may also be extended to the case of the self. (cf. *NK* p. 153 and p. 213 ; *TB* p. 20 and p. 24).
24. cf. Vātsyāyana on *NS* i.2.5 and particularly the etymological analysis of the term *anaikāntika* given therein.

eternality and others. Similarly, 'provability and the like' means properties beginning with provability and others.

When it is sought to be proved 'sound is eternal, because it is provable', the property of provability exists in *each*[25] of the similar and the dissimilar cases.

When it is sought to be proved 'sound is not produced by conscious effort, because it is non-eternal', the property of non-eternality exists in *some* of the similar cases and in *each* of the dissimilar cases.[26]

When it is sought to be proved 'sound is produced by conscious effort, because it is non-eternal', the property of non-eternality exists in *each* of the similar cases and in *some* of the dissimilar cases.[27]

When it is sought to be proved 'sound is eternal, because it is devoid of touch', the absence of touch is observed only in *some* of the both similar and dissimilar cases.[28]

Thus, four kinds of the 'ordinary irregular' (*sādhāraṇānai-kāntika*) are mentioned here. / 78 /

25. This is because provability (*prameyatva*) is a property which must belong to all existent entities, eternal and non-eternal.
26. Here *sapakṣa* would be represented by objects that are not produced by conscious effort. The reason 'non-eternality' is present in *some* of them, e.g. lightning etc. and, again, absent in *some* of them, e.g. empty space etc. On the other hand, *vipakṣa* would be represented by objects that are produced by conscious effort. The reason is present in *all* of them, because whatever is produced by conscious effort is non-eternal.
27. Here *sapakṣa* would be represented by objects that are produced by conscious effort. The reason 'non-eternality' is present in *all* of them, because whatever is produced by conscious effort is non-eternal. Again, *vipakṣa* would be represented by objects that are not produced by conscious effort. The reason is present in *some* of them, e.g. lighting etc. and also absent in *some* of them, e g. empty space etc.
28. Here *sapakṣa* would be represented by eternal objects and *vipakṣa* by non-eternal objects. The reason 'absence of touch' is present in *some* eternal objects, e.g. empty space etc. and also absent in *some* such objects, e.g. four kinds of atoms. Again, the reason is present in *some* non-eternal objects, e.g. qualities like colour etc. and also absent in *some* such objects, e.g. the jar etc.

> Similarly, [the pseudo-reason would be] the irregular,[29] when there is a doubt regarding the same characteristic [as stated in text 78]. / 79 /

It would be also a case of the irregular, when the absence of the reason in dissimilar cases is not known for certain. / 79 /

To give an example, the author says—

> As for instance, the property of being a speaker or the like, when it is sought to be proved 'a certain desired person is not omniscient or is characterised by passion etc'. / 80 /

When someone says 'a certain desired person is not omniscient, because he is a speaker' or 'a certain desired person is characterised by passion etc., because he is a speaker', the property of his being a speaker [would be a pseudo-reason called] the irregular. / 80 /

What is the name by which it [i.e. such an irregular] is known? To this, the author says—

> It is known as *sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛttika*. / 81 /

The term *sandigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛttika* means a reason the absence of which in the dissimilar case is not known for certain, i.e. a reason with uncertain negative concomitance. Though it is never observed that an omniscient being is not a speaker, the negative concomitance is not proved. / 81 /

29. For an account of the controversy regarding the nature of *anaikāntika-hetvābhāsa* between the Buddhists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians, see *ILM* pp. 102-5.

Why is it to be considered as the irregular ? To this, the author says—

> Because the non-apprehension of such a being—having something essentially imperceptible for its object—would only produce a doubt. / 82 /

No omniscient being is ever observed to be a speaker. But such a non-apprehension has for its object something which is essentially imperceptible. Hence it being a non-apprehension of something essentially imperceptible would only lead to doubt, and would not lead to the establishment of the negative concomitance. / 82 /

> Therefore, the absence of the properties like 'being a speaker' etc., in relation to one opposite to the non-omniscient [i.e. one who is omniscient] is not known for certain. / 83 /

The non-apprehension of something essentially imperceptible produces only a doubt. Hence the absence of the reason —viz. the property of being a speaker—in relation to one opposite to the non-omniscient, i.e. one who is omniscient, is not known for certain. / 83 /

Non-apprehension having for its object something essentially imperceptible, would not prove the negative concomitance. Let it be so. But why cannot it be proved by [the special form of non-apprehension, viz] the apprehension of the incompatible (*svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi*) ? To this, the author says—

> Because there is no opposition (*virodha*) between the properties of 'being a speaker' and 'being omniscient'. / 84 /

The two properties of 'being a speaker' and 'being ominiscient' are not opposed to each other. / 84 /

Therefore—

> The negative concomitance is not proved, though it cannot be observed 'whoever is omniscient is not a speaker'; because there is doubt. / 85 /

No omniscient being is ever observed to be a speaker. Even then the absence of a connection of 'being a speaker' with 'being omniscient' is not proved, because there is no opposition between the properties of 'being a speaker' and 'being omniscient' and as a result, there is only a doubt. / 85 /

Why is there no opposition between the two ? To this, the author says—

> The opposition between objects is of two kinds. / 86 /

Wherever any opposition is observed, in every case, it is to be included in either of the two kinds. One is 'factual opposition' (*vāstava-virodha*) and the other is 'essential opposition' (*lākṣaṇika-virodha*). / 86 /

To state the nature of factual opposition, the author says—

> If an entity though present with its unimpaired causes, is observed to be absent when another entity appears there, [the two would be] opposed to each other, as for instance, the sensation of cold and the sensation of heat. / 87 /

Supposing the appropriate causes of an entity are unimpaired and the entity to be produced by the causes has appeared. But when another entity comes into being there, it vanishes. In such a case there is a cognition of opposition. As for instance, between the sensation of cold and the sensation of heat. The sensation of cold though present with its causes unimpaired

disappears when the sensation of heat is produced, and as such, one ascertains that the two are opposed. / 87 /

> [The second kind of opposition between two objects] is due to their being mutually exclusive of each other by nature, as for instance, presence (*bhāva*) and absence (*abhāva*). / 88 /

The expression *paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇa* means those entities which are, by their own nature, established as mutually exclusive of each other, and *paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇatā* means the general property of such entities. [The second kind of opposition] is the opposition through such a property, e.g. between presence and absence of an object. Of these two, 'presence' can be affirmed in the cases excluding those of its absence, and again, 'absence' can be affirmed specifically in the cases excluding those of its presence. / 88 /

> None of these two kinds of opposition is possible in the case of the properties of 'being a speaker' and 'being omniscient'. / 89 /

Of the two kinds of opposition, none is possible in the case of 'being a speaker' and 'being omniscient'. It is never found that the property of being a speaker—present with its causes unimpaired—disappears even when the property of being omniscient has come into being.

Again, [it cannot be said], the property of being omniscient exists only in those cases where the property of being a speaker does not, and, the property of being a speaker exists only in those cases where the property of being omniscient does not. / 89 /

[It may be argued] that, if there is really no opposition between these two, they should be apprehended as without opposition—that is, [at least in some case] the property of being a speaker should co-exist with the property of being omniscient. To this, the author says—

> Even if [they are] not so apprehended, their absence is not ascertained ; because they are not proved as opposed [to each other]. / 90 /

If two entities cannot be asserted as opposed, the non-apprehension of any one would not lead to the ascertainment of its absence. Similarly, the negative concomitance of the property of being a speaker [offered as the reason] for the inference of the property of not being omniscient is not known for certain. / 90 /

To explain how the negative concomitance becomes doubtful when the property of 'being characterised by passion etc.' is offered [as the reason], the author says—

> [There would be doubt] because no causal connection between passion or the like and speech can be proved. / 91 /

There is no ground to prove that the cause of speech is passion or the like. / 91 /

Let it be admitted that no causal connection between passion or the like and speech is established. What does follow therefrom ? To this, the author says—

> The negation of speech etc., does not follow from the negation of something else which is not their cause. / 92 /

'Something else' means passion etc. How can the negation of speech etc. follow from the negation of these [passion etc.] which are not the causes thereof ? / 92 /

> Thus speech or the like [i.e. the property of being a speaker etc., if offered as the reason] would be a case of the irregular having an uncertain negative concomitance. / 93 /

The negation of speech [i.e. the property of being a speaker] cannot be known for certain through the negation of either the property of being not omniscient or passion etc., because there is no opposition between the properties of 'being a speaker' and 'being omniscient', nor is there any causal connection between passion or the like and speech. Therefore, it is a case of the irregular having an uncertain negative concomitance. / 93 /

> [The pseudo-reason called] the contradictory occurs when the opposite of two characteristics is ascertained. / 94 /

If the opposite of two characteristics is proved, there would be the pseudo-reason called the contradictory (*viruddha*). / 94 /

> What are these two characteristics ? / 95 /

[That is], what are the two characteristics in the ascertainment of the opposite of which there would be the pseudo-reason called the contradictory ? / 95 /

> [These two characteristics] are 'presence in a similar case' and 'absence in a dissimilar case'. / 96 /

That is, the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance. Here the general definition of the contradictory has been stated. / 96 /

To explain it in details, the author says—

> When eternality is sought to be proved, the properties of 'being a product' and 'being produced by conscious effort' would be the pseudo-reason called the contradictory. / 97 /

If one tries to establish 'eternality' by any of the properties of 'being a product' and 'being produced by conscious effort' it [would be] a pseudo-reason called the contradictory.[30] / 97 /

How is the opposite of [the two characteristics] proved in this case ? To this, the author says—

> These two properties are absent in the similar case and present in the dissimilar one. / 98 /

If the inferable property is 'eternality', the similar cases would be empty space etc. But none of the two properties of 'being a product' and 'being produced by conscious effort' can exist in any of them. The dissimilar cases here are the non-eternal objects like the jar etc. Both of the above two properties exist in them. The opposite of the two characteristics in relation to these is thus proved. / 98 /

> These two properties are to be regarded as the contradictory, because they prove just the opposite[31] of what is sought to be proved [i.e. the absence of the inferable property]. / 99 /

If the opposite of the two characteristics is proved, the opposite of the inferable property would then be proved. As

30. Dharmottara (*NBT* p. 102) comments that *kṛtakatva* illustrates the contradictory as in the case of *svabhāva-hetu* and *prayatnāntarīyakatva* as in the case of *kārya-hetu*.

31. cf. the wording in Praśastapāda's definition of *viruddha*.

such, it is known as the contradictory, for it proves just the opposite of what is sought to be proved. / 99 /

> The third variety of the contradictory known as *iṣṭavighātakṛt*[32] has not been [mentioned here]. / 100 /

The term *iṣṭavighātakṛt* means that which nullifies [one's own] admitted thesis. The third variety of the contradictory has been mentioned by the original author of the system [i.e. Dignāga]. / 100 /

An illustration of the above variety is—

> As for instance. 'the visual organ and the like are for the use of someone else, because they are composite substances, just like the various implements (*aṅga*), such as a bed, a chair and so on'. /101 /

The meaning of this [formulation] has already been explained [under text 52]. / 101 /

How does it become a case of the contradictory ? To this, the author says—

> It is contradictory, because it proves just the opposite of 'being useful to something else which is not a composite substance'—a thesis admitted by him [i.e. the disputant]. / 102 /

The word *parārtha* means what serves the need of somebody else. *Pārārthya* means the general property of such objects. *Asaṃhata-pārārthya* means being useful to something else which is not a composite substance. The compound in the expression *iṣṭāsaṃhata-pārārthya* is to be expounded as

32. It was also known as *dharmaviśeṣa-viruddha*. See *ILM* pp. 101f.

meaning 'being useful to something else which is not a composite substance', which is admitted as a thesis [by the disputant].

Asaṃhata-pārārthya-viparyaya means just the opposite of such a thesis. [The reason in the above instance] proves it. Thus, the above reason is to be understood as a case of the contradictory, because it proves just the opposite of 'being useful to something else which is not a composite substance'— a thesis admitted by him.[33] / 102 /

> It may be asked why it is not mentioned here. / 103 /

That is, [why it is not mentioned] even though it is admitted by the original author of the system and possesses the characteristic mark of the contradictory. / 103 /

> Because it is included in the above two forms. / 104 /

This variety has not been mentioned separately, because it is included in the two varieties of the contradictory already mentioned. / 104 /

To show the way of inclusion, the author says—

> This third variety does not differ from the other two, because it also proves just the opposite of what is sought to be proved. / 105 /

33. This argument occurs in *SK* (verse 17). The idea behind the objection against it seems to be as follows. The thesis intended to be proved is 'usefulness for a non-composite being [i.e. *puruṣa*]' (*asaṃhata-pārārthaya*). But the inference actually proves 'usefulness for a composite being' (*saṃhata-pārārthya*), because the instances like bed etc. establish usefulness for only ordinary persons who are composite beings. (cf. *TK* on verse 17). See *NBT* p, 103 f.

It has been stated that, if the properties of 'being a product' and 'being produced by conscious effort' are offered as reasons for establishing eternality, they would be contradictory pseudo-reasons because of proving just the opposite of what is sought to be established.

It [i.e. the third variety] also—proving as it does just the opposite of what is sought to be established—becomes as contradictory as the two varieties [mentioned above]. / 105 /

[It may be objected] that in the preceding two cases there is the establishment of just the opposite of an inferable property which is explicitly mentioned in words and there is no establishment of just the opposite of an admitted thesis. How can it therefore be similar to the above two ? To this, the author says—

> As regards their being a 'point to be established' (*sādhya*), there is actually no difference between 'what is admitted' (*iṣṭa*) and 'what is expressed in words' (*ukta*). / 106 /

It has already been mentioned that when something is sought to be proved, there can actually be no difference, whether it is stated in words or it is merely an admitted thesis. / 106 /

> When one of the two characteristics is unproved and the other is uncertain, there would be the pseudo-reason called the irregular (*anaikāntika*). / 107 /

When either the positive or the negative concomitance is unproved and the other remains uncertain, it would be a pseudo-reason called the irregular. / 107 /

An illustration is given—

> As for instance, somebody is free from passion or is omniscient, because he is a speaker. / 108 /

The meaning of all these has been already stated [under text 80]. / 108 /

> Here the negative concomitance is unproved, and the positive concomitance is uncertain. / 109 /

In the above formulation, the negative concomitance is not proved and the positive concomitance is uncertain. To explain, when the property of being omniscient is sought to be proved, the dissimilar case would be someone not omniscient. But it is not proved that speech [i.e. the property of being a speaker] is absent in non-omniscient beings. / 109 /

To show how the positive concomitance remains uncertain, the author says—

> An omniscient being or a being free from passion is inaccessible and as such, the prsence or the absence of speech etc. in them remains uncertain. / 110 /

Since the properties of being omniscient and being free from passion are beyond the range of the sense-organs, there can only be a doubt that in any of these two, speech etc. may exist or may not. In other words, in the case of the person referred to as the corroborative instance, it cannot be determined for certain : 'this person is a speaker as well as omniscient' or 'this person is a speaker though he is non-omniscient'. / 110 /

> When two characteristics are uncertain, it would be a case of the irregular. / 111 /

If both the positive and the negative concomitances remain uncertain, even then it would be a case of the pseudo-reason called the irregular. / 111 /

To give an illustration, the author says—

> A living body is characterised by a self, because it possesses 'vital breath etc.' (*prāṇādi*).[34] / 112 /

'Vital breath etc.' means such things as beginning with vital breath. The expression 'vital breath' includes [the other signs of life also, such as] the opening and shutting of the eyes, expansion and contraction etc.

'Characterised by a self' means [a substance] which serves as a locus for the experiences [of pleasure and pain] by the self. The expression 'a living body' excludes the case of a dead body. / 112 /

To explain the doubt regarding the negative concomitance here, the author says—

> Except the two classes of entities—possessing a self and without a self—there is no other class where vital breath or the like may exist. / 113 /

There are two classes of entities—one possessing a self and the other without a self. There is nothing else which is not included in either of these two. If the possession of vital breath etc. be assumed to be the characteristic of any substance, it would be something dissociated from [the two classes

34. See *BL* ii, p. 208, n 1. Uddyotakara (*NS* p. 291) and Dharmakīrti (PVr p. 62) mention this inference in a slightly different form : *nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram aprāṇādimattva-prasaṅgāt.* (cf. also Karṇakagomin's comments).

of entities]—possessing a self and without a self. [That is, vital breath or the like is then to be admitted as belonging to a third class of entities]. / 113 /

Let it belong to anything else. But how is it that there can be no third class ? To this, the author says—

> Because all objects are pervaded by the presence and the absence of a self. / 114 /

The expression *vṛtti-vyavaccheda* means presence and absence taken together. *Vṛtti* means presence and *vyavaccheda* means absence. *Ātma-vṛtti-vyavaccheda* means presence or absence of a self. These two pervade all existing entities. Thus, an entity in which the self resides is 'one endowed with a self' (*sātmaka*). All the other entities that cannot be included in the class of such entities are the 'ones without a self' (*nirātmaka*). How can there be any third class of entities ?

Thus, the disconnection of the 'possession of vital breath etc.' from either an entity endowed with a self or an entity without a self is not established. / 114 /

Admitted that its disconnection from the two is not proved. But let then its connection with them [be asserted]. To this, the author says—

> [Such an assertion is not possible] because [the reason] cannot be ascertained as located in any of these two [classes of entities]. / 115 /

It can never be known for certain that the possession of vital breath etc. is always present in the case of an entity endowed with a self or in the case of an entity without a self. / 115 /

Why is it so ? To this, the author says—

> Because [the presence of] vital breath etc.
> cannot be proved in any of the entities
> established either as characterised by a
> self or as without a self. / 116 /

The possession of vital breath etc. is found neither in an entity which is ascertained to be endowed with a self nor in an entity which is ascertained to be without a self. How then can it be ascertained as located in any of them ? / 116 /

> Therefore, [it is to be admitted] that the
> possession of vital breath etc. are connec-
> ted with only a living body. / 117 /

In conclusion, the presence of the reason in the subject is mentioned. The expression *jīvaccharīra-sambandha* is to be expounded as meaning 'connection with a living body' and *jīvaccharīra-sambandhin* means something characterised by such a connection. This is nothing but showing the presence of the reason in the subject. / 117 /

> Since it [i.e. possession of vital breath or
> the like] is proved as disconnected with
> none of [the two classes of] entities—
> those with a self and those without a self—
> there can be no negative concomitance
> with any of them. / 118 /

This remark points out the absence of the negative concomitance. / 118 /

> There can also be no positive concomi-
> tance, because it is not proved as connec-
> ted with any of them. / 119 /

This remark points out the absence of the positive concomitance. Thus, the presence of both the positive and the negative concomitances remains unproved. / 119 /

It may be objected that in this way the absence of the two [concomitances] would actually be ascertained. To this, the author says—

> Nor can there be any ascertainment of the absence of its positive and negative concomitances in relation to an entity with a self or an entity without a self. / 120 /

Just as the presence of the positive and the negative concomitances remains uncertain in the case of an entity endowed with a self, so also the absence [of the two concomitances] remains uncertain as well. The same is to be noted in the case of an entity without a self. / 120 /

But how is it that in spite of the absence of the ascertainment regarding the presence there is no ascertainment regarding the absence ? To this, the author says—

> Because the positive concomitance [=presence] and the negative concomitance [=absence] are, by their nature, mutually exclusive. / 121 /

Positive concomitance and negative concomitance exist as excluding each other. Thus, where there is no positive concomitance, there is negative concomitance ; and where there is no negative concomitance, there is positive concomitance. / 121 /

It has been said that the two [forms of concomitances] exist as excluding each other. What does then follow from it ? To this, the author says—

> [It follows that], if the absence of one is ascertained, the presence of the other is necessarily to be admitted. / 122 /

Since they exist as mutually exclusive of each other, [it follows] that when there is an ascertainment of the absence of

positive concomitance, there must be an ascertainment of the presence of negative concomitance. Similarly, when there is an ascertainment of the absence of negative concomitance, there must be an ascertainment of the presence of positive concomitance.

Thus, its [i.e. of the reason] absence can be ascertained only when it is known for certain 'the possession of vital breath or the like does not exist here'. Its presence can be ascertained only when it is known for certain 'it [i.e. the possession of vital breath or the like] is not absent here'.

There can thus be no ascertainment regarding the absence of the possession of vital breath etc. in entities endowed with a self and without a self, because, in the case of the positive and the negative concomitances the presence of one can invariably be established when the absence of the other is known for certain. / 122 /

> Hence, the positive and the negative
> concomitances being uncertain, it would
> be a case of the irregular. / 123 /

In other words, it would be a case of the irregular, because there is doubt regarding the positive and the negative concomitances. / 123 /

Let there be doubt regarding the positive and the negative concomitances. But why should it be regarded as nothing but a case of the irregular ? To this, the author says—

> Because it is not ascertained [to be present]
> in relation to either the inferable property
> or its opposite. / 124 /

It is to be regarded as a case of the irregular, because the possession of vital breath etc. [which is offered as the reason] is not ascertained [to be present] in relation to either the property to be inferred or a property opposite in nature [i.e. the absence of the property to be inferred]. / 124 /

> Thus there are three forms of the pseudo-reasons, namely, the unproved (*asiddha*), the contradictory (*viruddha*) and the irregular (*anaikāntika*). They are accordingly (*yathāyoga*) [to be understood] when any one or any pair of the three characteristics [of a valid reason] remains unproved or uncertain. / 125 /

'Thus' means in the said manner. 'The three characteristics' means presence of the reason in the subject, and the positive as well as the negative concomitances. "When any one or any pair of the three characteristics remains unproved or uncertain". In certain cases only one characteristic remains unproved or uncertain, while in others even two characteristics may remain so. 'Accordingly' means in accordance with the formulations.

"Three forms of the pseudo-reasons, namely, the unproved, the contradictory and the irregular". That is, by expounding [the compound], [it is understood] that there are three distinct forms of pseudo-reasons which are the unproved, the contradictory and the irregular. / 125 /

> [Another variety of the irregular] called the 'invariable opposite' (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*)[35] which produces doubt has also been mentioned. / 126 /

[The term *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is now analysed]. *Viruddhāvyabhicāra* means invariable connection with the opposite [i.e. the absence of the *sādhya*]. Thus, *viruddhāvyabhicārin* means a reason which has such connection. Or, *viruddhāvyabhicārin* means a reason which is opposite [i.e. proves just the absence of the actual *sādhya*] and is never irregular.

This variety has been mentioned by the original author of the system [i.e. by Dignāga]. / 126 /

35. See *BL* ii, p. 221, n 1.

It has not been mentioned here. / 127 /

That is, the present author himself does not mention it. / 127 /

Why is it so ? To this, the author says—

Because it is not possible in the case of [genuine] inferences. / 128 /

The implication is that such a pseudo-reason cannot occur in the case of [genuine] inferences, [because genuine inferences] proceed from the 'force of real facts' (*vastu-bala*). / 128 /

Why is it not possible [in the case of genuine inferences] ? To this, the author says—

Such an opposite reason is not possible in the case of any of the three marks based on causation, identity and non-apprehension, which have been already explained. / 129 /

The essential characteristic of a reason based on causation consists in [the law] : wherever there is the cause there is also the effect. The essential characteristic of a reason based on identity consists in its being a reason which is related to nothing but [the inferable property]. The essential characteristic of a reason based on non-apprehension consists in the non-apprehension of what fulfils the conditions of cognisability.

An opposite reason is not possible in any of the reasons having the said characteristics. For instance, when the presence of a tree has been proved by the presence of a *śiṃśapā*, the second form of the reason as defined above can never prove the existence of something which is not a tree and is different in nature. / 129 /

It may not be possible in the cases of the three reasons

which have already been explained. Let it be possible in some other case. To this, the author says—

> No other form of the reason is ever irregular. / 130 /

There is no other form of the reason which is irregular, but is not included in any of the three forms of the reason already mentioned. / 130 /

[To explain] why it is not possible in the cases of the three reasons [the author says]—

> Therefore, the invariable opposite has been mentioned as a fallacious reason, when the tenets [of any system] are discussed with the help of an inference which is founded upon an accepted doctrine of the system, but does not proceed from the strength of the observation of real facts. / 131 /

An inference not founded upon the strength of the observation of real facts occurs when the related instrument of knowledge does not actually lead to the conclusion [sought to be proved].

"With the help of an inference which is founded upon the accepted doctrine of the system". The expression *āgamāśraya* means which has for its foundation an accepted doctrine of the system. When the subject, the presence of the reason in the subject and such other conditions are offered in accordance with the accepted doctrines of the system [disregarding the actual order of things], the inference is one founded on the accepted doctrine of the system.

The expression *tadartha-vicāreṣu* means 'when the tenets of the system are discussed'. "The invariable opposite has been mentioned as a fallacious reason". The meaning of this is quite easy. / 131 /

If it cannot really be mentioned in a [genuine] inference, how can it be possible in the case of an inference founded upon the accepted doctrine of a system ? To this, the author says—

> It is possible that the authors of the various systems, because of some false notion regarding the nature of an entity, ascribe to it certain attributes which are actually opposed to its nature. / 132 /

The authors of the various systems sometimes admit certain entities—wrongly ascribing to them certain incompatible attributes—though they are not proved to be so by actual observation. And in such a case occurs the pseudo-reason called the invariable opposite. / 132 /

If it is admitted that the presence of such a pseudo-reason is possible in an inference connected with the accepted doctrine of the system, let it then be admitted that it also proceeds from the strength of real facts. To this, the author says—

> Such a pseudo-reason is not possible in the case of reasons based on identity, causation and non-apprehension—which are all based on entities as characterised by their real nature. / 133 /

The expression *yathāvasthita-vastu-sthiti* means which has for their basis entities that are characterised by their real nature. 'Based on' means 'specifically determined by'. The compound in the expression *ātma-kāryānupalambha* is to be expounded as meaning identity (*ātman*), causation (*kārya*) and non-apprehension (*anupalambha*) taken together. *Ātman* here means identity.

An entity is specifically determined when the object is really existing and in the same way are specifically determined the three forms of reasons based on identity, causation and non-apprehension. As such, how can there be [the pseudo-reason of] the invariable opposite in relation to them ? / 133 /

> An example of [the invariable opposite] would be : an entity which simultaneously comes in contact with all its substrata at various places is ubiquitous, e.g. empty space. A universal also simultaneously comes in contact with all its substrata situated at various places. [Hence it is also ubiquitous]. / 134 /

"An example". That is, an inference [lit. an instrument of knowledge] founded upon the accepted doctrine of a system is illustrated here. "An entity which simultaneously comes in contact with all its substrata situated at various places is ubiquitous". The expression *sarva-deśāvasthita* means things which are situated in various places and *sarva-deśāvasthitasva-sambandhin* means such things, which are moreover its [i.e. of the entity admitted to be ubiquitous] substrata. Whatever entity is observed to have simultaneous contact with its substrata which are situated at different places is to be regarded as ubiquitous.

"For example, empty space". Empty space has simultaneous contact with the various substrata situated at various places, viz. the jar and the like, and it is admitted to be ubiquitous. This statement shows the positive concomitance.

"A universal also simultaneously comes in contact with all its substrata situated at various places". The substrata of a universal are the different individuals, which are all located in different places. But a universal simultaneously inheres in each of them. This shows the presence of the reason in the subject. / 134 /

To show that the above formulation has a reason based on identity, the author says—

> The characteristic of being present in the spots occupied by them [i.e. the substrata] follows from the very essential characteristic of its substrata. / 135 /

Tat-sambandhin means its substrata. *Tat-sambandhi-svabhāva-mātrānubandhinī* means what always follows from the mere essential characteristic of its substrata [i.e. being always related to it]. *Taddeśa* means the spots occupied by them, i.e. the substrata. *Taddeśa-sannihita-svabhāva* means that which is of the nature of being present in the spots occupied by them. *Taddeśa-sannihita-svabhāvatā* means the general characteristic of such things, i.e. finally, presence in the spot occupied by the substratum. / 135 /

How is it that only something ubiquitous can pervade all the substrata ? To this, the author says—

> Because an entity itself cannot pervade a particular spot if it is not actually present there. Thus it is a formulation having a reason based on identity. / 136 /

If an object is not actually present in the spot in question, how would it be able to pervade that particular spot ? *Taddeśa* means a spot which is occupied by it. That is, an entity is not capable of pervading the substrata occupying various spots if it is not actually present in those spots.

"It is a formulation having a reason based on identity". The meaning of this is quite easy. / 136 /

A section of the followers of Kaṇāda maintains that the universal is 'ubiquitous in respect of all objects' (*sarva-sarvagata*). But another section of the followers of Kaṇāda claims that the universal is 'ubiquitous in respect of only the

substratum' (*kevalāśraya-sarvagata*).[36] To discuss the view of the latter, the author says—

> There is again a second formulation [showing a different view as to the nature of the universal]. / 137 /

The meaning of these lines is quite easy. / 137 /

> An entity which, though perceptible, is not apprehended in a particular spot must be absent from it, e.g. a jar absent from a certain spot. / 138 /

Here the positive concomitance of [the reason based on] non-apprehension has been stated. / 138 /

> The universal, though perceptible, is not apprehended in the 'intervals between the various individuals' (*vyaktyantarāla*). / 139 /

The term *vyaktyantarāla* means the intervals between the various individuals, i.e. other objects [which lie in between the substrata of a universal]. A universal in spite of being perceptible is not observed to reside in such objects.

The above states the presence of the reason in the subject. Those who put forward such a formulation maintain that the universal is ubiquitous in respect of only the substratum. / 139 /

> This formulation based on non-apprehension and the previous one based on identity prove two theses quite opposite to each other and as such, they only lead to a doubt[37] concerning the single entity [which is the subject in both the cases]. / 140 /

36. cf. *PBh* and *NK* (pp. 741f).

37. cf. Vātsyāyana's remarks (under *NS* i. 2. 7) drawing a distinction

[The reason based on] non-apprehension which has just been mentioned proves that the universal is ubiquitous in respect of only the substratum. It has again been proved earlier [under text 134], by a reason based on identity, that the universal is ubiquitous in respect of all objects.

The two reasons thus prove theses quite opposed to each other. As such, there arises a doubt concerning the same universal : 'Is the universal ubiquitous in respect of only the substratum, because it is not apprehended in the intervals between the various individuals ?' or 'Is the universal ubiquitous in respect of all objects, because it has simultaneous contact with all its substrata situated at different places ?'

This concludes the discussion of inference for the sake of others along with the processes simulating it. / 140 /

But why does not the author give the definition of a 'corroborative instance' (*dṛṣṭānta*) ? To this, he says—

> The reason with its three essential characteristics has been explained. The cognition of the inferable object [as invariably related to the reason] follows simply thereform and [it is not necessary to admit] any separate component of the argument [i.e. the formulation], namely, a corroborative instance. That is why its definition is not separately mentioned / 141 /

between *savyabhicāra* (=*anaikāntika*) and *prakaraṇasama* (=*satpratipakṣa*). " . . . in the case of *savyabhicāra*, the same mark, being irregularly connected with both the probandum as well as the absence of the probandum, results only in the doubt concerning the presence or absence of the probandum in the subject. In the case of *prakaraṇasama*, however, the mark leaves scope for an equally strong alternative mark proving the absence of the probandum in the subject and as such the two alternative marks give rise to an unsettled enquiry concerning two contradictory possibilities, viz. the thesis and the counter-thesis . . . " (*NPh* i, p. 144, *Elucidation*). In other words,

The three characteristics of a valid reason, mentioned previously, are themselves capable of proving the entity sought to be proved. Hence [there is no necessity of admitting] a separate component of the argument in the form of a corroborative instance. For this reason, its definition is not stated separately. / 141 /

> [The corroborative instance is not admitted as a separate component] because it is implied [in the definition of the reason]. / 142 /

That is, because the implication to be conveyed by a corroborative instance is actually revealed by the purport of the reason [i.e. from understanding the nature of the reason]. / 142 /

How is it so ? To this, the author says—

> It has been said that the essence of a logical reason in general consists in its presence only in similar cases and its absence from all dissimilar cases. / 143 /

In each and every case of formulation, the reason has been defined simply as follows : it must have the characteristic of being present only in similar cases as well as the characteristic of being absent from all dissimilar cases. / 143 /

> Again, it has been specifically mentioned [in the definition of the two particular forms of the reason] based on causation and identity that the causal relation and the intimate connection [i.e. identity] with it [i.e. the reason] are to be explicitly shown. / 144 /

according to the above, *anaikāntika* produces a doubt (*saṃśaya*) and *prakaraṇasama* produces an unsettled enquiry (*jijñāsā*).

Each of the reasons again has been specifically defined. It has been said that in the case of a reason based on causation, the causal relation is to be explicitly shown. And it has also been said that in the case of a reason based on identity [the inferable property] is to be explicitly shown as being intimately connected with it [i.e. the reason]. / 144 /

> One desiring to demonstrate the above [must state in the following manner]. / 145 /

That is, one desiring to demonstrate the general as well as the specific definitions of a reason [must state in the following manner]. / 145 /

> Wherever there is smoke, there is fire and where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as for instance, in the kitchen and in a certain spot [without fire] respectively. / 146 /

When the reason is based on causation it would be necessary to explain its general as well as the specific characteristics. Thus, 'one desirous of showing them' means 'one desirous of clearly explaining them'.

In other words, one who wants to show the presence of the reason in similar cases must state 'for example, in the kitchen'. Otherwise one cannot at all speak of the presence of the reason in similar cases.

Similarly, one who wants to state the absence of the reason from dissimilar cases must say 'for example, in water'. Otherwise it would not at all be possible to speak of the absence [from dissimilar cases]. / 146 /

> Again, one must demonstrate [in the case of a reason based on identity] in the following manner : wherever there is the property

> of being a product, there is the property of non-eternality and where the property of non-eternality is absent, the property of being a product cannot exist, as for instance, in the jar and in empty space. / 147 /

This text shows how the general as well as the specific definitions of a reason based on identity are to be explained. If one does not say here 'as for instance, in the jar' one cannot at all speak of the presence of the reason in similar cases. Again, if one does not say 'as for instance, in empty space' one cannot at all speak of the absence from [dissimilar cases].

[The special characteristic of] being intimately connected with the reason can also be similarly indicated. Thus—when one says 'wherever there is the property of being a product, there must be the property of non-eternality, as for instance, in the jar'—the characteristic of being intimately connected with the reason [i.e. the identity of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*] is adequately explained. / 147 /

> In no other way can the presence in similar cases and the absence from dissimilar cases—as has earlier been stated—be shown adequately. / 148 /

If one desirous of indicating the presence in similar cases does not say 'as for instance, in the kitchen' or 'as for instance, in the jar', one cannot at all speak of the presence in similar cases.

Again, if one desirous of indicating the absence from dissimilar cases does not say 'as for instance, in empty space', one cannot at all speak of the absence from dissimilar cases. / 148 /

Thus, the impossibility [of showing a reason without offering an instance] is explained with reference to its general definition. To explain such impossibility with reference to its special definition also, the author says—

> The law underlying a reason based on causation is that it [i.e. the reason] is necessarily an effect of that [i.e. the inferable entity]. / 149 /

Tat-kārya means an effect of that. *Tat-kāryatā* means the property of being an effect of that. *Tat-kāryatā-niyama* means the law concerning such a property. Thus, *tat-kāryatā-niyama* means the law that wherever there is the cause there is the effect. / 149 /

> In the case of a reason based on identity the invariable connection is through essential nature. / 150 /

An invariable connection through essential nature means an invariable connection that subsists [between two entities] because of their very nature. In other words, it means being intimately connected with a certain entity alone [i.e. being identical with the reason]. None of these facts can ever be stated unless an instance is mentioned.

Thus, when a reason—with reference to either its general definition or its specific definition—is asserted in respect of any subject, the instance also is mentioned therewith [so that it becomes unnecessary to mention the instance as a part of the actual formulation]. / 150 /

Why is it so ? To this, the author says—

> Because its [i.e. of an instance] essential nature consists in this much only [i.e. in its being an aid to determining the nature of the reason]. / 151 /

Its essential nature consists in this much only. When the instance shows the positive concomitance between the reason

and the inferable property, it is an instance based on similarity. When the instance shows the negative concomitance—i.e. the absence of the reason following from the absence of the inferable property—it is an instance based on dissimilarity. / 151 /

> 'Fallacious instances' (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*)[38] are also rejected by the above account [of the reason]. / 152 /

It is hereby stated that an instance is said to be valid when it rightly indicates the general as well as the specific definitions of the reason and as such, when [the instance offered] does not properly indicate those two definitions, it becomes a fallacious instance. / 152 /

Some examples [of fallacious instances] are given—

> For example: sound is eternal, because it is 'without an external body' (*amūrta*) ; like an action, an atom and a jar. / 153 /

[These instances] are deficient in respect of the inferable property, the reason and both. In the formulation 'sound is eternal, because it is without an external body', 'like an action' would be an instance deficient in respect of the inferable property, 'like an atom' would be an instance deficient in respect of the reason and 'like a jar' would be an instance deficient in respect of both.[39] / 153 /

> And there are also [fallacious instances] with an uncertain inferable property and the like. / 154 /

38. For details on *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*, see *ILM* pp. 106-10.
39. Because—i) *karma* though without an external body is non-eternal ; ii) *paramāṇu* though eternal is not without an external body; and iii) *ghaṭa* is neither eternal nor without an external body.

The expression *sandigdha-sādhyadharmā*, when the compound is expounded, means an instance in which the presence of the inferable property is not known for certain and [*sandigdha-sādhyadharmādi*] means instances beginning with the above variety. / 154 /

Other examples are also given—

> This person is characterised by passion ctc, because he is a speaker, just like a man in the street. / 155 /

In the instance given here, the inferable property is uncertain. / 155 /

> This person is subject to death, because he is characterised by passion etc., just like a man in the street. / 156 /

In the instance given here, the property offered as the reason is uncertain. / 156 /

> This person is not omniscient, because he is characterised by passion etc., just like a man in the street. / 157 /

In the instance given here, both [the inferable property and the reason] are uncertain. / 157 /

> [There are also two other forms of faulty instances, called] *ananvaya* and *apradarśitā-nvaya*. / 158 /

Ananvaya means an instance in which the positive concomitance is actually absent. *Apradarśitānvaya* means an instance in which the positive concomitance, though existing, is not properly shown. / 158 /

An example of the above is given—

> As for instance, whoever is a speaker is characterised by passion etc., just like the person intended. / 159 /

There is no positive concomitance [between 'being a speaker' and 'being characterised by passion etc.']. As such, [between these two], there can also be neither a causal relation nor a relation of the pervader and the pervaded. / 159 /

> Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, just like a jar. / 160 /

The positive concomitance, though existing, is not properly shown here. / 160 /

> Similarly, [there is another form of faulty instance] called *viparītānvaya*. / 161 /

[The expression *viparītānvaya*], when the compound is expounded, means an instance in which the positive concomitance is stated in a reverse order. / 161 /

An example is given—

> Whatever is non-eternal is a product. / 162 /

Here the statement should properly be 'whatever is a product is non-eternal'. But the statement has a reverse order 'whatever is non-eternal is a product'. / 162 /

> [These are all] based on similarity. / 163 /

All these cases mentioned above have fallacious instances based on similarity. / 163 /

> [There are also such instances] based on dissimilarity. / 164 /

Now the fallacious instances based on dissimilarity will be shown. / 164 /

> Instances without the absence of the inferable property etc. are : just like an atom, just like an action and just like empty space. / 165 /

'The inferable property etc' means what begins with the inferable property [i.e. the inferable property, the reason and both]. The non-absence (*avyatireka*) of inferable property etc. means the non-absencc of these three. '[Instances] without the absence of the inferable property etc' means [instances] in which such non-absence exists.

Here 'just like an atom' is an instance without the absence of the inferable property. The inferable property is absent [in the instance], because the atoms are eternal. 'Just like an action' is an instance without the absence of the reason. The reason is absent [in the instance], because actions are without external bodies. 'Just like empty space' is an instance without both. Both [the inferable property and the reason] are absent in empty space. / 165 /

> Also, [there are the fallacious instances called] *sandigdha-sādhya-vyatireka* and the like. / 166 /

The expression *sandigdha-sādhya-vyatireka*, when the compound is expounded, means an instance in which the negative concomitance is uncertain. '*Sandigdhasādhyavyatireka* and the like' means the fallacious instances beginning with it. / 166 /

Examples are given—

> As for instance, Kapila and such other sages are neither omniscient nor trustworthy. / 167 /

Here two theses are mentioned at the same time. / 167 /

> Because the characteristic mark of one who is omniscient or one who is free from passion—viz. giving instruction concerning the 'highest proof' (*pramāṇātiśaya*)—is not present in them. / 168 /

The expression *sarvajñatva-vītarāgatve* means the properties of 'being omniscient' and 'being free from passion' taken together. *Avidyamāna-sarvajñatva-vītarāgatva-liṅgabhūta-pramāṇātiśaya-śāsana* means those who do not possess the characteristic mark of 'being omniscient' as well as 'being free from passion', viz. giving instruction concerning the highest proof. 'Being as such' means having this general property [i.e. the absence of instruction]. Thus, *avidyamāna-sarvajñatva-vītarāgatva-liṅgabhūta-pramāṇātiśaya-śāsanatvāt* means because of [this peculiarity i.e. the absence of instruction]. / 168 /

> An instance based on dissimilarity [will now be examined]. / 169 /

The expression 'will now be examined' is to be added to the above [statement of the author]. / 169 /

> [It is observed] that one who is either omniscient or free from passion has given instruction on the science of astronomy, as for instance, [the Jaina teachers] like Ṛṣabha, Vardhamāna and others. / 170 /

Here the ground [for proving omniscience or freedom from passion] is [instruction on] the science of astronomy, i.e. a thorough and critical examination of the stars.[40] Such [instruc-

40. cf. Akalaṅka's remark (*Nyāyaviniścaya* in *AGT*, p. 85, verse 414 ; notes thereon p. 168) :
grahādigatayaḥ sarvāḥ sukhaduḥkhādihetavaḥ /
yena sākṣātkṛtāstena kinna sākṣātkṛtaṃ jagat //
See also the discussion by Anantakīrti (*Bṛhatsarvajñasiddhi* in *LS* p. 176).

tion] is the characteristic mark of one who is omniscient or one who is free from passion and [the teachers like] Ṛṣabha, Vardhamāna and others have given such instruction. Hence they are ascertained to be omniscient or free from passion. / 170 /

> In these instances based on dissimilarity, the absence of the inferable properties, namely, 'being not omniscient' and 'not being free from passion', remains uncertain. / 171 /

Here [teachers like] Ṛṣabha, Vardhamāna and others have been mentioned as instances based on dissimilarity. But the absence of non-omniscience or the absence of freedom from passion in relation to them is not known for certain. / 171 /

> [There may also be an instance] in which the absence of the reason is uncertain. / 172 /

The meaning of all these has already been stated. / 172 /

An example of the above is given—

> As for instance, there is no such person—as desired by a Brahmin versed in the three Vedas—whose words can be relied upon, because he is characterised by passion. / 173 /

There are three Vedas, namely, the *Ṛgveda*, the *Yajurveda* and the *Sāmaveda*. These three are also called by the term *trayī*. One versed in the three [Vedas] is one who has fully studied the three [Vedas]. The expression *grāhya-vacana* means one whose words can be relied upon, i.e. one whose utterances are trustworthy. Thus, the implication conveyed is : the utterances—of a person as admitted by a Brahmin versed in

the three Vedas—which are absolutely trustworthy do not exist. / 173 /

> Here the instance based on dissimilarity [is as follows]. / 174 /

The meaning of the above has already been stated. [The negative concomitance here is] : persons whose words can be relied upon are not characterised by passion etc. / 174 /

> As for instance, [sages] like Gautama and others who have composed works on *dharmaśāstra*. / 175 /

The works on *dharmaśāstra* which are composed by the sages like Gautama, Vyāsa and others give instructions which are admitted to be absolutely trustworthy by the persons versed in the three Vedas. / 175 /

> The absence of the property offered as the reason—viz. being characterised by passion etc—from Gautama and others is uncertain. / 176 /

The absence of 'being characterised by passion etc' from them is not known for certain. / 176 /

> [There may be an instance] called *sandigdhobhaya-vyatireka*. / 177 /

The term *sandigdhobhaya-vyatireka*, when the compound is expounded, means an instance in which both the inferable property and the reason remain uncertain. / 177 /

An example is—

> As for instance, Kapila and others are not free from passion, because they possess desire for acquisition and avarice. / 178 /

Acquisition means the acceptance of gifts and avarice means getting attached after their acceptance. The expression *parigrahāgraha* means acquisition and avarice taken together, and [*parigrahāgraha-yoga*] means possession of these two. / 178 /

> Here an instance based on dissimilarity is : one who is free from passion has neither any desire for acquisition nor avarice, as for instance, Ṛṣabha and others. / 179 /

Ṛṣabha and others do not accept even the least amount of food [lit. curry] as a gift. They have therefore no desire for acquisition. The absence of avarice follows from this absence of the desire for acquisition. They are all free from passion. / 179 /

> The absence of the properties sought to be established and offered as the reason—i.e. the properties of 'not being free from passion' and 'the possession of desire for acquisition and avarice' respectively—from Ṛṣabha and others is uncertain. / 180 /

'Not free from passion' means 'being characterised by passion etc.' Acquisition is 'accepting mentally' and avarice is extreme attachment. All these cannot be apprehended by the senses, because they are all mental phenomena. As such, their absence from Ṛṣabha and others cannot be known for certain. / 180 /

> [There may also be an instance] called *avyatireka*. / 181 /

The term *avyatireka*, when the compound is expounded,

means an instance in which the negative concomitance is absent. / 181 /

> As for instance, [a certain person] is not free from passion, because he is a speaker. / 182 /

The meaning of all these has already been stated. / 182 /

> Whatever is without passion cannot be a a speaker, as for instance, a piece of stone. / 183 /

This is an instance based on dissimilarity. / 183 /

> Although both the properties [of being characterised by passion and being a speaker] are absent from a piece of stone, the negative concomitance is not proved by any such generalisation as 'all persons who are free from passion are not speakers'. Therefore, it would be an instance in which the negative concomitance is absent. / 184 /

It is true that a piece of stone, being something unconscious, can be characterised by neither the property of 'having passion etc.' nor the property of 'being a speaker'. Still, no invariable connection in the form 'whoever is free from passion is not a speaker' is established. The negation of 'having passion' does not lead to the negation of 'being a speaker', because there is no necessary connection between the properties of having passion and being a speaker. Thus, in fact, negative concomitance is absent here. / 184 /

> [There may also be an instance] in which the negative concomitance is not properly shown. / 185 /

That is, an instance in which the negative concomitance though existing is not actually spoken of. / 185 /

An illustration is given—

> An instance based on dissimilarity would be : sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, just like empty space. / 186 /

When, to illustrate an instance based on dissimilarity, one says 'sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, just like empty space,' it would be an instance where the negative concomitance though possible is not expressed. Because the negative concomitance can clearly be shown if one also says 'whatever entity is eternal is not a product', and an instance alone is not sufficient. / 186 /

> [There may be a further instance called] *viparīta-vyatireka.* / 187 /

The term *viparīta-vyatireka*, when the compound is expounded, means an instance in which the negative concomitance is stated in a reverse order. / 187 /

An illustration is given—

> As for instance, whatever is not a product, is eternal. / 188 /

Here the correct form of the statement is 'whatever is eternal, is not a product'. But it is mentioned in a reverse order. / 188 /

> These fallacious instances cannot show with certainty the general characteristic of a reason, namely, its presence only in similar cases and its absence in all dissimilar cases. Nor can the specific characteristics [of a reason be shown with certainty by them]. / 189 /

These fallacious instances can show neither the general characteristics nor the specific characteristics of a reason, and as such, they are known as fallacious instances, i.e. pseudo-instances which only appear as instances [but are not actually so]. / 189 /

> Therefore, it is to be understood by implication that these [pseudo-instances] are to be rejected. / 190 /

Since these can show neither of [the general and the specific] characteristics of a reason, it follows from implication, that they are not to be accepted.

This concludes the discussion of right knowledge and those related to it. / 190 /

Now, to state the conditions conducive to [right knowledge], the author says—

> Vitiating (*dūṣaṇā*) means indicating the fallacy of the deficient (*nyūnatā*)[41] and the like [in the arguments of the opponent]. / 191 /

"The fallacy of the deficient and the like" means fallacies beginning with that of the deficient. "Indicating the fallacy of the deficient and the like" means pointing them out clearly. All such indications are to be known as vitiating conditions. / 191 /

> In other words, vitiation means exposing the fallacies of a reason—like those of the deficient and others—which have already been spoken of. / 192 /

The expression 'and others' includes the fallacies of the unproved, the contradictory and the irregular. The word *ukti* ['indication' in text 191] means what speaks of something,

41. Gautama (*NS* v. 2. 12) mentions *nyūna* as a special form of *nigraha-sthāna* and defines it as the statement (of a *parārthānumāna*) in which one of the inference-components (*avayava*) has been left out.

i.e. a statement in words. Thus, vitiation means a statement in words which brings out the fallacies [contained in the arguments of the opponent]. / 192 /

Why is it so ? To this, the author says—

> Because it negates the establishment of the thesis intended by the opponent. / 193 /

It [i.e. a statement of fallacies] is called a vitiating factor, for such a statement disproves the thesis sought to be established by the opponent. These [i e. the cases of vitiation] are cases in which the fallacy pointed out really exists. / 193 /

> Rejoinders (*jāti*) are cases of reply which only simulate the cases of vitiation. [That is, they do not point to real fallacies.] /194/

Rejoinders are to be known as only cases of false vitiation. / 194 /

What is the nature of these rejoinders ? To this, the author says—

> Rejoinders are [futile replies] in which a fallacy, though not present, is invented. / 195 /

'Not present' (*abhūta*) means what does not exist. 'A fallacy though not present' (*abhūta-doṣa*) means a fallacy which does not exist. 'Invention of a fallacy which is not present' (*abhūta-doṣodbhāvana*) means wrongly discovering such fallacies. That is, by 'rejoinder' is to be understood a statement which wrongly refers to the fallacies of a reason, even when they are actually absent.[42]

How is it that in the context of discussing the nature of right knowledge, the vitiating factors and the futile rejoinders are also explained ? The answer is as follows. The discussion

42. Thus *dūṣaṇā* is an indication of a fallacy which is real and *jāti* is an indication of a fallacy which is only invented.

of right knowledge along with the conditions conducive to it becomes complete only when the vitiating factors as well as the rejoinders have been explained. When it is said, 'These are the vitiating factors and one must be careful in avoiding them [in one's own argument]' or 'These are only futile rejoinders and one need not be apprehensive of them [if they are employed by the opponent]', it leads to nothing but the comprehension of right knowledge.[43] Therefore, the objection mentioned above is not sustained. / 195 /

By explaining the *Nyāyabindu* word for word, I have to-day acquired a great amount of merit (*puṇya*). By virtue of it, let all the living beings have immortality and let their series of worldly existences come to an end.

Following the right path and in accordance with the order of the king, this brief commentary on the *Nyāyabindu*—know as *vistara*—has been composed by Vinītadeva for the benefit of the pupils.

Here ends the third chapter of the elucidatory comments on the *Nyāyabindu*, composed for the benefit of the pupils.

In this work [called] *Elucidatory Comments* the discussion is completed in one thousand and thirty *śloka*-s.[44]

Here ends the *Nyāyabindu-vistara-ṭīkā* composed by *ācārya* Vinītadeva for the benefit of the pupils.

Colophon of the Tibetan version

The translation and the answering of the various objections raised have been made by the Indian *paṇḍita* Jinamitra and the great revisor of Sanskrit texts, venerable Ye-śes-sde (Jñānasena), along with others.

43. cf. Vātsyāyana's remark (under *NS* i. 1. 1, p. 63) explaining the utility of *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* and also that of Gautama (*NS* iv. 2. 50) indicating the utility of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*.

44. This word occurs in Tibetan transliteration, evidently not in the sense of a stanza in *anuṣṭubh*. Stcherbatsky (*BL* ii, p. 253) takes it to mean "16 syllables", others (*NBT* p. 134, n 2) as "a group of 32 letters" (*dvātriṃśad-akṣarāṇi*).

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

1. *Refutation of the validity of determinate perception*

According to Nyāya and other systems, both the forms of perception—determinate and indeterminate—are equally valid. The Buddhists however strongly deny the validity of the former and argue that the latter alone should be regarded as true perception.

The objection against the validity of determinate perception rests on the contention that such knowledge is not really derived through the senses. Some of the arguments for this may be noted as follows.

First, determinate perception cannot represent a proper sense-cognition, because it contains an image (*pratibhāsa*) which can be conveyed through 'verbal expression' (*abhilāpa*). But a piece of cognition originating through the function of a sense-organ and an object does not have the power of uniting the image of the object to a verbal expression. The verbal expressions (i.e. words) are not contained in the objects. Nor are they identical with the objects themselves. If it were so, the behaviour of a 'person who is quite ignorant of the implications of the verbal expressions' (*avyutpanna*) would be just the same as that of a 'person who actually understands them' (*vyutpanna*), for one would be able to learn the verbal expressions simply by looking at the objects. It cannot also be maintained that the verbal expressions, though without any real connection with the objects, are only the properties of sensation (*saṃvedana*), for they are always applied to signify the objects alone and nothing else. It is to be concluded therefore that a piece of cognition produced by an object reveals that object alone and it can never point to the corresponding verbal expression as well. An object, for instance, may be endowed with both colour (*rūpa*) and taste (*rasa*). But the visual perception of its colour can never reveal its taste also. As such, a real perception would reveal merely the object itself and none of its imaginary associations.

It may be argued against the above that there is an invariable relation between the object and its verbal expression through an 'arbitrary convention' (*saṃketa*). When an object is perceived the verbal expression too is invariably remembered and hence the object is apprehended as associated with its verbal expression. This claim however is untenable. An arbitrary convention is established in respect of the universal alone which is never really apprehended by the sense and it is never established in respect of the unique particular which alone is really apprehended by the sense. Hence what is perceived is not what is united with a verbal expression, and what is united with a verbal expression is not what is perceived.

Secondly, if it were possible to express verbally what is exactly perceived, one would have known the heat of fire, as one knows it through perception, simply from the words 'fire is hot'.

Thirdly, a determinate perception would be a form of 'qualificative cognition' (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) in which the object (i.e. the unique particular) would be revealed as qualified by an attribute (i.e. the universal). In other words, the object would be the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and the universal would be the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). But even if it is conceded that both the unique particular and the universal are equally real and are also equally apprehended by the sense at the same moment, it does not necessarily follow that a relation of the qualifier and the qualificand would subsist between these two. As for instance, a relation of the qualifier and the qualificand is never understood in the case of a pair of fingers which are apprehended in the same perception.

Fourthly, a qualificative cognition can be produced only after one has properly understood the qualifier, the qualificand, the relation between the two and the 'normal order of things' (*laukika-sthiti*). But it is simply impossible for the sense to perform all such functions merely through its contact with the object.

Lastly, perception is defined (as in the Nyāya view) as knowledge resulting from sense-object contact. But there is neither any positive concomitance (*anvaya*) nor any negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) between such a contact and construction. Construction is possible even when there is no sense-object con act, and construction would not be possible in spite of the presence of sense-object contact if the term referring to the object is not remembered. Besides, even those who accept the validity of determinate perception admit that such perception is not produced at the very first moment of the sense-object contact. But had the sense-object contact been really the cause of construction too, it would have produced the element of construction at the very first moment, and not after the term referring to the object has been remembered. If the contact does not possess the power to produce it at the initial moment, how does it succeed in producing the same at a later moment ? If however it is admitted that in the case of determinate perception the sense-cognition stands in need of not only a sense-object contact but also a coalescing with the recollected verbal expression, determinate perception itself would be an impossibility, because the functioning of the sense-object contact would then be interrupted by this very act of the subsequent recollection of the verbal expression.

It is to be concluded therefore that indeterminate perception alone is produced by the sense and as such, it alone represents true perception. (cf. *NM* i, pp. 86f and *NVTT* pp. 115ff.).

2. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view on the perception of a yogin*

The doctrine of the extraordinary cognising ability of a *yogin* attained through various spiritual exercises found wide acceptance even among the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

Praśastapāda mentions such perception separately from those of an ordinary person and describes it as follows. Through the constant practice of the different 'spiritual disciplines' (*yoga*) [like *yama, niyama, āsana. prāṇāyāma* etc], the *yogin*-s acquire in themselves a special faculty which acts as an aid to the mind. They can thus have a direct and uncontradicted knowledge of the nature of such things as their own selves, the selves of others, space, time, atoms and the like, which are not accessible to the senses of an ordinary person.

He divides the *yogin*-s into two classes : (i) *yukta* or one who has the extraordinary perceptions only during one's state of absorption, and (*ii*) *viyukta* or one who has the direct experiences of all objects—perceptible and imperceptible—even when one is out of the state of absorption.

Jayanta and Śrīdhara have discussed the nature of such perception in great details and advanced certain independent arguments for its establishment. Some of these may be described as follows.

It is observed that the power of vision as belonging to the different living beings has a varying degree. Human eyes can see objects only when the objects lie at a short distance and when there is sufficient light. Animals like the cat etc, again, can see quite clearly even in deep darkness. There are also birds which—while flying high up in the sky—can rightly mark the objects on the earth below. In this way, we may conceive of higher and higher degrees of the power of vision. And the beings in whom the highest degree of the power of vision resides are known as the *yogin*-s. The highest degree of the power of vision consists in their ability to apprehend such objects as are very minute, obstructed, lying at vast distance, have long ceased to exist, have not yet come into being and the like.

An objection may be raised here. The excellence of the power of any sense-organ must be conceived of as relating to its own specific object. As for instance, however powerful the visual organ of any being may be, it can never be admitted as producing the cognition of smell which is not an object appropriate for it. Similarly, objects which are too minute or have not yet come into being are not the appropriate ones for the visual organ. As such, how can it be accepted that the visual organ of the *yogin*-s is capable of apprehending all these ? Let then the Naiyāyikas also admit in a simpler way that a single sense-organ of the *yogin*-s is powerful enough to apprehend all kinds of objects like colour, taste, smell etc. The answer

to this charge however is not difficult. The objects which are too minute or have not yet come into being may not be the appropriate ones for the visual organ of an ordinary person, but there is no objection in their being quite so for the extraordinarily powerful visual organ of the *yogin*-s. The absurdity of a single sense-organ powerful enough to apprehend all kinds of objects also does not arise inasmuch as each sense-organ of the *yogin*-s would acquire supernormal power in relation to its own object only, e.g. the olfactory sense-organ when extraordinarily powerful would apprehend only such smell as is not amenable to the one of an ordinary person.

Moreover, the mind is a very powerful sense-organ and it can be related to all sorts of objects, there is nothing which cannot be made an object of mental perception. If one can control the mind in the proper way and absorb oneself in deep meditation with the mind unswerving, one can have a clear and direct cognition of objects which are ordinarily not perceptible. As it is often observed, even ordinary persons who are completely absorbed in love or in deep sorrow or are in a state of dream sometimes perceive as real objects which are not actually present there. It is true that the knowledge of such persons is false, while that of the *yogin* is admitted to be valid. But still, it is cited as an instance only to show that distinct knowledge of what is actually not there is even possible—the point of similarity between the two being simply their distinctness. The knowledge of such persons is considered as false. because it is subsequently contradicted and the knowledge of the *yogin*-s is considered as valid, because it is never contradicted.

It has been argued that through the repeated performance of the various spiritual disciplines one can acquire the extraordinary power of cognising all kinds of objects. Such a contention however does not seem convincing, for through the repeated performance of an act one cannot attain success to an unlimited degree. A person who practises long jump everyday may, day by day, be able to cover a longer and longer distance. But there is a limit somewhere to the increase of his capacity and he is never observed to attain the power of traversing, say for instance, a distance of one mile. Similarly, the *yogin*-s also cannot reach an uncertain point of excellence.

This objection is answered as follows. The capacity for jumping is a property of the material body and the elements constituting the body cannot lead to a stage of extraordinary excellence, because there are causes in the form of disease, exhaustion and the like to confine their capacity within limits. But in the case of knowledge, there is no such adverse condition. Secondly, a particular act can lead to a higher degree of excellence only when it produces some property and the substratum in which the property produced resides is something without any change. The act of jumping, though repeated, does not produce any property the accumulation of which may be said to be the cause of a higher degree of excellence.

Besides, the body which would be the substratum of such a property, if any, is constantly changing. That is why, when one repeats the act of jumping at a particular period, one's capacity actually declines through exhaustion. But knowledge, though itself short-lived, leaves impressions on the eternal self which get accumulated and gradually lead to higher and higher degrees of excellences, as for instance, the colour of gold becomes brighter and brighter—and all its impurities melt away—when it is again and again treated with acids etc.

A further objection against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis may be raised through an inference: the *yogin*-s cannot perceive objects 'beyond the senses' (*atīndriya*), because they are living beings, just like ourselves. The inference however cannot be logically defended. What is exactly the subject (*pakṣa*) of this inference ? If the opponent accepts for its subject persons in general, there would be a fallacy of 'proving what is already proved' (*siddha-sādhana*) inasmuch as even the Naiyāyikas do not claim such extraordinary power for each and every person. If again, the subject is intended to be a particular type of individuals (i.e. the *yogin*-s) it would be a fallacy of 'having an unproved substratum' (*pakṣāsiddhi*) inasmuch as the opponent does not believe in the existence of such individuals. (cf. *PBh* pp. 464-5 and *NK* thereon ; *NM* i, pp. 95ff).

3. *Refutation of the Nyāya view on the essential characteristics of a valid mark.*

As against the three essential characteristics of a valid mark admitted by the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas consider them to be five—which corresponds to their fivefold classification of the pseudo-reasons. The additional two characteristics accepted in the Nyāya view are 'absence of contradiction with *pramāṇa*' (*abādhitatva*) and 'having no counter-reason' (*asatpratipakṣitatva*). Some of the arguments advanced by the Buddhists who strongly criticise the Nyāya view may briefly be noted here.

'Absence of contradiction' cannot be an essential characteristic of a valid mark, because 'contradiction' (*bādha*) and 'invariable concomitance' (*avinābhāva*) are mutually opposed. Invariable concomitance implies that the reason is necessarily accompanied by the inferable property. If therefore the reason having invariable concomitance is present in the subject, the inferable property too must be present there and as such, its absence there cannot be ascertained by any *pramāṇa*. It would be simply an absurd position—*pramāṇa* trying to expell the inferable property from the subject and *avinābhāva* compelling it to remain in the subject.

In answer, the opponent may say that it is not maintained that the reason coexists with the inferable property even in the subject. The invariable concomitance is really ascertained in the case of objects other than the subject. There would thus be no scope for the above objection, because 'contradiction' and 'invariable concomitance' would then relate to different objects—the former to the subject (*pakṣa*) and the latter to the objects like the corroborative instance etc.

Such a contention however seems to be absurd. If one tries to prove a property by offering a reason which is proved to have invariable concomitance with it only in the case of objects other than the subject, it would be like expecting a baby from a woman married to an impotent person. How can a reason—the invariable concomitance of which is unproved in respect of the subject—prove the existence of the inferable property in the same? One may, for instance, ascertain an invariable concomitance between water-ness (*ambhastva=hetu*) and salinity (*lavaṇatva=sādhya*) in the case of sea-water. But even then, one cannot offer water-ness as a ground for inferring salinity also in 'other cases of water' (=*pakṣa*) where salinity does not exist.

It may be claimed by the opponent that the above example actually supports his own contention, namely, that a reason is 'capable of proving an inferable property' (*gamaka*) only when the presence of such a property in the subject is not negated by any *pramāṇa*. Thus, in the above example, the reason 'water-ness' cannot prove 'salinity' in water other than that of the sea, for salinity there is negated by perception (i.e. gustatory sensation).

However, such a claim too cannot be logically defended. What exactly is the implication of the statement that a reason proves an inferable property only when there is no contradiction with *pramāṇa*? If it means that there is an invariable relation between 'absence of contradiction' and 'establishment of the inferable property' (i.e. wherever there is 'absence of contradiction' there is 'establishment of the inferable property'), the statement of the reason would be quite unnecessary, for in that case the basic ground for the establishment of the inferable property would be 'absence of contradiction' and not the reason. If, again, no invariable relation between the two is admitted, the opponent would have to admit that there may be cases where the reason would establish the inferable property in spite of the presence of contradiction. But in that case 'absence of contradiction' cannot be an essential characteristic of a valid mark.

The opponent may try to show the usefulness of stating the reason by maintaining that 'absence of contradiction' is to be taken in the sense of 'non-apprehension of contradiction'. Thus, a person in spite of there being a contradiction may sometimes remain unaware of it and since 'non-apprehension of contradiction' does not lead to the 'establishment

of the inferable property', he would be justified in offering the reason for that purpose.

It may however be pointed out that, even then, absence of contradiction cannot be an essential characteristic of a valid mark. The non-apprehension does not establish its absence, but only leads to a doubt regarding its possibility. As such, the reason offered would not be a valid reason at all, for one of its essential characteristics (as admitted by the opponent)—namely, absence of contradiction—remains unproved. A reason can never be ascertained to be valid or capable of proving the inferable property unless the presence of all the essential characteristics in it is proved.

Besides, the characteristic of 'absence of contradiction' may be shown as covered by the characteristic of 'absence in a dissimilar case'. 'Contradiction with *pramāṇa*' means that the absence of the inferable property in the subject is already established by one of the *pramāṇa*-s. Thus, the subject there is actually turned into a dissimilar case. As such, the reason offered becomes a pseudo-reason because of its presence in a dissimilar case.

As to the second additional characteristic—namely, having no counter-reason—the Buddhists argue that if the first reason has a real invariable relation with the inferable property, its presence in the subject would necessarily lead to the presence of the inferable property too, and no other reason would be able to invalidate it by proving the absence of the inferable property in the same locus. If, on the other hand, the first reason has no real invariable relation with the property to be inferred, it would not be able to prove the inferable property irrespective of whether a counter-reason exists or not.

It follows therefore that there are only three essential characteristics of a valid mark as are admitted by the Buddhists.

(cf. *HB* pp. 68f and *HBT* thereon ; *NM* i, pp. 101f, *NK* pp. 482ff.).